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Foreword

*Klaus Schütz **

“I warmly welcome this second publication of the Jerusalem-Berlin Forum (JBF) and celebrate its achievement as a unique joint Palestinian, Israeli and German initiative. The JBF was initially founded in 2001, and within two years it published its first book; a detailed overview on the history of divided cities in both Jerusalem and in Berlin. The publication was as original as it was unconventional. It explored the history of the two cities from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, and from both East and West German perspectives. This new publication goes one decisive step further. This publication invites the reader not only to face the rifts and fault lines within the cities, but it encourages the reader to engage in a creative thinking about the dynamic day-to-day processes which shape the cities in spite—and in many cases because—of such divisions. This book invites a discussion and debate on the “management of transition”, paving the way for a future discourse, which is built upon shared ideas and shared visions.

This book explores new territories. With regards to the city of Jerusalem, this book goes beyond the conventional, challenging one of the main myths of the extended Israeli-Palestinian *impasse*. This book demonstrates that the issue of Jerusalem is neither too complicated nor too sensitive to be solved. This is not to say that it paints over the complexities of the “Jerusalem Issue”, or that it ignores the often diverging interests and perceptions between its two peoples. On the contrary, this publication shows that *despite* such manifold difficulties, a meaningful, co-operative and peaceful dialogue between the Palestinian and the Israeli side can be reached. Moreover, this is not a future prediction, but an

* Dr. Klaus Schütz is the former Governing Mayor of Berlin.

assertion based upon a real dialogue which is taking place on the ground in and around Jerusalem today. If there is one lesson which can be drawn from the experience of Berlin, it is that below the surface of a seemingly static and rigid situation simmers the potential for rapid transformation.

Days before the 9 November 1989, few would have predicted that the Berlin Wall would fall. As this book shows, even fifteen years after unification, differences between (*and differences within*) the formerly divided parts of Berlin continue to exist. The management of its transition is a continuing process; it is imperative that both sides continue to learn from one another and strive to develop their sensitivity towards the other. Moreover, they must do so in respect of their shared and divided histories. Only then can the future of all people's within the one unified city be equally respected and justly celebrated. As this process continues, so does the research of the JBF.

The JBF is an on-going dialogue, which holds as its basic foundation, a commitment and willingness of all parties involved to learn from and to understand the other. The JBF embodies a practical and symbolic message of hope. This message is vital to building a dynamic and sustainable unified future for the city of Jerusalem; for its multiple cultures, religions and peoples.”

Berlin, April 2005

Preface

Michèle Auga and Hermann Bünz

As one of the legacies of Friedrich Ebert, a Social Democrat who had his own painful experience in political confrontation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung tries to serve furthering international understanding and cooperation. It is this spirit that lies behind the history of the Jerusalem-Berlin-Forum. When in October 2001, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the IPCC and the JIIS brought together experts and local decision-makers from Berlin, with a team of Palestinian and Israeli urban planners from Jerusalem, the second Intifada was heading into its second year. Many observers doubted that there could be any positive outcome under such nerve breaking circumstances. Nevertheless, on both sides of the Jerusalem team, the Israeli and the Palestinian side, there was a consensus that work must go on and that there is an urgent need to talk about Jerusalem's future today.

Learning from the sad experience of Berlin, the idea behind the workshop was that East and West Germans can indeed assist the Jerusalem team in analysing mechanisms of integration and separation. The question was how such mechanisms can be employed to shape Jerusalem's urban environment, and bring about a positive transformation from a city of conflict to one of peace? The Jerusalem-Berlin-Forum (JBF) was established and ever since ten Palestinians, ten Israelis and ten Germans (including decision makers, members of the local parliament and a former mayor of Berlin) have worked jointly on identifying mechanisms and techniques that will help with this process of transformation. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is convinced that through this work we can not only break the cycle of violence and overcome superficial images of 'the other', but also prevent a situation similar to November 1989; When the Berlin wall came down, German unification was suddenly and unexpected on the agenda, but nobody - including government agencies - had a plan of how to solve the daily problems

of an urban centre, which had to be integrated from day one.

The political act of unification was only one side of the story; the merger of two segments of a nation, which had been separated into two states, had been based upon two different ideologies. The entire infrastructure, such as streets, highways and telephone lines had to be modernized. After the decision was taken to move Germany's state administration to Berlin, (a move that took almost ten years to accomplish) East Berlin turned into the continent's biggest construction site for more than a decade.

For many Jerusalemites one of the most astonishing outcomes of the JBF meetings was the fact that the German colleagues (from East and West Berlin) often did not agree amongst themselves on many factors of their common history. These different perceptions of the process of unification led to the desire to analyse the experience of unification in Berlin. If it was not possible to agree on a joint narrative of the past, maybe it would be possible to consent on a narrative of the future?

Separation and unification, integration and fragmentation; these are themes that the cities of Jerusalem and Berlin have in common. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung supports any initiative between Israelis and Palestinians that tries to look for a joint narrative for the future regardless of Separation Walls and legitimate rights for statehood. Jerusalem is one of the main obstacles on the way to peace. But at least within the JBF, both sides have managed to agree on a common vision: Jerusalem would be the capital of two states, which would not be divided by borders or by walls. The team members do not want to leave the topic for a later day. To them the current developments in the city can not be challenged in any final negotiation because - as Seneca put it - "while we are postponing, life speeds by". The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is looking forward to the results of the JBF work and is ready to assist in the development of the Forum. We hope that at a later stage the work can serve the respective decision makers, helping them to draw conclusions to ensure that Jerusalem becomes a healthy, peaceful and prosperous city.

Introduction

Shlomo Hasson, Rami Nasrallah,
Stephan Stetter and Michèle Auga

Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and focal issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its global importance means that reaching peace in the region depends on attaining peace in Jerusalem. Jerusalem will either be the bedrock to a secured and sustainable peace in the Middle East—a city that represents a model for peaceful coexistence between both national groups—or it will be the source of a continuous eruption of clashes, violence and wars. In the latter case this will bring negative consequences for both Palestinian-Israeli relations in particular and more generally, relations between the Arab Islamic world and Jewish Israeli society.

The Second Intifada confirms the centrality of Jerusalem for both the peace process and regional stability. Ultimately, stable and sustainable peace will not be reached without resolving the disputed issue of Jerusalem.

In order to resolve the Jerusalem issue, it is necessary to embark upon an in-depth exploration of various aspects of the city's reality and to build a detailed knowledge of its dynamics. Jerusalem is the only city that Palestinians and Israelis share. Today, it is realized that the city cannot be physically re-divided, as it was between 1948 and 1967. The terror attacks in Jerusalem, and the current trend of building Walls of separation around and within the city, are a real threat to Jerusalem as a positive model for Palestinian-Israeli coexistence, and as a 'City of Peace'.

A desire to learn from other divided cities

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung brought together a group of Palestinian, Israeli and German experts representing the two cities. 'Team Jerusalem' consists of

Palestinian and Israeli planners, social scientists and practitioners. 'Team Berlin' includes planners, practitioners and local decision-makers from the formerly divided city of Berlin. Both teams met for the first time in Berlin in October 2001, where they explored the city's mechanisms of integration and separation and their subsequent impact on the city's ability to function. They identified the obstacles and barriers that existed in the process of unification and integration in the city of Berlin.

In the first workshop, Team Jerusalem presented the Jerusalem case, focusing on the dynamics of the conflict at both the micro-city and the macro-state level. The two-way exchange of experiences between the divided and formerly divided cities was viewed as essential for future internal dialogue. The two teams felt that rather than focusing on a static comparative study, it was more productive to examine the dynamic processes and changes within the cities, thereby taking into consideration the very different social, cultural and political histories of Berlin and Jerusalem.

The workshop in Berlin resulted in the creation of a trilateral framework of cooperation; the 'Jerusalem-Berlin-Forum (JBF).' This framework has also been the context for a realistic dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis by focusing on functional ability and transition. Particular attention has been paid to practical issues including ways to promote peace, viability and sustainability in Jerusalem, the efficiency of the urban fabric to work for peace and the reality of both sides coexisting in peace and prosperity.

In July 2002, a second JBF workshop was held in Jerusalem, where the Berliners experienced Jerusalem's reality of the conflict. The two groups discussed the themes central to the planning of divided cities. These were investigated via a series of working papers, which focused on the past, and the present state of affairs. The edited collection of the papers was the first visible fruit of the JBF-cooperation, and was published under the title, *Divided Cities in Transition I*.

Although Team Jerusalem was not always in internal agreement, they provided constructive analysis, demonstrating how complex factors evolved within the conflict-ridden divided city of Jerusalem. Similarly, Team Berlin drew upon experiences of the extended and continuous process of unification in the Ger-

man capital.

In August 2003, a third JBF workshop was held in Berlin. The German experience of the division and reunification was examined in greater detail, with the aim of extracting lessons and predictions for the future of Jerusalem. The two teams agreed upon guidelines for a vision of Jerusalem, based on the concept of an open and viable undivided city, serving as the capital of two states.

In August 2004, a fourth workshop was again held in Jerusalem. Its aim was to identify barriers to transition, transition motives and management, and potential models of transition for Jerusalem. *Divided Cities in Transition II* is a culmination of this research.

Volume II

The aim of this second volume was to systematically investigate developments in Jerusalem and Berlin in order to provide a potential framework for Jerusalem's transformation from a city of conflict to one of peace. The aim was to build models that dealt more effectively with the sources of conflict and tension. While the first volume concentrated upon the historic causes of the conflict, *Divided Cities in Transition II* examines Jerusalem's current transformation as well as looking towards the future. The previous volume featured various contributions by Team Berlin and focused on Berlin's development before, during, and after unification in 1990. The contributions were substantial but they were also diverse.. The JBF dialogue motivated the Berliners to transgress from descriptive methods of assessing the process of transitional management to a new analytical re-evaluation. Team Berlin's latest contributions builds upon their previous work, but additionally, the team evaluates the past experiences of Berlin's unification.

The dialogue between and within the Jerusalem and Berlin teams encouraged the JBF to develop their discourse based on the future issues affecting the two cities. The result has not only been the proposition of models for peaceful transformation in Jerusalem, but it has prompted the teams to question for the

first time, “What went wrong with the unification, and what lessons we can learn from the past experience?” This exercise of re-assessing the unification and the integration process has generated fresh perspective for both Jerusalem and Berlin.

The Palestinian articles

Rassem Khamaisi Rassem

In his paper, Rassem discussed the similarity and diversity between Jerusalem and Berlin. The paper offers various models of urban management and administration for the Jerusalem metropolitan area. In addition, Rassem highlights the fact that settling the geo-political conflict is a condition to erect efficient urban management structures for the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

Omar Yousef

In his paper, Omar draws sketches of mutual coexistence; towards a City of Equals and a Capital of Two states. He plans a future Jerusalem as a ‘City of Peace’ that incorporates the aspiration of both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. He proposed five priority projects in developing East Jerusalem as an equal partner and as an urban intervention act to promote the concept of a ‘City of Equals’.

Sameer Hazboun

Sameer’s paper maps the current economic situation in Jerusalem and the impact of the Israeli policies on the different economic sectors. He presents different scenarios and future economic models. Sameer’s analysis of the role of different sectors on the city’s economy, anticipates that the economic perspective for Jerusalem should be based on developing tourism in relation with the services sector and using modern information technology.

Rami Nasrallah

Rami’s paper reviews the history of urban transformation and the institu-

tional development in Jerusalem since the end of the Ottoman rule. He presents a set of assumptions for the future peace transformation in Jerusalem and suggests a model of political transformation which considers both political and urban functions.

Muhammad Kaimari

Kaimari's paper maps the policies undertaken by different Israeli ministries, the rationality behind such policies, their geo-social impacts and their results on the social life in the city. Conclusions and recommendations for the city development are drawn.

The Israeli articles

Israel Kimhi

Kimhi traces the demographic growth of the Jerusalem metropolitan region and the need for functional cooperation within and across national borders. Hence, Kimhi suggests different possible models for the metropolitan management of Jerusalem and its environs. One model could be Israeli mono-nuclei metropolitan region, and another could be an Israeli-Palestinian multi-nuclei region.

Maya Choshen

Choshen argues that demography plays a central role in the current conflict over Jerusalem between Israelis and Palestinians. She argues that in this conflict the Jewish population feels under existential threat due to their diminishing share in the city. Future forecasts predict further decline of the Jewish population in Jerusalem. Based on this analysis Choshen advances two radically different scenarios: the 'Black Nightmare' and the 'Golden Dream'. The Black Nightmare anticipates further decline and confrontation between the two communities, whereas the Golden Dream scenario anticipates growth and conciliation.

Michael Turner

In his paper Turner reviews the introduction of the UNESCO World Herit-

age Convention, and its application to the Old City of Jerusalem. Turner suggests extending the convention from the Old City to its environs to include the surrounding valleys, the necropolis and some other biblical landscapes surrounding the city. In this way Turner wishes to introduce a new planning code for Jerusalem that would be respected by citizens of the two communities. Around the conservation of Jerusalem and its environs Turner wishes to see the emergence of an active society, a new pro-Jerusalem society that transcends national affiliation.

Shlomo Hasson

Hasson explores the possible future geopolitical and political changes in Jerusalem. In the geopolitical sphere, Hasson suggests six major scenarios: united capital under Israeli sovereignty, informally divided capital, two separate and permeable capitals, two separate and impermeable capitals, shared capitals and united capital under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian control. In the political sphere, Hasson reviews the tension between the ethnocratic structures that elevates one ethnic group over the other, and democratic rule that regards all communities as equal. The intersection between the geopolitical and political dimensions leads to four major scenarios: bi-national and democratic capital, ethnocratic and conflict ridden capital, two marginal and undemocratic capitals, and two sustainable and democratic capitals.

Ruth Lapidoth

Lapidoth reviews the main issues associated with the conflict over Jerusalem: the question of sovereignty, the holy places, the Old City, the Temple Mount, municipal administration, security arrangements, planning and conservation and international involvement. She then moves to explore how the Geneva Initiative (2003) has related to these issues. Lapidoth praises the Geneva Initiatives for reaching a compromise on issues, which until recently were considered irresolvable. Nevertheless, Lapidoth argues that certain issues, such as economic matters, were not dealt with. Meanwhile, other issues such as the border regimes and security arrangements, were left vague.

The new perspectives proffered by the JBF dominate both of the contributions by Team Berlin, and they reflect three new dimensions; the individual, the dialogical, and the analytical.

In the first volume, each individual member of Team Berlin contributed separate articles. Alternatively, in this volume Team Berlin has produced two collective articles. The aim was for this method to enable the generation of individual perspectives to under a shared conceptual umbrella. However, this joint effort does not reflect a unified opinion within Team Berlin. In fact, this has not even been attempted. Instead, Team Berlin's collective contributions incorporate both the shared and the diverse perspectives of its members with one voice. In other words, Team Berlin has experienced the management of transition. This is a transition which did not aim to overcome all differences but rather generate a process allowing all parties to learn to cooperate, sharing, enjoying and learning from the richness of their diversity and differences.

Admittedly, the years since the publication of the first volume have been a challenging and an interesting experience for each member of Team Berlin. They have learned more about Berlin, they have learned to listen and to respect the perspectives of the other members of the team; be they from West or East, man or woman, or younger or senior. They have learned that rather than searching for a joint perspective, it is imperative to allow a space for each voice to be heard. Ultimately, this achievement was the ambitious objective of Team Berlin; that their articles are joint contributions and not a single perspective.

This success relates closely to the second dimension of a real and coherent dialogue. Team Berlin would not have been able to embark on this joint quest of exploring the management of transition in Berlin without the continuous dialogue with the team from Jerusalem. Consequently, the first article was initially a set of answers to questions posed to individual members of Team Berlin by Team Jerusalem. The second article developed from a workshop held by Team Berlin in 2004, which aimed at reassessing the unification process. The workshop discussed alternatives to the forms of management transition in existence since 1990. The realization that a re-evaluation of the management of transition would be a productive exercise was partly instigated from the cross dialogue

with the Jerusalem Team. This dialogue forced a reassessment of the history of Berlin, and triggered a new awareness that a re-examination of the past is not only a valuable intellectual exercise but also one which reconfigures the present.

Ultimately, the two new contributions by Team Berlin offer analytical perspectives, which complement the first volume. Rather than focusing upon providing a description of different political, cultural, social, infrastructural and economic developments in Berlin before, during, and after 1990, the two articles on Berlin in this volume have a more ambitious objective. By integrating the shared (but diverse) perspectives of individual members of Team Berlin into two overarching articles, the underlying themes are integrated into a single analytical framework without erasing individual traces. It is, of course, up to the reader to decide whether they have succeeded in this task. However, Team Berlin is confident that their contributions in *Divided Cities in Transition II* will prompt new questions as well as instigate a reassessment of the processes of the management of transition in Berlin. The dialogue supporting the contributions has been rich and stimulating. The JBF has been a valuable experience for all members of Team Berlin. It is hoped that the insights gathered in this process are equally relevant for Team Jerusalem.

Next steps


This volume is a mid-way point between the desire to learn from practical “down to earth experiences” and the need to develop models for the future, which adopt peace as the only strategy to solve the conflict on both the macro-state and the micro-city level.

The gap between the current reality and trends in Jerusalem, and the ultimate goal of reaching a peaceful settlement, has brought together a unique group of Israeli and Palestinian scholars and practitioners. Within the context of the JBF they have devoted their expertise to developing future scenarios for Jerusalem. Participants identified the variables which presently affect the city of Jerusalem as well as its future. They developed a matrix of relations between different factors affecting Jerusalem, future scenario structures, as well as formulating guiding principles for a shared vision for the city.



The next stage is to develop strategies of intervention in order to promote the best case scenario and to avoid the worst case scenario. The focus of future JBF work is to examine the vision of Jerusalem and Berlin, against the different scenarios, and to assess the barriers and opportunities for the realization of this vision. Identifying the geo-political, physical, socio-economic, socio-cultural, psychological and legal barriers will be essential in order to develop a universal theoretical and practical model of transition for Jerusalem and other divided cities.

This process of developing transition models, in order to promote the best case scenario of “peace and viability” in a future Jerusalem, will characterize the future work of the JBF. The work is due to be completed by the end of 2006, and will culminate in the publication of the third and final volume of *Divided Cities in Transition*.

Map 1: Jerusalem Palestinian Governorate




Map 2: Jerusalem Israeli Metropolitan Area



XV

PART ONE

**Divided Cities in Transition:
Palestinian and Israeli Perspectives**



Demographic Processes in Polarized Cities:

The Case of Jerusalem

Maya Choshen

Introduction

The space of the metropolitan area of Jerusalem contains, in geographical proximity and often in a continuous built-up sequence, local governments that espouse different and diverse interests, giving rise to interest groups based on various criteria of identity and identification. Thus, the localities become divided into spaces with interests, which are given expression in a series of geographical divisions corresponding to the different realms of interest, identity, and identification.

The population of Jerusalem is diverse and polarized, the polarization clearly manifested in separatism within the urban space: Neighborhoods of Jews alongside neighborhoods of Arabs; and secular neighborhoods contiguous with Haredi (ultra-Orthodox Jews) neighborhoods, creating a singular social and physical fabric.

The differences between the population groups in the city and its environs, and the diversity of identities, identifications, and interests that distinguish the groups encourage conflicts of interest and competition between them. Both alike lead to geographical segregation and struggles for territorial control, economic resources, and the shaping of the way of life of all the groups together and each group separately.

It all comes down to demographics. Demographic processes reflect the interaction between the population profile at a given time and the economic,

social, political, and cultural processes that unfold in the urban and national space. As such, they have an effect on changes in the size, composition, and distribution of the population. These changes affect the day-to-day life and the quality of life of the city and its inhabitants in the present, but will impact no less on the future that lies in store for them.

Demography has an impact on:

- The relative size of each population group and the political influence it wields – the proportion of eligible voters and of those who vote in practice.
- Territorial consumption of each group in the urban space.
- Each group's way of life within the space.
- The consumption of services and the character of the services provided, especially in education, culture, religion, and welfare.
- The economic status of each group (family structure and size, rate of participation in the workforce).

Differences in the growth rate of each population group account in large measure for the “demographic threat” which is felt by population groups that increase at a relatively slow rate. In Jerusalem, there are three groups that feel threatened in this way because of their slow growth relative to other groups:

1. The Jewish population (as compared with the Arab population).
2. The general Jewish population (as compared with the Haredi population).
3. The affluent population (as compared with the non-affluent population).

This article addresses the demographic aspects of the Jerusalem situation and tries to examine the past, comprehend the present, and ask some of the more pertinent questions concerning the future.

The first part of the article briefly surveys the prospects and the risks facing urban dwellers at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It focuses on the increasing segregation in cities between population groups that differ from one another. It then goes on to consider the “more problematic” cities which scholars subsume under a variety of categories and definitions, such as: contested, divided, partitioned, frontier cities, and so forth.

The second part of the article describes the demographic processes in

Jerusalem, tracing their origins and considering their implications, and concludes with a population forecast for Jerusalem in 2020. The third and final section attempts to sketch the city's future demographic character by means of two extreme scenarios – the “golden dream” and the “black nightmare.”

Cities between Despair and Hope

Cities are multifaceted phenomena, repositories of possibilities and dangers. They are marked by a mosaic of trends – demographic, political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technological – whose interaction has concrete implications for the city and its inhabitants. The city of the nascent twenty-first century is a center for a large population that is crowded into a space that is geographically small but humanly extensive: multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-social. The multifarious character of the population can give rise to creativity, innovation, and positive change, but also to tension, conflict, discrimination, and violence. The city is fraught with many hopes but equally with multiple threats. Hope for quality of life, education, progress, and enhanced prospects; threats of social exclusion, spatial segregation, and mounting urban violence. An OECD report of 1994 noted a severe concentration of disadvantages, unemployment, poverty, and alienation in many cities within the organization's member countries.

Across Europe, processes are under way which generate hate, fear, and non-acceptance of the other, creating fragmented cities. Fragmentation, isolation, and enclaves of poverty are increasingly becoming characteristic of cities. These urban areas are also marked by an extreme process of segregation. The gaps between population groups in large cities are increasing and giving rise to growing segregation and rift. The city's spaces are becoming divided into areas that are very different from one another, some of them overprotected, others simmering with danger and beyond the pale. In a growing number of cities there are sections where even the police, whose task is to preserve law and order, are reluctant to enter.

Many forms of urban crime are committed not only against a background of political exclusion but also social, economic, and cultural exclusion. The degree of social inequality, cultural conflict, and political fragmentation has become

more acute in the past two decades.¹ The question is where the city is going and how it is being “taken there.” Does the future consist of a mechanism that constantly heightens exclusion and inequality, or one that enhances a sense of belonging, security, and quality of life?

Urban Segregation

Segregation within the city and across the urban space has been discussed in numerous contexts and is clearly a significant component in the human space of Jerusalem, which will be discussed extensively later.

Segregation and Concentration: Defining the Concepts

Spatial *segregation* can be seen as the residential separation of groups within a broader population. A group is said to be completely mixed in a spatial sense when its members are distributed uniformly throughout the population: The greater the deviation from a uniform dispersal, the greater the degree of segregation (Johnston et al., 1986²).

Exclusion and segregation, namely the unequal access to specific territories within cities, regions or national territories, is typical of all societies, on various scales and at different periods. Spatial segregation and separation among social groups is founded on ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences, and/or on certain social and economic criteria. Societies are differentiated in terms of how they classify people: in some, segregation among individuals and groups is voluntary and relatively low; in others segregation is involuntary and comparatively high. Thus, each neighborhood, city, region, or state could be classified along an imaginary axis of integration-segregation-separation (Kliot and Mansfeld, 1999, p. 168³). Various types of groups have left their imprint on urban ecology and segregation in cities. Such groups can be identified by their common background,

1. Lapeyronnie, D. 1993. “De l’intégration à la ségrégation”, in Roman, J. (ed.). *Ville, exclusion et citoyenneté*. Paris, Editions Esprit, pp. 97-115, in: Sachs-Jeantet, Céline. 1995. *Managing Social Transformations in Cities: A Challenge to Social Sciences*. MOST Working Document no. 2. Paris: UNESCO, <http://www.unesco.org/most/sachsen.htm>, Retrieved 3/20/04.

2. Johnson, R. J., Gregory, D. And Smith, D.M. 1986, *The Dictionary of Human Geography*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

3. Kliot N. and Mansfeld Y. 1999 *Case studies of conflict and territorial organization in divided cities*, Progress in Planning, 52:167-225.

based on: culture; social values and/or norms; economic status; political affiliation; color; race; religion; origin; or the way they have been treated by society.⁴

In many cases, as a result of the variant backgrounds of these groups, interrelations between them are characterized by conflict.⁵ Conflicts between groups are a major factor in shaping the spatial, socio-cultural, and economic processes that are occurring in urban settings.⁶

The literature on spatial segregation tends to emphasize the negative effects segregation may generate. In the main, segregation and concentration restrict the opportunities for people to participate in civil society. This restriction derives from a lack of contact with relevant individuals and institutions. Ideas, beliefs, and types of behavior are reinforced by their social milieu.

However, segregation may generate positive effects as well. The existence, development, and nurturing of social contacts – which are made possible by the physical proximity of like-minded people – can be seen as a highly beneficial aspect of spatial segregation and concentration. Social contacts can lead to the emergence and preservation of a culture that is not based on the norms and values of mainstream society but on those of a specific group. The effort to maintain a minority culture entails more than particularistic attitudes and behavior; it is also manifest in the persistence of shops, clubs, and religious institutions.⁷

An example of extreme segregation is cited in an article published in *Political Geography*: “Segregation has provided a basis for community solidarities while also generating an environment for the maintenance of community conflict and group stereotyping. Bombing, shooting, fire-raising, intimidation – all conspired

4. 1 “bbib100” Smith, D., 1990. *Introduction: the sharing and dividing of geographical space*. In: Chisholm, M. and Smith, D. (eds.), 1990. *Shared Space: Divided Space* Unwin, London, 1–21. 11 “bbib27” Fainstein, S.S. and Harloe, M., 1992. *Introduction*. In: Fainstein, S.S., Gordon, I. and Harloe, E. (eds.), 1992. *Divided Cities—New York and London in the Contemporary World* Blackwell, Oxford, 1–18. 11 “bbib80” Peach, C., 1995. *The meaning of segregation*. *Planning Practice and Research* 11, 2:137–151. Klot N. and Mansfeld Y. (1999) *Case studies of conflict and territorial organization in divided cities*, *Progress in Planning*, 52:167–225.

5. 1 “bbib70” Marcuse, P., 1993. *What is so new about divided cities?*. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 17, 3:355–365. *Abstract-GEODATABASE*.

6. 1 “bbib49” Huckfeldt, R., 1986. *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflicts in Urban Neighborhoods* Agathon Press, New York.

7. Van Kempen, R. and Ozuken, A.S. 1998 *Ethnic Segregation in Cities: New forms and Explanations in a Dynamic World*, *Urban Studies*, 35 (10):1631–1656.

to create a city almost overwhelmed by on-the-street manifestations of ethno-national struggle. The unprecedented violence and the escalation of segregation to new heights produced a city more deeply divided than ever before. Into this fractured space was inserted a series of physical barriers...”

This might well be a description of Jerusalem in the spring of 2004. In fact, the city referred to is Belfast, and the article, by the geographer F.W. Boal, appeared in 2002.⁸ Boal goes on to note that the barriers (“peace walls”) were constructed at “interfaces” – locations where highly segregated Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods abutted uncomfortably against each other.

Discussing walls in cities, Peter Marcuse has written that “they represent power, but they also represent insecurity; domination but at the same time fear; protection but at the same time isolation”.⁹ Of course, the “peace walls” themselves provide a modicum of security, but they also distort patterns of travel – to work, to hospital, to school, to visit relatives and friends, and so on.¹⁰ Belfast provides a curious combination of separation and integration. Never fully integrated and never fully segmented, the city presents a situation where many people live in conditions of ethnic segregation while still sharing some spaces.

Kotek¹¹ sharpens the distinction between segregation in the urban space and segregation that is contained in historical memory, and in national conceptions, that characterize cities she calls “frontier cities,” explaining:

Frontier-cities are above all disputed places because they are subject to contradictory and opposing claims. A frontier-city is a territory for two dreams. Three elements characterise [sic] any frontier-city: sovereignty’s quarrel, double legitimacy and conflict.

It is the national memory, with its baggage of victories and defeats which dominates debates. Only a step separates the celebration of national history from the celebration of a nation’s geography, which in its turn leads to the territorial issue.

8. Boal, F.W. 2002 *Belfast: walls within*, *Political Geography*, 21 (5), 687-694.

9. Marcuse, P. 1994, *Walls and Metaphors and Reality*, In Dunn S. (ed.) *Managing Divided Cities*, Keele: Ryburn Press, 41-52.

10. Bollens, S.A. 2000 *On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast*, State University of New York Press. Albany NY.

11. Kotek, J. 1999 *Divided cities in the European cultural context*, *Progress in Planning*, 52:227-237.

It is for a specific reason that Kotek uses the notion of a “frontier-city” rather than other terms such as “polarized,” “multicultural,” or “multiethnic.” This term, he believes, most adequately describes the complex reality of cities like Jerusalem, Brussels, or Belfast. By frontier-city (or frontier-region) he refers to all cities (or regions) that are not only polarized on an ethnic or ideological basis (like Berlin during the Cold War), but are, above all, contested because of their location on fault lines between ethnic, religious, or ideological wholes.¹²

Jerusalem

Few cities anywhere manifest as complex and delicate a human and social fabric as Jerusalem. Along with its human diversity, Jerusalem is blessed with historical sites that are of cardinal importance to the three monotheistic religions and with a hilly physical structure which produces singular landscape qualities both urban and natural. Taken together, these elements forge a unique and distinctive city to which all eyes in the world are turned, even as the city itself is tormented by the question: Whither Jerusalem?

The urban space of Jerusalem and its surroundings offer a classic example of spatial segregation. Three highly distinct groups inhabit the area: Palestinians, Haredis and non-Haredi Jews. Socio-economically, the lowest-ranking population group is the Arab community, with the Haredis one rung higher and the general Jewish population (secular and non-Haredi religious) on the highest rung. The deepest dichotomy is between Jews and Arabs, as manifested in their geographical segregation, which is the sharpest and clearest between all the groups. An intense perception of dichotomy also exists between Haredi Jews and other Jews, leading to sharp geographic segregation between those groups.

Jerusalem is the center of the metropolitan area surrounding the city – both Israeli and Palestinian. Metropolitan areas are typified by a growth from the center outward to the periphery, and the movement of residents plays a major role in population dispersal. The processes of building and consolidating a metropolis are marked by negative migration rates from the central city to the settlements surrounding it. These communities are connected to the metropolis,

12. *Ibid.*

and the metropolitan area functions as a single geographic unit with internal municipal divisions.

The city's demographic complexity is not only a factor of the demographic, social, and cultural diversity of the population; it derives also from the fact that Jerusalem is the nexus of a national-religious struggle that is the center of international interest. At the end of 2002, Jews accounted for about 67 percent of the city's population, with Arabs being the overwhelming component of the non-Jewish 33 percent. Haredis make up about 30 percent of the Jewish population and 20 percent of the city's total population.

The demographic dimension affects the sense of national feeling. In Israel, the rapid demographic growth of the Arab population vis-à-vis the Jewish population will continue and reduce the share of the Jewish majority. According to Soffer, the demographic dimension has ramifications for all areas of life, including political, geopolitical, and quality of life. Their interaction is liable to set in motion a process at the end of which Israel will find itself facing an existential threat. As the demographic weight of the Arab population increases, so does its electoral strength.¹³ In Jerusalem, apprehension that the Jewish majority in the city will shrink has underlain the decisions of policymakers at the national and municipal levels since 1967. For nearly four decades, then, demographic goals have guided the city's development policy, motivated the expansion of its municipal boundaries, dictated the pace of construction in and around the city, and have been at the center of the public, planning, and policy debate.

The demographic aspect of relations between Jews and Arabs is compounded by intra-Jewish demographics concerning the relations between "general Jews" (non-Haredis) and Haredis. The Haredis' share in the population is on the rise, and in June 2003, for the first time, a Haredi was elected mayor of Jerusalem. That event illustrates how, given a particular political and social constellation, a relatively small population (20 percent of the city's inhabitants, as noted) can garner a majority in mayoralty elections and a near majority on the city council.

The differential increase of the various population groups is affected by dif-

13 .Soffer, A. *Israel Demography 2003-2020*, University of Haifa, Haifa.

ferences in the rates of natural increase and by migration processes. The directions of migration within the city and outside it, as well as the migration balance, are influenced by numerous considerations made by thousands of individuals and households. Considerations of the perceived benefits accruing to the current place of residence vis-à-vis alternative locales (within the community or outside it) are crucial in the decision about whether to remain in one's current place or move to what is deemed a more attractive locale. The sum total of the migration movement within and from the community is of considerable influence on population size, distribution, and profile. Decisions by individuals and households about whether to stay or move, and if the latter, where to go, are constantly reshaping the urban space.

Population Size in Jerusalem, 1967-2002¹⁴

Following Israel's expansion of the city's boundaries in 1967, its population stood at 266,300 inhabitants: 197,700 in West Jerusalem (74 percent), and 68,600 (26 percent) in extended East Jerusalem. At the same time, the Arabs living within the new municipal boundaries were given the status of residents, offering them advantages such as social security, and later also national health insurance. The change in Jerusalem's status as a result of the 1967 war, and the removal of the barriers that had separated the city's western and eastern sections, restored the urban neighborliness between Jews and Arabs. Jerusalem's transformation from a terminal city "with a wall in its heart" (on both the Israeli and the Jordanian sides) into a central city within an open space was a major boost to its development and made the space a magnet for Jews and Arabs alike.

At the end of 2002, the population of Jerusalem stood at 681,000; the share of the Jewish residents had fallen to 67 percent, while that of the Arab population was now 33 percent. This trend runs contrary to the declared policy of every Israeli government since 1967, namely that the ratio of Jews to Arabs must not be allowed to fall. However, despite residential construction earmarked for Jews, efforts to boost the city's economic development, and the large wave of immigration to Israel from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, the share of the

14. Data based on, Choshen M. (ed.) 2004, *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook 2002 – 2003*, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Municipality of Jerusalem, Jerusalem.

Jewish population in Jerusalem is on the wane. There are a number of reasons for this:

1. High total fertility rates among the Arab population in comparison with the Jewish population.
2. A lower mortality rate among the Arab population for the past few decades.
3. A lower rate of natural increase among the Jewish population.
4. Negative internal migration balances of the Jewish population since the beginning of the 1980s, in comparison with Arab migration to the city (according to official data), which does not show negative balances.

The differences between the components of Jewish population growth in comparison to the Arab population explain the more rapid rate of growth of the latter in relation to the former. If these demographic trends continue, the share of the Jewish population in Jerusalem can be expected to go on declining, while the share of the Arab population will continue to rise.

Population Spread

Since 1967, ties and associations were formed between the two parts of the city and the two populations in and around it, creating a new urban and metropolitan urban fabric. However, as in other cities, in Jerusalem too, people tend to draw close, geographically, to those who resemble them, and keep their distance from those who are different.

These tendencies have created segregation between the neighborhoods based on the profile of their inhabitants. The highest level of segregation exists between the Jewish and Arab neighborhoods, manifested in the form of an almost total separation between areas of Jewish and Arab residence. A very high degree of segregation, though not as sharply delineated as that between Jews and Arabs, characterizes the separation between Haredi neighborhoods and general ones. Although the Haredi sections of the city can be sharply delineated, separation is not total: many Haredis reside in non-Haredi neighborhoods, and non-Haredis continue to reside in Haredi neighborhoods.

The segregation between populations does not stop at the city's municipal boundaries but marks the metropolitan area as well. The ongoing development

of the metropolis is fomenting a change in the population's size, profile and distribution. This process is leading to the diversification of the population but at the same time to heightened segregation between the different groups. Thus we see greater heterogeneity at the trans-metropolitan level and greater homogeneity in each individual locale. Communities in the metropolitan space are thus acquiring a clear identity in terms of ethnic and religious affiliation as well as at the economic level, in municipal government and administration and, to a growing degree, in regard to the infrastructures and services available in them. The emergent trends in the Jerusalem area resemble those that are familiar from other cities around the world and in Israel, but Jerusalem being Jerusalem, they are more tangled and complex. That complexity is compounded by personal insecurity and mounting hostility, which are manifested in the city and its environs.

With the outbreak of the first Intifada (at the end of 1987) and again in the second Intifada (which erupted at the end of September 2000), restrictions were placed on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, impairing their earning ability, which had been based on employment in economic transactions with Israel. However, the Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem continued to enjoy freedom of movement, and with it broader and more varied job opportunities compared to those whom closure, curfew, or the separation barrier prevented from crossing the Green Line. As a result, the city's Palestinian inhabitants acquired economic advantages compared to Palestinians in the Jerusalem sphere of influence. At the same time, though, the cost of housing in Jerusalem rose sharply, nearby villages grew, and an Arab metropolitan area developed around the city. Villages such as A-Ram, A-Zaiim, Anata, and others grew several-fold. Some of this growth was a result of a spillover of Jerusalem residents. Nevertheless, Jerusalem's unique economic and geopolitical situation prompted all the city's residents to maintain their official address within the city even after they left it.

Jerusalem: The Future is Already Here

Demographic processes that are discernible in metropolitan areas point to the future expected for the core city if the trends of the past few years continue:

- A further decline in the weight of the central city within the metropolis.
- The continued aging of the population.

The stronger population will shrink due to emigration to the metropolitan settlements surrounding the city. The wealthy will choose to improve their housing conditions by living outside the city, leaving behind a large, weak population that will be a burden to the city's development and to the maintenance of its unique values.

If no far-reaching changes occur in the space of Metropolitan Jerusalem, we can expect heightened emigration among all population groups: secular and non-Haredi religious Jews, Haredis, and Arabs. Many of those who move to Jerusalem's near environs will continue to maintain ties with the city, but such ties will weaken for those who choose to move farther from it, leading them to form ties with other urban centers. In the Jewish sector, this trend is seen particularly among those who are moving to the west of the city (inside the Green Line). They are drawing close to Metropolitan Tel Aviv, which is Israel's economic core, and are concomitantly reducing their ties with Jerusalem. The development of the Jewish and Palestinian settlements in the area of the metropolitan space that lies in the West Bank, and their ties to Jerusalem, are closely interwoven with the security situation and with the local and national arrangements that will be introduced in the future.

A study conducted by DellaPergola¹⁵ sought to analyze the demographic diversity of urban residential neighborhoods in Jerusalem characterized by different ethnic, religious, cultural, and socioeconomic patterns with the aim of projecting the observed trends from 2001 to the year 2020. The stated goal of the projection was to illustrate the potential direction of currently visible demographic trends, irrespective of actual physical constraints. The demographic data make it quite clear that, assuming "business as usual," the total population of Jerusalem will continue to increase substantially.

15. DellaPergola, S 2001, *Jerusalem Population, 1995-2020: Demography, Multiculturalism and Urban Policies*, *European Journal of population* 17, 165-199.

The scenario most likely to be realized, according to the team of demographers that prepared the forecast, is the one based on the continuation of the demographic trends of recent years. This projection indicates that in 2020 Jerusalem will have a population of 947,000, including 589,000 Jews (62 percent) and 358,000 Arabs (38 percent). The following tables illustrate the expected population trends according to the “business as usual” forecast.

Table 1: Population according to types of forecast region, Jerusalem 1995-2020

Type of forecast area	1995		2020		Difference
	Absolute No.	%	Absolute No.	%	Absolute No.
Total	591,000	100.0	947,000	100.0	+356,000
Jewish	422,000	71.4	589,000	62.2	+167,000
Arab and other	169,000	28.6	358,000	37.8	+189,000
Muslim	128,000	21.7	286,000	30.2	+158,000
Christian	7,000	1.2	9,000	0.9	+2,000
Mixed Muslim-Christian	34,000	5.8	63,000	6.7	+29,000

Table 2: Jewish population according to types of forecast area, Jerusalem 1995-2020

Type of forecast area	1995		2020		Difference
	Absolute No.	%	Absolute No.	%	Absolute No.
Total	422,000	100.0	589,000	100.0	+356,000
Very high fertility (mainly Haredis)	124,000	29.4	190,000	32.2	+167,000
High fertility	45,000	10.7	53,000	9.0	+189,000
Medium fertility, low cross-section	171,000	40.5	278,000	47.2	+158,000
Medium fertility, high cross-section	55,000	13.0	45,000	7.6	+2,000
Low fertility	27,000	6.4	23,000	3.9	+29,000

The data that have been presented so far suggest several major trends. The present and forecast rate of growth of the population of Jerusalem – approximately two percent a year – will bring about a population of about 950,000 in the city by the year 2020. The more rapid rate of growth of the Arab population in Jerusalem (three percent a year) will result in a clear increase in its share of the city's total population. Assuming the continuation of the existing trends, no dramatic change looms in the internal division of the Jewish population among the five types in the area, or within the social-demographic sectors that were noted. True, a numerical increase is discernible, mainly in areas with a very high fertility rate, which have a religious-Haredi profile, and in areas of medium fertility with fairly high social diversity and a relatively low socio-economic profile. In contrast, a substantial decline in the number of residents is apparent in the Jewish forecast areas with a medium fertility rate and a higher than average social profile, and in the areas with low fertility levels. The reasons for these developmental differences are complex.

In areas populated largely by Haredis, the very high fertility rates produce demographic pressure and overcrowding. However, in recent years many Haredis, mainly young couples with children, have left these areas and settled primarily in communities located in the proximate and less proximate periphery outside Jerusalem (in Betar Illit, Beit Shemesh, and the Modi'in area, for example). As a result, the rate of demographic growth in the areas of origin has been moderated, and some of the potential there for future demographic growth no longer exists.

A similar pattern can be discerned in areas of high fertility (consisting largely of a religious-national population), where a young population is leaving Jerusalem in favor of the ring of communities around the city, thus moderating even further the growth rate in these parts of the city.

The areas of forecast that show medium fertility and a relatively low social profile absorbed the majority of the new immigrants who arrived in the past few years (mainly from the former Soviet Union), as well as the relative majority resulting from internal mobility on the part of the city's existing population. On the assumption that immigration to Israel will continue and that Jerusalem will succeed in attracting a larger share of the new arrivals, these areas of the city (or others like them that will be built) are projected to continue growing at a rapid pace.

The inhabitants of the Jewish areas of the city that show a medium fertility rate and a high social profile, and the areas with a low fertility rate have an above-average socio-economic level and are also sometimes critical or highly critical of the Haredis. The trends in these areas – low fertility, aging of the population and concomitant frequent mortality, emigration, and high mobility into new areas of the city possessing a lower profile – are creating a significant demographic deficit.

The forecast decrease in the demographic ratio of the residents of the more economically established neighborhoods (from 19.4 percent in 1995 to 11.5 percent in 2020) is liable to lower the socio-economic level of the entire population of the city.

The Arab population shows a very high rate of growth in areas where there is a distinct Muslim majority, a slow rate of growth in Christian areas (for the purposes of the forecast, only the Armenian and Christian Quarters of the Old City), and a fairly high rate also in mixed areas containing a Muslim majority and a relatively large Christian minority. In these parts of the city, the existing statistical data indicate a positive migration balance and a minor or negligible trend toward leaving. The reason for this apparently has to do with the residents' considerations in regard to the possibilities, advantages, and drawbacks entailed in residence in Jerusalem as compared with the A, B, and C areas of the Palestinian autonomy region and in Judea and Samaria.

Another crucial element in regard to the development of Jerusalem's population is the expected age composition and the balance of the population strata within each age group. Age composition is fundamentally determined by higher or lower levels of fertility and changes according to the different frequency, within each age group, of mortality, internal geographical mobility, and international migration. Therefore, the developments discussed in the previous section will not occur, or will not occur equally, in each age group.

The forecast data sharpen and reinforce the results of the previous analysis. No dramatic changes are foreseen in the distribution of the total population according to principal age groups. The expected population growth indicates an increase in all age groups, though in different proportions. As a result, the per-

centage of youngsters below the age of 15 years old is expected to decline (from 35 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2020); the percentage of those aged 65 years old and above will increase (from eight percent to nine percent); and the percentage of the adults aged 45-64 years old will increase in particular (from 14 percent to 16 percent).

In addition, significant differences loom in the age composition of various sub-groups of the population. Thus, in 1995 the percentage of Jews within the total population ranged from a minimum of 64 percent – of the 0-4 age group – to a maximum of 88 percent among the 75 plus age group. These disparities are the result of the higher fertility rates in the past and the present among the Arabs and others in the city, in addition to the emigration trend among many young Jews, who are moving largely to other locales in metropolitan Jerusalem. The age composition of the new immigrants is not especially young (though it is far younger than the Jewish population in their countries of origin). In 2020, these disparities will be even more pronounced, with Jews constituting no more than 54 percent of the 0-4 age group and about 56 percent of all the other age groups below 25 years old. At the other extreme, Jews will still account for 83 percent of those aged 75 years or above.

As for the residents in the areas of very high fertility (areas of a Haredi character) within the total Jewish population, in 1995 they constituted 44 percent of the 0-4 age group, declining gradually in the higher-age groups, to 22 percent of the 75 plus age group in the Jewish areas. According to the forecast, the percentage of those aged ten and below in the areas of very high fertility within the total Jewish population will increase slightly (45-47 percent); the percentage of those in the 10-19 age group will increase to 40-42 percent, will stand at about 30 percent in the 20-44 group, and will continue to decrease gradually in the older age groups, to a minimum of 18 percent among the 75 plus group.¹⁶

16. DellaPergola, S. & Rabhun, U., 2003, *Strategic plan for Jerusalem: 2020, Vol. 2: Demography, Jerusalem Municipality, Jerusalem, (in Hebrew).*

Future Models

The design of models that simulate processes of population change in the city and its environs must:

- Understand the existing reality.
- Posit future goals.
- Formulate assumptions about variables that might affect these processes.

The population forecast presented above analyzed the existing situation and assumed the continuation of the existing demographic trends. Its advantage is that it makes it possible for us to examine the quantitative implications deriving from a continuation of the trends.

The forecast is a basis for understanding the processes underlying the demographic changes. It is extremely important for understanding the size of the population groups and how they change in the future. However, it does not examine building capacity or the prospects of future residential construction in and around the city. Nor does it presuppose scenarios of a geopolitical, social, economic or other character. It does, however, lay the foundation for analyzing future scenarios, and as such it is an important and effective tool for planners and elected officials.

Given that demographic processes are influenced by a variety of factors and developments, it follows that different models of development at the local, regional, and national levels will lead to different demographic manifestations.

Population growth in Jerusalem and its environs is closely bound up with the political, social, and economic situation that will exist in the city and the region. A necessary though insufficient condition for the city and its residents to flourish is a political settlement, accompanied by security and stability. Beyond this, intelligent development of the city and its surroundings is needed, grounded in identifying and cultivating its advantages in the local, regional, national, and international spheres. “Natural” demographic trends can be expected to lead to a gradual decrease of the fertility rates among all population groups, including the Haredis. Despite this, natural growth rates will continue to be positive, espe-

cially among the Arabs and the Haredis. Life expectancy will continue to rise.

The differential growth of the various population groups is influenced by differences in the rates of natural increase and in migration processes. Differential migration balances within each of the major population groups will bring about a change in the ratio between the groups. Populations characterized by a more positive or less negative migration balance will tend to greater growth due to the quantitative contribution of migration and their younger age structure. This will lead to a change in the proportions between the various population groups, creating, in turn, a change in the population distribution in the urban space. The population groups that increase quantitatively will extend their residential area and their day-to-day living space. In some urban spaces, the quantitative decrease of one group, combined with the increase of another, will bring about a situation in which one group expands into the residential neighborhoods and living spaces of another, thus accelerating the change of population distribution in the urban space.

There are numerous examples of such developments; notably in Belfast, where the more rapid natural increase of the Catholic population as compared with the Protestants, and differences in the socioeconomic profile of the two groups – the Protestants being of a higher social class – led to the more accelerated suburbanization of the Protestant population. These two demographic developments brought about a rise in the relative share of the Catholic population in the city and its spread into Protestant neighborhoods. The same phenomenon is discernible in the United States, when a black population spreads into white neighborhoods, prompting the white population to leave and thereby changing the neighborhoods socially, economically and racially. Many of the large cities in Europe are undergoing a similar process as increasing numbers of foreign nationals settle in them, tending to live together in clearly demarcated spaces. Their entry and subsequent growth in a given space prompts intra-urban and intra-metropolitan migration: the “local” residents, feeling the change in the social, ethnic and cultural fabric, choose to move to locales where they perceive greater similarity and closeness vis-à-vis the reference group. The same phenomenon is taking place in Jerusalem with the spread of Haredis from dominantly Haredi neighborhoods into general neighborhoods, and can be expected

to occur with even greater intensity if Palestinians spread into Arab enclaves within Jewish neighborhoods.

Thinking about demographic models in Jerusalem presupposes that the natural growth (fertility) and life expectancy of each population group will continue along the lines of past trends, as noted in the previous section, based on DellaPergola's research. The main demographic element that will be affected by the developments in and around Jerusalem in all spheres of life – political, economic, social, cultural, mood and morale, etc. – will be migration. This demographic element is also far more susceptible than natural demographic processes to the effects of different policies. Thus, future models need to develop a variety of scenarios and simulate the processes that will occur in and around Jerusalem, showing how they will influence:

1. Thrust and scale of migration to and from the city.
2. The changes in the size of each population group and its social, economic, and demographic profile.
3. The shift of population distribution in the urban space.

In order to show the range of possibilities of demographic developments in Jerusalem and its environs, and their implications for the city and the metropolitan area, I have chosen to present two extreme scenarios. They derive from the present and sketch the future: one is a hope-filled “golden dream,” the other a despair-driven “black nightmare.” Nesting between these two models are numerous and diverse scenarios that are composed of the variables contained in the two extreme scenarios. The following table is intended to help develop these scenarios.

The “Golden Dream” Scenario

The city of Jerusalem will be open and safe, and will become a religious, cultural, and economic magnet. Jerusalem will exploit its inherent advantages and transform a situation of conflict into a common jumping-off point for all its populations. A heritage of religions and cultures, both spiritual and physical, will attract interest, investment, and development. Jerusalem will not become the richest city in the region, but it will offer residents and visitors a high quality of life.

Table of Guidelines for Developing Scenarios

Function	Scenario		City of Jerusalem			Area Around Jerusalem	
			Palestinian neighborhoods	Jewish neighborhoods		Palestinian locales	Jewish locales
				Haredi	General (non-Haredi)		
	Golden Dream	Black Nightmare					
Economy	Growth in city and environs	Decline, deterioration					
Politics (Israel – Palestinian Authority)	Stable: settlement	No settlement, instability, confrontation, terminal city					
Relations between population groups	Conciliation, acceptance, coexistence (tri-existence)	Tense and strained					
Quality of life	Improved	Aggravated					
Public order	Feeling of personal security	No personal security					
Relations between Israel and the Palestinian entity	Sane relations between sane neighbors	Hostility					
City's status in relation to other	Places Rising	Deteriorating					
City and region's perception of the future	Hopeful and optimistic	Despair, hopelessness, pessimism					
Development	Responsible, considerate, coordinated between the various authorities	Wild, inconsiderate, competitive and destructive					
National and international investment and incentive	Attraction of investments from Israel and abroad, governmental incentives in both Israel and the PA	Few international investments, governmental incentive for preserving the periphery					

In reference to Belfast in the early 21st century, Boal has written:

In the nervously hopeful phase we have recently entered, we may begin to look for new opportunities, as mutual accommodation strives to replace inter-ethnic acrimony. The segmentations of ethno-nationalism may slowly dissolve or be pluralistically accommodated, leaving Belfast *integrated* in the style of most other cities in the developed world. Having stripped away the layers of ethnicity, it can join other cities in concentrating on unemployment, social polarization, crime, drug abuse and God knows what else. Please prepare to welcome us on board.¹⁷

Although the scenario presented here is more hopeful than the one suggested by Boal's description, it is nevertheless clear that on the way to realizing all the city's dreams a long road must be traversed, on which ordinary civic problems such as those cited by Boal will be encountered.

A lengthy period of uprising, bloodshed, and mistrust will be followed by an efflorescence of prosperity, security, and hope. The primary beneficiaries will be the city's residents. Intra-regional and international cooperation will attract investments aimed at preserving the ancient heritage while developing cultural centers, institutions of higher education, and high-quality nature and landscape areas that will integrate a building heritage and new construction with natural elements of rare beauty and diversity. Geopolitical and municipal arrangements will regulate the relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and the local governments in the area. These arrangements will create security and stability and make possible the convenient, though controlled, passage of people (residents, workers, and tourists) and goods.

The combination of an improving quality of life and new economic opportunities in and around the city, together with stability and hope, will attract investments and other business and financial activity that will enhance the economy of the city and the region. The budgetary balance of the local governments will improve, and investment in physical infrastructures and social services will increase. The economic growth in the city and the region will gen-

17. Boal, F.W. (2002), *Belfast: walls within*, *Political Geography*, 21 (5): 687-694.

erate a substantial number of new jobs, driving down the unemployment rate while driving up household income and the general economic level. The combination of economic growth both the citywide and the individual level, together with a more efficient network of services, will significantly improve the general wellbeing of the population. Special efforts will be invested in the education system, culture, social welfare, and the preservation of public order. National and international funds will be invested in the area of the sacred basin, where most of the elements that create the city's "holiness" for the three monotheistic religions are concentrated.

A special effort will be made to develop the city's religious-cultural heritage and its unique physical features. The city core will undergo rehabilitation and renewal, and the arteries leading to it will once again be heavily traveled.

Population size: The change in the political situation along with the economic momentum and the urban quality of life will increase the level of the city's attractiveness. The emigration trend will be reversed, as the city draws new residents and gives the existing inhabitants good reason to stay. Strategic thought taking into account the principles of sustainable development will move the city forward toward responsible and considerate development of social, physical, economic, and environmental infrastructures. National and international institutions will be established or resume their former activity. Children will romp in the many and varied open areas and public parks, and will enjoy superb education systems (both formal and informal).

The development in the city will radiate to the surrounding area and the population will grow and establish itself. It should be noted that a large population in the city is not necessarily an advantage. The city will attract a young population with the potential for upward mobility. This will strengthen the existing population, whose younger generation and middle class have thinned out. They chose to leave Jerusalem – laden with emotional, religious, and political freight that is tinged with holiness – for communities in the periphery and the "secular" spaces of Tel Aviv in Israel and Ramallah in the Palestinian Authority. Along with encouraging immigration of a "strong" population (from all the major groups: general Jewish, Haredi Jewish, and Arab), the city will invest in its inhabitants. The education systems will enhance the life prospects of the young

generation and inculcate the values of coexistence, community activity, and civic responsibility. The city fathers will be attentive to the needs of the inhabitants and imbue them with confidence in the city and in a leadership with vision that will carve out a better future.

Famed for its human mosaic, Jerusalem will continue to be multicultural and will practice tolerance that will enable it to gain the greatest benefit from its diversity. The delicate balances between the different population groups will be maintained, each group imbued with confidence in its ability to preserve its distinctive way of life and its identities and identifications.

Population distribution in the urban space will remain segregated, characterized by geographical concentrations of population groups based on differential profiles. Within its cultural-social-political geographic space, each group will retain its identity and singular traits. The city will ensure a dignified existence for each group in accordance with its preferred way of life, while showing consideration for the other groups. Alongside the separate spatial organization of each group, the geographical spaces and areas of encounter and contiguity – and above all of acceptance – between the groups will proliferate.

The Jewish neighborhoods: Urban renewal in the older neighborhoods, combined with improved transportation infrastructures, will attract a new population. The Mandate-era neighborhoods of the Inner City will become accessible and their urban quality of life will be upgraded. Young families, the middle class, intellectuals, the educated, the newly successful, and the influential – along with anyone else who will be able to afford expensive housing in the city – will enjoy life in a diverse and sane space that is fraught with singular potential and ensures quality of life at a virtually unrivaled level. There will be an infilling of the neighborhoods in the city's outer envelope, where the young population will increase as well. Schools that were emptying out as population ageing increased will be reactivated and increase the range of educational possibilities that will be available to every child in its residential area.

The geographic segregation between general Jews and Haredis will persist. Each group will pursue its way of life in security. The Haredi population will expand into the area extending northward from the city center. The level of serv-

ices in the Haredi neighborhoods will improve, and household income there will rise. Higher Haredi participation in the workforce will contribute also to the development of private and semi-public services in commerce and culture. The quality of life will improve. As satisfaction with the infrastructure of community, neighborhood, and municipal life rises among both Haredis and general Jews, the conflict between the two groups will become more moderate.

The Arab neighborhoods: The new prosperity, hope, and improvement in the quality of life will encourage the internal strengthening of each population group. The connections between Jerusalem's Palestinian residents and the surrounding communities will grow closer and become stronger. The same pattern will occur in the economic, cultural, and social ties between Jerusalem and its residents and the Arab states in general. Physical infrastructures will be restored and rehabilitated and an effort made to preserve the built-up heritage, accompanied by a building momentum that is compatible with comprehensive and orderly plans. The social and cultural services infrastructure will be redeveloped throughout the city, including the Old City. After years of distress, a sense of relief holding out hope for the future will heighten the attractiveness of East Jerusalem, and economic growth there will be accompanied by cultural efflorescence. Artists of all types will again look to the city for inspiration. Pleasure at the city's revitalization will facilitate cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians at all levels – national, regional, and municipal. Jerusalemites will take advantage of a life of coexistence and derive benefit from the city's treasures.

Economic growth that will enhance the quality of life at the community and individual levels alike will stem from:

1. A resurgent tourist industry, which will see the return of the traditional visits of Jews and Christian pilgrims, enhanced now by Muslim tourists.
2. The renewal of the ties between Jerusalem and its surrounding communities, and the strengthening of the city's status as the core of the Arab metropolis.
3. Foreign investment and job growth in the "seam" areas between Jewish and Arab sections, and between Jerusalem and its surroundings.

The economic recovery and the newly gained sense of personal security,

heightened by the hope of a better future, will make Metropolitan Jerusalem – centering around the cities of Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem, as well as the surrounding communities – a magnet for an Arab population from the West Bank and beyond: Palestinians from the diaspora and the Gaza Strip.

Jewish-Arab segregation in the city will persist. Housing demand in the Arab neighborhoods will increase, driving up land values and, concomitantly, the cost of housing. Rapid economic growth and surging demand will encourage investment in physical and social infrastructures. The level of public services will improve dramatically and the quality of life will rise. A well-to-do population – middle and upper-middle class – will choose Jerusalem as its home. The established neighborhoods will grow, investment in education will increase, cultural activity will proliferate and flourish, and restaurants, hotels, and festivals at the city's unique sites, will be major drawing cards for both local residents and tourists from near and far.

It will be worth the wait...

The “Black Nightmare” Scenario

Israel and the Palestinian Authority fail to reach a settlement or even agreement on a “live and let live” approach. The struggle continues, mutual delegitimization intensifies, the city of Jerusalem is at the vortex of a violent struggle over identities, beliefs, symbols and land. Each side – convinced it is in the right – does battle to achieve “justice.” Hostilities break out in the city; the war for public opinion escalates. Mutual accusations and destructive provocations are broadcast worldwide, heightening the escalation. Terrorism continues unabated: the entire city and country are under constant threat. The residents of Jerusalem (Jews and Palestinians) are exhausted from the bloodletting but cannot break out of the vicious cycle of violence. As the armed struggle continues and terrorism claims ever more innocent lives, the public order associated with normal cities deteriorates. The police and the other security forces have their hands full coping with the terrorist attacks and with the fighting in the city. They do not have time to deal with “regular” civilian crime. A vacuum of authority is created in the weak and vulnerable areas. Theft and robbery, drug trafficking, prostitution, and

other social ills dominate day-to-day life.

Jerusalem is a frightened city, ruled by insecurity, instability, despair, hopelessness, and hatred. The economy deteriorates; private investors flee in the hope of saving what little is left; new investors give the city a wide berth. Unemployment soars among all population groups. The economic situation and the unrelenting fear of terrorist attacks are calamitous for commercial and entertainment centers; more and more of them close down or move to other, more promising locales.

The flight of local and foreign investment obliges the government to apply “artificial respiration” in an effort to prop up the city’s economy. Target-specific government investment (like the German government’s support of West Berlin until the country’s unification), subsidized salaries, tax benefits, incentives at the private and company levels, and revenues from a compulsory “Jerusalem Loan”, slow the rate of deterioration of the ailing city.

The enmity between Israelis and Palestinians intensifies, aggravated by organizing on the part of extremists from all population groups, which further radicalizes the situation. The quality of life declines precipitously. The city is bleeding, and its image, too, is mortally wounded. Jerusalem becomes increasingly ugly in its own eyes and in the eyes of all those in Israel and around the world (who will not go near it).

Population size: Deterioration of the quality of life, economic collapse, a lack of personal security, unrelenting hostility, and a pervasive hopelessness will make the city gloomy, conflicted and frightening. The scale of migration will impact substantially on the size of the population. The pull factors from the city will multiply and intensify; people from all sectors will look for a way out. At the same time, it should be recalled that decisions to migrate entail:

1. Drawing up a balance between the positive and negative elements of one’s current place of residence – in this case, Jerusalem.
2. Drawing up a balance between the current place of residence and the expected benefits at the alternative locale.

Thus, the perceived benefits of living in Jerusalem will be weighed against

the perceived benefits of living elsewhere. Each population group in Jerusalem has available various possible alternative places of residence. The Jewish population can choose among all the Israeli communities inside the Green Line and in Judea and Samaria. The human tendency is to choose a nearby locale. A tendency toward decay of migration exists as the distance increases. Thus, many of those who leave Jerusalem will likely opt for one of the communities in the metropolitan area. Security, quality of life, accessibility, cost of housing, and employment opportunities are major factors in deciding the new locale. If security in the settlements and on the roads of Judea and Samaria is poor, and job prospects there are significantly lower than those in the western metropolitan area within the Green Line, Jewish migrants will probably tend to move westward, perhaps even to places in the metropolitan area that are not attractive for a secular Jewish population, such as Beit Shemesh. The major flow of Jewish migrants will be outward from Jerusalem to more attractive locales, where housing is affordable and employment prospects are good. Housing prices have fallen in places where the factors creating decay of migration have increased, among them Jerusalem.

A counter flow of migration to Jerusalem will be characterized by a light sprinkling of ideologues and extremists, or both. Overall, the negative migration rate will exceed the natural increase rate, and the city's Jewish population will decline.

The size of the Arab population depends in large measure on the situation of the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem relative to the Palestinian locales around the city. The decision making mechanisms of Jews and Palestinians are the same. However, the balance of the push and pull factors between Jerusalem and the alternative locations can be radically different for Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem. If the economic situation, the job opportunities, and the general quality of life in the towns and villages of the West Bank deteriorate in the same measure as East Jerusalem, or perhaps are even more acute, Jerusalem will become more attractive for Palestinians than for Jews. The Palestinian inhabitants of Jerusalem, who hold blue ID cards (residents of Israel), will continue to enjoy far-reaching social rights as compared to their compatriots in the Palestinian Authority. They will also enjoy free movement inside Israel. This, in addition to the possibility of legal employment in Israel, will ensure superior living condi-

tions for Jerusalem's Palestinian residents as compared to the residents of the West Bank. The relative situation of the city's Palestinian residents will appear good when they look to the east, the north, or the south, to the communities of the West Bank, but not as good when they look to the west – to the neighborhoods of West Jerusalem and even more to the communities of Metropolitan Jerusalem that lie west of the city. In this state of affairs, Jerusalem's Palestinian residents will prefer to remain in the city and Jerusalem will be more alluring than the West Bank for the Palestinians. Conversely, if the situation in Jerusalem is worse than that in the West Bank, more and more residents are likely to leave it in favor of the metropolitan region.

Migrants everywhere do not constitute a representative sample of the population, and there is no reason to think that Jerusalem will be different in this regard. In a scenario in which the gap between push- and pull-factors widens in the direction of push, the first to leave the city will be the middle and upper classes, the young, and the educated. These are the more mobile groups, who find it easier to make life changes. The city will remain with an aging population, which is less economically established and is prone to despair and lack of motivation. Those who stay will be those who have no choice and those without the inner strength to leave.

Who will choose to move to the city?

Among the Jews, the migrants to Jerusalem will consist of ideologues and extremists from all segments of the population. Haredis, imbued with belief in the Holy City, may be attracted to the city because of lower housing costs in the Jewish neighborhoods. Perhaps an influx to the city of Haredis at rabbinical commandment and spurred by faith will ultimately bring about an increase in the size of the Jewish population. A large Haredi community, with its high fertility rate, will also have the effect of lowering the general population age. A large-scale influx of Haredis will hasten the emigration of secular Jews.

Among the Arab population, too, there will be greater outward migration of the middle class and of all others who are capable of making the change. Ideologues and extremists will enter the city, along with the poor, who will take over abandoned dwellings of those who left.

Composition of the population: The processes described above will change the composition of the city's population. Jerusalem will become more extreme, with greater segregation. The share of the Arabs within the general population can be expected to increase, especially if the situation of the Arabs in Jerusalem is perceived to surpass that of the West Bank Arabs. The secular Jewish population will shrink and age. In regard to the Haredi population, two options exist. One shows a possible decline in their share of the population, owing to accelerated outward migration, in common with the other Jewish population groups, and for the same reasons. In the second option the Haredi population increases, as does the Haredis' share within the general population. This option will be realized because of falling housing costs, which will make it possible for the Haredis – whose economic level is below that of the general Jewish population – to buy or rent homes in the city. In addition, the Haredi leadership may urge migration to the city because of its holiness.

A notable change in the socioeconomic structure of the population will be a decline in the share of the middle and upper classes in the overall Jewish population. Indeed, this trend is likely to characterize all the Jewish population groups – secular, non-Haredi religious, and Haredi. Within the Arab population, the trends of change in the class structure are less clear. If Jerusalem is perceived to be attractive in relation to the surrounding area, the cost of housing in the Arab neighborhoods will rise and be affordable only by the more established classes. However, if Jerusalem deteriorates even in relation to the Palestinian satellite communities around it, the socioeconomic status of the city's Arab population will also decline and will push the established Arab population groups.

Population distribution in the urban space will probably continue to be characterized by geographic concentrations of population groups according to their differential profiles. Each group will preserve its distinctive identity within its cultural-social-political geographic space. There will be fewer points of contiguity between the Jewish and Arab populations, and the seam lines will become manifestations of the rift. The geography of fear will shape a segregated space that is under threat, in which the barriers of separation are made higher by overt and covert means alike.

The Jewish neighborhoods: These neighborhoods will deteriorate and undergo a cumulative filtering down process. Dwellings and neighborhoods where the emigration rate is high will be partially taken over by a weaker population, while other structures will remain empty and neglected, their physical condition and exterior appearance decaying. If the Jewish neighborhoods that are physically closer to the Arab neighborhoods suffer more from violence originating in national terrorism and civil crime, they will be the first to be abandoned and decay. The residents who leave, flee, or abandon their homes will be replaced by radical activists who, in their view, will ensure that the boundaries of the confrontation remain constant. Their presence will only heighten the tension and escalate the clashes and the intensity of the confrontation. The neighborhoods of West Jerusalem will be less affected by the confrontations and the looming threat. Like every geographic phenomenon, clashes and attacks, too, become less intense as the distance from the epicenter of the confrontation increases. Nevertheless, all the city's residents will suffer from the aggravated economic situation and the decline in the quality of life. They will pay more taxes for fewer services. The result will be growing unease even in the neighborhoods that are far from the lines of confrontation, and they, too, will experience a process of deterioration and filtering down. If the Haredi population in the city grows, it will necessarily expand into more and more neighborhoods. Those developments, in turn, will accelerate the departure of both the secular and the non-Haredi religious groups. Some of the non-Haredis will leave the city, while those who stay will heighten the geographic segregation and entrench the "protective lines" around their way of life.

Overall, the secular population will age, and as a result kindergartens and schools of the state and state-religious tracks will shut down and cultural institutions will lose their audiences. The urban deterioration will thus be accelerated, making the city even less attractive for both the longtime residents and for prospective newcomers. Poverty, distress, and insecurity will generate greater violence, and the city will become a hotbed of crime, its streets neglected and dirty.

The Arab neighborhoods: As noted, the Black Nightmare scenario contains two main options.

If the situation for Jerusalem's Palestinian residents improves as compared with the residents of the West Bank, positive migration balances of the Arab population can be expected, and the arrival of an established population that will generate greater housing demand. Housing costs will soar and residential construction will intensify in all the Arab neighborhoods. Neighborhoods with a less established population and substandard housing will attract a weak population of Jerusalem residents who previously left the city but retained their Israel residency status. Conditions of overcrowding will become more frequent, and social distress will become rampant. It will be increasingly difficult for the municipality to supply an acceptable level of services. Alienation and despair will prevail, rooted in poverty and deprivation. The education system will not be able to meet the requirements of a steadily growing number of students. Economic distress will prompt parents to send their children out to work so the family can make ends meet. Violence will become rife. The police, preoccupied with security problems, will lack the resources to cope with "civil" crime and violence.

The major effort in the civil sphere will be aimed at protecting the stronger population, which will be the target of the surging crime. Security systems financed by public funding and private individuals will try to protect the more affluent areas, which will be raided by criminals from the poor neighborhoods – ramshackle ghettos which no outsider will dare enter. The shortfall of resources will rule out efforts at preventive treatment in the slum areas, such as investment in education and culture, attempts at bridge building, and heightened law enforcement; the only available option will be to keep the residents of those neighborhoods away from other neighborhoods.

Demand will also grow in the more established Arab neighborhoods as well; there, too, housing will become more expensive and residential construction will increase. The residents there will be looking for a "quiet corner." They will invest in protection against the rampaging crime in the weak neighborhoods and expand the prestigious private schools. Socioeconomic class segregation between the Arab neighborhoods will deepen. The relative moderation of the middle and upper classes, and their desire to maintain a respectable life, will encourage economic cooperation (of a covert character) with Jewish entrepreneurs in various spheres. (In Belfast, too, even in ultra-hostile periods, the mixed middle-

class neighborhoods, home to both Catholics and Protestants, remained relatively quiet.) In Jerusalem, the Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods will continue to be separate, though social contiguity and cooperation will be greater among the middle and upper classes (and between gangs of smugglers and other criminal elements, where common interests will override ethnic, national, and religious differences).

In the second option, which foresees deterioration in the situation of Jerusalem's residents as compared with the nearby West Bank cities, the Arab neighborhoods will be mortally affected. The migration balance will be negative. A weak, extreme population will enter in place of those who succeed in leaving. Poverty, neglect, distress, and alienation will be rife. Walls of social and national hatred will separate Arabs from Jews, and diverse modes of protection will be introduced to safeguard the Jewish population against national terrorism and civil crime.

Let us hope it never comes to this...

Understanding the Socio-Cultural Facts Created by Planning East-Jerusalem

Muhammad Kaimari

The History of the City Fabric

Since more than a century, the city of Jerusalem has begun to be shaped according to the Israeli policy; which aims to ensure a Jewish majority inside the boundaries of the city. The operative measures of this ideology include widening the municipal boundaries and marginalizing the Palestinian Arab society into one that does not play a role in shaping the city's image. The city was virtually divided into two parts from the beginning of the British mandate: the Jewish part and the Palestinian Arab part (which at that time included many of today's West Jerusalem); while the responsible British planning committees were biased towards enhancing development and broadening the municipal boundaries in the direction of the West.

During that period, the modernization of the Arab society was progressing, and the Palestinian built-up area also expanded to the West by extending some of the existing neighborhoods. This process was also motivated by the migration to the city from the surrounding villages and cities, and by the willingness of more and more Palestinian Jerusalemite communities to get out of the city wall boundaries and to live in the neighborhoods outside of the city walls.¹ Thus, the Palestinian built-up area prospered more and more, and it included many neighborhoods that share the modern architecture and urban fabric, such as: Al Baq'a, Al Wa'riya, At Talbiya, Esh Sheikh Bader, Khallet At Tarha, and Al Qatamon in the Western parts of today; and also Sheikh Jarrah, Bab as Sahira, El-Qa'a, Wadi al Joz, and other neighborhoods in the Eastern parts of today.²

1. Tamari, 1999.

2. Kark & Oren-Nordheim, 2001; Tamari, 1999.

However, after the war of 1948, the Palestinian Arab population was evacuated from the current Western side and Jerusalem was divided physically into two parts: East and West. After that, East-Jerusalem began to develop and interact more rapidly with other cities and villages in the West Bank. It became a central capital city for the Palestinian population in the West Bank, and its geographic location between major cities in the West Bank (Ramallah and Al-Bireh from the north, and Bethlehem and Hebron from the south) facilitated this process.

Then, East Jerusalem was occupied in the year 1967. It was directly annexed to the boundaries of Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem, and the administrative and planning systems of the city came under Israeli sovereignty. By the year 1980, the Israeli government had passed a law that declared Jerusalem a unified city within the Israeli municipal borders.³ In association with these regulations, the municipal area of East Jerusalem expanded from 6.5 km² in the year 1967 to 70 km² in the year 1993,⁴ where 24 km² were used to build Israeli settlements.⁵ Moreover, in the intra-urban perspective, the Palestinian suburb villages around Jerusalem that were annexed to the city became to be considered as neighborhoods within the municipal area.

Additional changes in the city fabric were introduced after the Israeli occupation. These included the confiscation of land and the building of settlements on more than a third of the area of East-Jerusalem, segregation of the Palestinian neighborhoods, enforcement by law, of all the Palestinian Jerusalemites to live in East-Jerusalem, and the building of a separation Wall around the city, that isolates it from its continuity with the surrounding Palestinian suburbs and cities.⁶ All of these changes complicated the situation in Jerusalem, and nowadays all of them accumulate together and endanger the development of the society in the city.

The past decade has witnessed a crucial change in the city fabric. The residential neighborhoods in East Jerusalem became more and more crowded, in order to accommodate the additional population that resulted from natural growth

3. Halabi, 1997.

4. Choshen, 1998; Margalit & Halper, 2004.

5. Hurwitz, 1998; Margalit & Halper, 2004.

6. Nasrallah et al., 2005.

and migration into the city. Furthermore, because of an absence of adequate planning for East-Jerusalem, and very difficult and prolonged (and in many times impossible) procedures needed for building, many areas in East-Jerusalem were unable to develop in harmony with the Town Planning Schemes defined by the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem. The result was that 15,000-20,000 residential units were built in the city without official building permits from the Israeli authorities (hereinafter, “informal building”). This number not only represents a small city, but more importantly is that it has had a significant influence upon the urban fabric. That is, these buildings created new unplanned neighborhoods, which are more similar to a traditional type of city fabric, and which are critical in shaping the city.⁷




Figure 1: Schematic development of Jerusalem in the 19th and 20th century, by means of traditional (unplanned) and modern (planned) physical environment.

7. Kaimari, 2005.

This paper aims at presenting the rationality behind the need to seize the process of informal building, and replace it with alternative and suitable planning that meets the needs of the residents. The basic assumption is that an informal type of development is opposite to the natural one that the city has been following (despite all the political obstacles) for the past 200 years. As shown in **Figure 1**, since the beginning of the world modernization process, the city has been trying to assimilate modernism into its fabric for many years. Nevertheless, there is a tendency lately towards a more unplanned traditional built-up environment, which is still associated with the traditional social structure based on kinship.

In the following sections, this paper will focus on the Israeli policies that significantly affected - and are still affecting - the development of the city.

1. The Background of the Israeli Policy in Planning East Jerusalem

This section presents the different policies adopted by the Israeli authorities that influenced the shaping of East-Jerusalem. It mainly focuses on the measures that hardened the process of development in East-Jerusalem, and how the authorities invented for themselves a thesis for West-Jerusalem and an anti-thesis for East-Jerusalem (see **Table 1**).

Table 1: The Acts of the Israeli Authorities and their Influence on the East-Jerusalem Population.

Act	Responsible Israeli authority	Influence on issuing a building permission	Influence on immigration to East Jerusalem
Building the Segregation Wall around East-Jerusalem	Ministry of Defense		+
The law of "Jerusalem as the center of daily life"	Ministry of Interior Affairs		+
	The Knesset		
Absence of Land registration	Ministry of Justice	-	
New planning regulation	Municipality of Jerusalem	-	
Building permits regulation	Municipality of Jerusalem	-	
Building of settlements	Ministry of Housing	-	
Expropriation of Land	Ministry of Interior Affairs	-	
	Ministry of Finance		
Absence of planning	Municipality of Jerusalem	-	
Inadequate Planning	Municipality of Jerusalem	-	

1.1 Siege, Colonization and Segregation Policy

Since the year 1993, East Jerusalem has been closed to West Bank residents. The entrance to the city is opened only to those who have permission from the Israeli military forces. The closure became more severe during the second Intifada, between 2000- 2002. Later, in the year 2002, the Israeli government began constructing the segregation Wall around the West Bank. The implication of this Wall on Jerusalem was very hard. The Wall has confiscated much of the Palestinian lands, totally isolated the city from its environments, and hindered the economic and social interaction between the populations of East Jerusalem and the surrounding villages and cities.⁸ In the near future, it is expected that the Palestinians of East Jerusalem will also need special permits from Israel to visit the West Bank. The population of East Jerusalem of 250,000 Palestinians (in the year 2003), exists for the first in a total isolation from every Palestinian community; and in this view, East Jerusalem resembles the gated and estranged city in the world.

This is not the only image of isolation, but in the intra-fabric view East-Jerusalem is isolated and fragmented into neighborhoods and areas. This occurred after the expropriation of more than 24,000 dunam from the Palestinian land for the benefit of building Israeli settlements in East-Jerusalem. One of the results of the building of these settlements, and the roads that serve them, is the fragmentation of East-Jerusalem into three sub areas:

- The first is in northern area which includes Beit Hanina, Shu'fat and Al Isawiya. This area is separated from the other Palestinian built-up areas by Ramot, Reches Shu'fat, Pisgat Ze'ev and the French Hill settlement.
- The second is the center area that contains the following Palestinian neighborhoods: Ash Sheikh Jarah, Wadi al Joz, At Tur, Ras Al 'Amoud, At Thuri, in addition to the Old City of Jerusalem. These areas are separated from other Palestinian built-up areas by the French Hill and Talpyot Mizrach settlements.
- The southern area, contains the following Palestinian areas: Jabal al Mukabbir, As Sawahira, Umm Tuba, Sur Bahir, and Beit Safafa. It is sur-

8. Nasrallah et al., 2005.

rounded and separated by many settlements including; Talpyot Mizrach, Jabal Abu Ghneim and Gilo.

In addition to this, the siege policy is continuing by the expansion of the built settlements. For instance:

- The Israeli settlement of Jabal Abu Ghneim is to expand from 2,832 residential units to 12,776 units,⁹ and thus it will occupy the whole Palestinian land around it and it will not allow the Palestinian area of Sur Bahir to expand further.
- Gilo settlement will expand with more 8,240 units, and thus surrounding the Palestinian area of Beit Safafa.¹⁰
- The settlements of Ramot and Reches Shu'fat will expand by 5,640 housing units,¹¹ which will encroach into the Shu'fat area.
- The Pisgat Ze'ev settlement will expand by more than 2,510 residential units, French hill by more than 660 units and Talpyot Mizrach by 1,970 units.¹²

Moreover, the activity of settling in the center of East-Jerusalem is taking place in other forms in which settlers try to go deep into the Palestinian area, these forms are:

- Buying houses directly and indirectly in the area of the Old City, Silwan, Ras Al 'Amoud and Jabal al Mukabbir.
- Building settlements inside the Palestinian areas such as, The Moskovitch settlement (140 housing units) in the heart of Ras Al 'Amoud, and the Nof-Zion settlement in the Jabal al Mukabbir (400 units).¹³

All of these settlements limit the Palestinian expansion by setting clear boundaries for the Palestinian built up areas, disturbing the residents' daily life with the security forces of the settlers, and prohibiting them from building while blocking the entrance to their city under the "security measures" slogan.

9. Bar-Sheshet & Afron, 2005

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

1.2 Restrictive Planning Policy

In Israel, the existing planning law is a very traditional law, differentiated from the old ordinances of the British Mandate and acting only upon planned areas. The law deals with the geographic areas as zones, which each have different uses. For most areas there are plans that specify the uses of the zones on four levels: national, regional, local, and detailed plans. The relationship between these plans is hierarchical. For example, if one wants to change the use of a small area (such as one that is 'detailed' on the level of the neighborhood or the house), the change has to be associated with a change of the upper local plan and, if there is any specific relationship, with the regional plan. The process may take between two and three years (sometimes more) in Israel. It is very complicated and needs the approval of the Regional Planning Committee of the Israel Ministry of Interior Affairs. However, this process is very important, because land use definition in the plan and the instructions act as a law.

For East Jerusalem there is no Town Planning Scheme that refers to the city as a unit. After the 1967 occupation, East-Jerusalem was annexed into the municipal boundary of the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem, the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem cancelled all the Jordanian plans; and because of canceling these plans, all building was prohibited. Thus, new clauses (77 and 78) were introduced to the Israeli Planning and Building Law (1965) in order to allow building while preparing plans, and in order to prevent the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem from falling into a critical situation.

The area of East-Jerusalem which was originally annexed to Israel was 70,000 dunam; from which more than 24,000 were expropriated to build Israeli settlements. From the remaining 46,000 dunam, there is only 25,000 until now; that can be utilized by the residents in accordance to the Israeli law¹⁴. Moreover, only 9,000 of this 25,000 dunam have been dedicated to residential use, and even this comes with very strict instructions insufficient for the residents' needs (such as: building percentages¹⁵ and number of floors). The remaining 16,000 dunam has been declared as green areas, or for streets and other areas for public use.

14. Margalit & Halper, 2004.

15. The building percentage is the ratio of the total built area in a parcel to the area of the parcel.

The municipality began to prepare plans that acted upon each neighborhood independently in the 1970s. It dealt with East-Jerusalem as a puzzle made up of parts (neighborhoods).¹⁶ The neighborhood plans were prepared in different periodic stages; and until the 1990s, most of the plans for the Palestinian neighborhoods were not approved (Until the beginning of the 1990s, the approved plans acted upon third of the today's approved area in East-Jerusalem, and they remained concentrated around the Old City of Jerusalem). This process resulted in a different planning status for Palestinian neighborhoods, and many neighborhoods still have not had the plans approved; (such as Shu'fat Refugee camp; parts of At Tur, Jabal al Mukabbir, Silwan, Sur Bahir, and Beit Hanina).

The approved neighborhood plans themselves are very difficult in their instructions and they place many restrictions on building. For example, in the area of Shu'fat neighborhood, the plans designated 51 ranges for re-parcelization (with an area of 1795 dunam that constitutes approximately 20 percent of the total residential area in East-Jerusalem¹⁷) in the zones of residential use. In these areas building permits could not be acquired, since the beginning of the process of re-parcelization more than ten years ago. Until now, no one knows the exact reason for this, and recently (in June 2005) due to the sharp shortage of residential units in the area, the residents decided to appeal to the court about this issue. It is also important to mention that although the municipality teams have not succeeded in the re-parcelization in ten years, one of the areas was re-parcelized in four years through a public initiative.¹⁸

In addition to this, the plans themselves put very strict instructions upon the allowed number of housing units per parcel, the building percentages and the number of floors. The building ratios allowed in the plans of Palestinian neighborhoods is much lower from those of the adjacent Israeli settlements. For example, the building percentage in Beit Hanina is between 50 -70 percent (with a number of floors between two and four), while the building percentage in the adjacent Pisgat Ze'ev settlement is between 90 percent and 120 percent (with a number of floors between four and nine); the building percentage in Jabal al

16. Hurwitz, 1998

17. HaReuveni & Sivan, 2004

18. This was an initiative of an association of professionals that bought the land and commenced the process of re-parcelization in order to build a housing project for the members of the association

Mukabbir is 25 percent (with a number of floors of two), while that in the close Talpyot Mizrach settlement is between 150 -170 percent; the building percentage in Shu'fat neighborhood is 75 percent, while in the adjacent Ramat Shlomo settlement it is 90-120 percent¹⁹. These claims are also valid in the newly prepared unapproved city Master Plan²⁰ (for the whole city) that the municipality prepared recently in the year 2000.

On the land use level, the plans that are in the Palestinian neighborhoods designate small areas for public institutes and public use, while denoting large areas for green areas. The plans also do not deal with the real residential needs (such as the allocation of areas for public use - especially in the right place where it could be used for the benefit of the residents), but rather nominates huge areas as green areas, which can not be used for anything. At the same time, many areas that are allocated for public use are not developed. Instead, they are neglected until their owners build residential units on them.

1.3 Bureaucratic Discriminative Policy

East-Jerusalem suffers from a serious problem in land registration. A very small part of the Palestinian neighborhoods are not registered in the land registry office (except those in the neighborhoods of Wadi al Joz, Sheikh Jarrah, As Suwwana, and a small part of Beit Hanina that were registered at the time of the Jordanian rule in Jerusalem).²¹ The Israel Ministry of Justice has not done anything on the ground to rescue the state of land thefts (because of the absence of land registration), while all the Israeli settlements that were built in East Jerusalem are registered.

The aspect of issuing building permits became of significant negative consequence to the Palestinian population after the 2000 (when the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem issued new regulations, which forbid those who do not have their lands registered in their names to have a building permits). For example: A person who has inherited a piece of land from his father or his grandfather can-

19. *Ibid.*

20. *The target year of the prepared master-plan of Jerusalem is the year 2020. This is the first plan prepared for the city since the year 1956 and the first one to include East-Jerusalem.*

21. *HaReuveni & Sivan, 2004.*

not acquire a building permit before transforming the land into his name. This of course costs a lot time and money. Moreover, third-generation inheritors who owned their land from the first-generation, have to register the land in their name in order to be allowed to build on their land. This may take a long period of time; however, if one of inheritors is not interested or absent, all the others will be influenced negatively; and if one is living outside of Jerusalem then his property will be lost to the benefit of the guardian property, which - according to the Absentee Law- is Israel. The result is that number of building permits²² issued for Palestinians in East-Jerusalem ranges between fifty-four permits per year (for example in the year 2003) and 150 in previous years.²³

In addition to this, the Jerusalem Regional Committee of Planning and Building (in Israel) issued new regulations in the year 2003 In relation to submitting detailed plans. The results of these regulations, in addition to that all the plans of East Jerusalem were frozen for more than a year, included:

1. Raising the level of difficulty in submitting detailed plans by asking for very hard instructions, such as the confirmation of ownership (which is also associated with taxes).
2. Asking for survey maps for the unregistered lands that cost more than \$3500 per dunam.
3. Hardening the process of submitting a detailed plan in East-Jerusalem by demanding the signature of an authorized architect on the plans that include architectural details.²⁴

All of these difficulties in finding a place to live in, came in association with a mass of migration to East-Jerusalem of Palestinian Jerusalemites who held a Jerusalem ID but lived in the West Bank²⁵, after the approval of the law in 1994 of "Jerusalem as the center of daily life".²⁶ These Palestinian Jerusalemites, together with the other Palestinian Jerusalemites who lived all their life in the city, were looking for houses to live in. However, because of the above-mentioned

22. *A building permit may allow building more than one housing unit.*

23. *HaReuveni & Sivan, 2004.*

24. *Most of the detailed plans in Jerusalem include architectural details, and at the same time, the number of authorized architects that work in this field in Jerusalem could be counted on the fingers of one hand.*

25. *Nasrallah et al., 2005.*

26. *The law implies the withdrawal of residency from the Palestinian Jerusalemites who reside in the West Bank (after the amendment of clause 192 in the Israeli "National Insurance" Law in the year 1994 (Halabi, 1997).*

difficulties, and also because of the urgent need of a house to live, many individuals began to lose hope of receiving a building permission, of buying a house or of building one according to building permission.

The final resort of many of these immigrants and other Palestinians living in the city was the informal building. However, thousands of the informally built houses were detected by the municipality teams and received demolition orders,²⁷ and hundreds of them were actually demolished.²⁸ However, there are also various forms of bureaucratic discrimination. For example:

- In the year 2001, the total number of informal building detected by the municipality teams was 7,042; out of which, 1,040 were Palestinian buildings (15 percent of the total). The number of the Palestinian buildings that received demolition orders in the same year was 70; only seven Israeli houses were detected and received demolition orders in the same year. This discriminative data is also valid in the previous and following years.²⁹
- In the year 2001, the total number of the legal processes adopted against informal building in Jerusalem was 1,030, from which 270 (26 percent of the total) were against Palestinian houses and 760 (74 percent of the total) against Israeli houses. In the same year, 32 Palestinian houses were demolished and only seven were demolished in the Israeli built-up area.³⁰

2. The Implications of the Israeli Policy

This situation asserted in this paper makes the process of choosing the place of residence as a politically oriented,³¹ rather than a demographically driven process. The residents move to and from the city according to the political restrictions. They chose for themselves the quickest path to reside in the city: either

27. Usually, after detecting informal building a legal process is commenced against the owner in which he is forced to pay a bill (on the average of \$10,000 per residential unit), and also to work within a specific period of time on "legalizing" the informal building by submitting a detailed plan, and the gaining the approval of the plan from the responsible committees. If the owner cannot succeed in the legalization process the building (the house) would be demolished on his account.

28. HaReuveni & Sivan, 2004.

29. Ibid

30. Ibid.

31. This claim was asserted by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in the Israel High Court session on 22 June 2000 in relation to building the segregation wall in Bir-Nabala, north of East-Jerusalem.

by building informally, by buying or renting a house informally, or by sharing with relatives in their apartment.

In the intra-neighborhood perspective, the increase in the size of the household, which is accompanied by a logical increase in the needed space, is often not associated with residential mobility and the households adjust their size to a new place (because of the absence of housing market).³² The residents postpone their decision to move, and as a result, specific changes in the household are not necessarily translated into the acquisition of a larger, more expensive, dwelling unit. Instead, households who are dissatisfied with their housing conditions consider other forms of housing adjustments. They may attempt to make in-situ adjustments; improve their housing conditions through remodeling, such as the informal expansion of a house; or they may choose to reduce dissatisfaction by revising their needs and aspirations in order to reconcile the incongruity.

At the same time, many others may chose to live in another new house (even if does not have a building permission) in order to modify their space. Also, it is worthy to mention here that the residents are vulnerable to the illegal activities of land thieves and contractors who sell “illegal construction” or stolen lands to the residents.³³

The implications of planning made the process of building a Palestinian resident complex difficult; especially because housing planning is absent and is largely limited to small-scale private initiatives. This resulted in the spread of mass “informal building” in East Jerusalem.³⁴ In this view, it seems that the city is in a spontaneous tendency towards developing in the direction of a traditional built-up area, because of the spread of “informal buildings”, which are constructed to accommodate population growth and immigration.

According to the preceding background, the anticipated picture of the city in terms of traditional (unplanned) and modern (planned) environments would be

32. *The total number of housing units that were built (according to permissions) by the Palestinians since 1967 is 18,000 units (Khameyseh & Nasrallah, 2003). That is, one additional unit for every eight additional persons.*

33. *On 9 January 2004 the Israeli “Municipality of Jerusalem” announced, through a public advertisement in Al-Quds daily newspaper, that eight multi-floor buildings in different parts of the city were illegal. The buyers of the units were warned that these buildings would be expropriated and destroyed.*

34. *According to the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem, more than 15,000 dwelling units were built in the city without being issued with a building permit.*

opposite to the normal direction.³⁵ It is expected that the city will develop into a more traditional pattern, with less cultural heterogeneity, as portrayed schematically in **Figure 2**.³⁶ Thus, the continuity in this path gradually pushes the whole city into a less planned area, which develops accumulatively according to individuals' interests and without planning considerations. It is expected that a great number of "informal" houses will be added in order to accommodate the natural growth and the population that comes back from the West Bank cities in order to maintain their rights of residence.³⁷ The other expected alternative for the population is that many households will choose to share space with their relatives in the same house.




Figure 2: Anticipated structure of the city in 2020

35. Kaimari, 2005.

36. Ibid.

37. Due to the decision of the Israeli Ministry of Interior Affairs in 1996, to withdraw residency from the Palestinian Jerusalemites who reside in the West Bank, (after the amendment of clause 192 in the Israeli "National Insurance" Law in the year 1994); and recently because of the construction of the Wall.

tional housing is more and more fortified: On the one hand, many of the residents who have chosen to return to East-Jerusalem prefer to live near their relatives and kinship members. On the other hand, the young people who get married choose the most available solution and live nearby their parents by building above their house, even if it is informal. This kinship type of development occurs mainly because of the critical situations in which many households exist; especially from an economic point of view, as many of them are incapable of buying houses. The family and the kinship provide a good type of support in the local area of residence; whether social, economic, or psychological. It is expected that households in such communities wish to remain in this environment in virtue of their socio-economic status and the social support from their communities. Thus, their choice to live near the family refers also to geographic reasons that also pour into the economy of the household.

On the other hand, the modern environment in East-Jerusalem, which emerged as a result of the process of the city modernization, is returning to a process of traditionalism. The people who live in such environments can no longer liberate themselves from the cohesive world of community and family commitments, or to create for themselves their own individualistic life style, and live in an independent manner. In the presence of segregated neighborhoods in the city, many places are difficult to reach especially using public transportation. These people cannot maintain their family ties in the city. Therefore, the spontaneous process that occurs is that they either move close to their kinship area, or that their kinship (especially if they migrated recently to East-Jerusalem) move to where they are. In both cases, the long-term result is the same: a traditionally kinship based environment.

In summary, the whole mentioned policy that represents a long history of neglect and discrimination, aiming to hinder growth of the Palestinian population and ensure that the Palestinian percentage of the city's population does not grow beyond 30 percent of the total city population,³⁸ is continuing now but in another form. It seems that it is more efficient and applicable to shape the cultural aspect of the Palestinian population, by the creation of more traditional populations - fragmented by means of social and cultural groupings such as fami-

38. Cheshin, 1999.

lies, Hamulas, and place of origin- so that it is easy to control.

This traditional social structure is associated with, and created by, a traditional physical structure that enhances and revitalizes the traditional environment. The absence of modern (or semi-modern) environments could guarantee that middle class would escape from the city, and hence, create a poorer and weaker city.

3. Planning Recommendations for East Jerusalem

In brief, the reasons behind the mentioned picture of development are: the absence of alternative housing planning in the city, and the discriminative policy against the Palestinians in the city. In order to rescue the deterioration of their social and physical environments, the theme of housing and the social services becomes very crucial for the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. The appropriate way to hinder this process and enhance healthy development is to handle this problem through understanding the socio-cultural factors, promoting public and private housing initiatives and culturally orientating planning processes for the population that is developing and growing outside of the original traditional environment. This includes the analysis of the socio-demographic and cultural factors behind mobility. Such a step will enhance the development towards a more modern society, rather than moving in the opposite “abnormal” direction.

The plans should be directed principally towards rehabilitation and development of the built-up areas on one hand, and towards providing suitable housing and services in the city according to cultural preferences on the other hand. The basic assumption considers preserving the cultural identity of the Palestinian population in the city, and creating new opportunities for educational and other career options. This would act as significant supports for the healthy development of the city.

Conclusion

When a municipality or any planning body is responsible for a specific area, regardless of its political status, it must plan for all the population of the area

equally and aim for a better future quality of life. Of course, this rational is profound in the international law and agreements, as well as in the modern and post-modern planning and social theories.

These bodies are not authorized to change the culture of a society by fragmenting it into communities or to portray the societies' culture as unsuitable with the Planning and Building Law. Rather, instead of changing a culture it is much easier to change a law.

Professional engineers, planners, sociologist and lawyers are the ones most capable of helping Palestinian Jerusalemites in attaining their urban rights. It is important to act intensively and immediately in order to prevent the situation from even further deterioration.

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Models of Coordination in the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area

Israel Kimhi

General

The population of the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area has been growing rapidly over the last two decades, in the Israeli as well as in the Palestinian sectors. Two main streams of population movements are consolidating the metropolitan area. In the Israeli sector, the movement from Jerusalem outside to the new towns and settlements around the city, in the Palestinian sector the movement is mainly from the outer parts of the West Bank to the Jerusalem area, mostly from the Hebron region. There is also some movement from the city to adjacent localities like Ar Ram or Az Za’ayyem. As a result of these migration trends and the high birth rates of the Arab population the metropolitan area is steadily growing up and will continue to grow in the future (**Table 1**). Because of this growth the need for cooperation in the area is becoming more and more pronounced.

Table 1: Jerusalem Metropolitan Area Population 2000–2020

Year	Population	The entire metropolitan area	The population in the city of Jerusalem	The metropolitan area without the city	Only in the West Bank
2000	Total	1,492,300	658,000	842,300	740,600
	Jews	626,000	449,000	186,600	90,600
	Arabs	865,700	209,000	655,700	650,000
2020	Total	2,548,000	857,000	1,691,000	1,481,000
	Jews	953,000	530,000	423,000	225,000
	Arabs	1,595,000	327,000	1,268,000	1,256,000
Growth in percentage 2000-2020	Total	71	30	101	100
	Jews	52	18	127	148
	Arabs	84	56	93	93

Cooperation is a very broad and comprehensive term with a vast range of possible implementation methods. It could work on a minimal scale by transfer of information among the various municipalities only, or a full range of cooperation could be developed through a well-organized administrative body. Even in a time of conflict transfer of information may help to improve the functional effectiveness of the communities involved.

Generally speaking it is not enough to operate at minimal scale cooperation. In the future, the various municipal bodies, in the Jerusalem region, will have to adopt mutual goals and objectives for the development of the region and develop strategies to achieve these goals. Taking planning decisions together concerning the future of the region will be a very important step towards regional cooperation.

In more advanced stages, it will be possible to share various projects among the cities; like creating a joint data bank or research and planning teams or even implement some of the economic projects together for the benefit of the metropolitan region.

The need for cooperation in a metropolitan area is very obvious. In any metropolitan area many functional connections exist among the municipalities who share the region. Roads and Infrastructure are the most obvious ones, but it is also true for public health, environmental issues, public services, air ports and other terminals of transportation, insurance and finance, direction of the built up area, problems of contradicting land uses, high education, cultural centers, occupation centers etc.

Metropolitan Area

A metropolitan area or region is in a way a “new community” without a defined border. The borders can change according to the issues involved as time progresses. The metropolitan region is not limited by a natural barrier or by political or administrative structures.

The demand for metropolitan organization rises from local needs created by problems above the capacity of the local level to handle, but below the need of the central government to interfere.

The main reasons may be the following:

- The rise in the standard of living creates more demand for the variety of housing in the region, more cars to commute to places of work, and more polluting and congestion on the roads that should be handled jointly.
- Cities that have many daily visitors and commuters must look for regional solutions to these problems.
- The development of suburbia and the pressure to develop open spaces in the cities. The misuse of natural resources like water, polluting large areas by traffic and the construction of industrial plants.
- Conflicts of interest between localities on issues like utilizing public services or the waste of public resources.
- Solving the problems known as NIMBY (Not in My Back Yard); e.g. dumping, sewage treatment plants, heavy industry etc.

Metropolitan structure aims to solve these regional conflicts for the benefit of the population that resides in the region. This can be done only through cooperation, understanding of the problems and the alternatives and overcoming selfishness and local un-proportional patriotism. The size of the metropolitan area should be big enough to maintain the individual interests of the communities of the region and the communities should be big enough to support a large range of services for its inhabitants.

The Definition of the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem

There is no official line delineating the metropolitan area of Jerusalem. Moreover this line is moving according to the amount and volume of conflict. But the Jerusalem region had functioned as a metropolitan area for more than 25 years. In that time tight functional connections were developed among the various municipalities in the region. A study of the metropolitan area was carried out by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies defining the various borders of the metropolitan area.

The criteria used in that study were the following:

1. Administrative division of the area.
2. Travel isochrones of private cars from the Jerusalem center.
3. Traffic volumes and traffic divided line.

4. Service area of the public transport from Jerusalem.
5. Commuting area of Jerusalem (30 percent of the labor force of the towns around Jerusalem)
6. Service area of Jerusalem for certain commodities.

The result of the study was the definition of a metropolitan area around Jerusalem stretching from the town of Hebron in the south, Jericho in the east, Beit Shemesh in the west and Shilo valley north of Ramallah in the north. Within this area Two Rings were suggested, expressing the connections with Jerusalem as a central city: “The Inner Ring” within a radius of some 15 km from the old city, and an “Outer Ring” within a radius of some 40 km.

The Population of the Metropolitan Area

In the year 2002 approximately 1,542,000 inhabitants resided within the Greater Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem, 56 percent Palestinians and 44 percent Israelis. In the inner ring of the metropolitan area (not including the city of Jerusalem) there were 335,000 inhabitants, 78 percent Palestinians and 22 percent Israelis, while in the outer ring (not including the city of Jerusalem) there were 525,000 inhabitants, 74 percent Palestinians and 26 percent Israelis. The conclusion is that without the majority of the Israelis in the city of Jerusalem, the Metropolitan Area, around the city, has a majority of Palestinian inhabitants.

The Goals of Cooperation

In any metropolitan area interrelationships develop between the various municipal entities. In many cases tensions are developed among the towns and the regional councils on the basis of competition. Each one of the localities tries to establish its own uniqueness and economic prosperity. It is certainly true in the Jerusalem case where nationalistic feelings are added to the functional competitions. This kind of competition could lead practically to nothing. The right way is the cooperation among the involved parties, in order to develop a more fruitful way to enhance the economy of the region and the well being of its inhabitants. There is no doubt that, in many cases, working together on some of the projects will emphasize the advantage of the economy of scale, saving money and other resources for all participants. In the EU a debate on the necessity of

cooperation between different layers of government, which have separate authorities but certain shared spaces of sovereignty, has been described as a system of “multi-level governance”. Such a system shows that coordination and sharing authority is not about abolishing sovereignty but rather about coordinating sovereignty – so that it works in the interests of all affected by the decisions.

The *raison d’être* for cooperation in the Jerusalem case might be the following:

- Strategic planning in functional daily issues of common interest.
- The advantage of scale. The larger the metropolitan area – the more economic opportunities.
- Improvement of services. The larger the municipal bodies the specialization in the given services is greater.
- Some problems in transportation and in public utilities can be solved only through mutual cooperation.
- Economic activities can be further enhanced on a metropolitan scale rather than by individual cities.

Criteria for Choosing Alternative Metropolitan Structures

The criteria are based on the experience of other metropolitan areas but with relevance to the Jerusalem case. The uniqueness of Jerusalem makes it difficult to compare Jerusalem metropolitan area to other places. The city is a bi-national one; a holy place for the three monotheistic religions with a complex structure of the built up area and topography, the city has been in the heart of a conflict for more than 150 years, very heterogeneous ethnically, with many historical neighborhoods and historical holy sites, and with a history of being a divided city.

The criteria are:

- 1. Effectiveness of implementation** – In which metropolitan structure the local authorities will better serve the inhabitants with greater variety of services, better quality and accessibility to those services.
- 2. Economic effectiveness** – In which structure the economy of scale will be more effective, better income to businesses, more efficient use of the land etc.

- 3. Equality** – Closing the gaps between localities and settlements participating in the metropolitan area administration.
- 4. Development of local democracy and public involvement** – The extent the alternative metropolitan area structures enhance better participation of the public in local elections, better democratic procedures and better representatives.
- 5. Implementation** – Establishing a metropolitan area that could not be implemented because of public disagreements or political and legal problems is not acceptable.

Organizational Models of Metropolitan Area Administration

There are many possible ways to establish an administration for handling problems of cities and their surroundings. One way could be to establish companies to deal only with one subject (like sewage treatment). On the other end, full range cooperation could be formalized statutorily to deal with all of the common issues of the region. It is also possible to establish organizations to deal only with a part of the area.

Establishing a metropolitan area government in the area of Jerusalem is a very difficult task, mainly because of the political situation. Nevertheless, the needs are there and it might be a good idea not to impose such a structure by the government but to convince the parties of the growing necessity to coordinate actions in the region to the benefit of all. It means to gradually establish a Metropolitan Council according to a set of goals agreed upon by all of the participants. The range of possible Metropolitan systems can start from an informal and voluntary agreement up to a formal and statutory one, and can include non-for-profit organizations as well as companies and urban conurbation. The options are:

1. Voluntary agreements for cooperation on specific issues
2. Non-for-profit organizations dealing with specific problems
3. Various kinds of companies
4. Urban Conurbation dealing only with part of the issues
5. Urban Conurbation dealing with a full range of the municipal- regional issues
6. Greater Metropolitan council with sub-municipalities

Interrelationship among Towns and Villages in the Area

The Jerusalem Metropolitan Area consists of a great variety of settlements which differ ethnically, economically, functionally and administratively. There are towns that operate as service centers to small villages around them. There are satellite towns with some independence, and there are dormitory towns or small communities that are totally dependent on services in the larger cities in the area.

Basically, the metropolitan area consists of two ethnic groups: the Israelis and the Palestinians. From this respect this is the only metropolitan area which is practically divided between two nations and has an open dispute regarding the future of the area.

The Israeli Part of the Metropolitan Area

The Israeli section of the metropolitan area operates on the principle of a mono-nuclei system. Jerusalem is the center for all the localities around the city. Functionally all the main economic activities, the financing, the administration and the main services (health, high education, culture etc.) are located in the city.

The Palestinian Metropolitan Area

The Palestinian section of the metropolitan area is presently functioning as a multi-nuclei Metropolitan system, due to political interference in the regular ways Metropolitan Areas are developed. Jerusalem today serves basically only as a religious center. There are three Metropolitan sub centers – Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah. Until some 15 years ago, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Ramallah were actually one functional area. The build up area is almost connected, the businesses were in good contact, the labor force moved freely between the cities as well as traffic, goods and tourism. Since then, Jerusalem has been segregated by various political and military means from its natural Palestinian hinterland. This segregation badly influenced the Arab population of the region but also weakened the economy of the city. In the last four years the situation has become even worse and the closure of the city has become more and more tight,

cutting East Jerusalem off almost completely from its Palestinian hinterland.

As a result, Ramallah became the main city serving all the area north of Jerusalem in services such as higher education, administration and financing. In the southern section of the splinted Metropolitan Area, Bethlehem acts as a nucleus to the villages around it and developed, until the last crises, as a tourist, religious and commercial center. Hebron, to the south, is the third nuclei, also functioning as a focal point to many villages in its region and a center of small industry. Bethlehem and Hebron are functioning separately from each other and are actually completely separated from Ramallah.

To sum up, the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area is presently divided and operates abnormally. From an Israeli point of view a mono-nuclei metropolitan area exists around Jerusalem. From a Palestinian perspective the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area has been divided into three sub-centers, leaving Jerusalem out of the functional Metropolitan structure. This abnormal situation could change dramatically due to political circumstances in the future, and Jerusalem may regain its central position as the major service center to all of the inhabitants of the region. Until such change occurs, it will be very difficult to establish one effective metropolitan area around Jerusalem, and the functioning of this metropolitan area will be divided. In the villages of utmost physical proximity to Jerusalem (Abu Dis, Al 'Eizariya etc.) cooperation on a voluntary basis will be needed in planning, environment and infrastructure issues. With Israeli communities, economic projects could be added to the list. Moreover, there are regional activities that do not recognize national borders and in such activities cooperation is of utmost necessity mainly in environmental issues.

Cooperation on the Metropolitan level is not so easy even if the national issues were not an existing problem. Both in the Palestinian Authority and in Israel there is a need for new legislation concerning Metropolitan Areas to overcome the “ego” feelings of the politicians in the individual towns.

Problems and Perspectives

1. The local administration in Israel is going through a process of decentralization. On the other side, in the Palestinian Authority, there is a tendency to

strengthen the central government. The mayors are practically under the district authority of the Muchafaz. The central authority rules the local municipalities by means of controlling the budgets and by the system of internal security. These, together with the national issues, are minimizing the possibilities for cooperation with the municipalities around Jerusalem.

2. Jerusalem is a poor city with no resources to support Metropolitan structure. There is little income from industry; there are many public and cultural institutions that are exempt of municipal taxes.
3. Practically, a Metropolitan Area should be divided into a large sub-area for dealing with economic and transportation issues, and to a smaller area to deal with local services.
4. The spatial definition of any Metropolitan Area should be according to the sensitivity of accessibility. The more sensitive the activity (or the service) the smaller will be the definition of the Metropolitan Area. Commuting to work is less sensitive than the service of education for children, therefore according to this criterion the border of the Metropolitan Area may be larger.
5. The means of transportation and the volume of traffic on the roads are influencing the spread of activities, first from the central area of the city to the outskirts, and later to the suburbs. The road network around Jerusalem and the bypass roads in the Palestinian Authority territories are also shaping the borders of the Metropolitan Area.
6. The small towns and settlements around Jerusalem are growing on the account of the central city, using its services without paying for them.

Alternatives for Organizing Jerusalem Metropolitan Area

For the past 37 years the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area has been growing in two different directions. The Palestinian growth is to the north-south axis while the Jewish one is on the west-east axis. This kind of development weaves the two groups of population in the metropolitan area and will influence its future structure and the ways of cooperation. The alternatives for the organization of the metropolitan area in the future may be:

A. Continuity of existing trends

Israeli small towns and the regional councils will continue to cooperate with Jerusalem municipality on a voluntary basis. Jerusalem will plan and implement various projects in the region and the other partners will join the city voluntarily by paying their share.

More formal relationships

B. Differential *ad hoc* cooperation

The Jerusalem municipality, the central governments and some of the towns in the region will hire companies to carry out some of the projects. Not all of the projects will necessarily be carried out by the same companies. Subjects for coordination will be: culture and education, social services, health services, transportation, dumping, sewage treatment, physical planning, environmental and economic issues.

C. More statutory bodies

The parties involved in the region will jointly establish municipal companies or NGO's to carry out, in a more formal way, the needed projects. Those companies will also operate on a more regular basis and will conduct surveys of the needed projects.

D. Urban conurbation for specific needs

In such a system more formal cooperative bodies will be established. The participants will sign contracts on cooperation, will be able to collect taxes and will have tools for implementation of projects and creating revenues.

E. Greater Metropolitan Council (GMC)

The Greater Metropolitan Council will be established by law through the central government. The details on the tasks and responsibilities of the GMC will be legally defined. Regulations will be made about the representative bodies, who are going to be elected, the number of representatives, the head of the GMC, taxation etc.

The Selected Alternative

After testing the alternatives by the criteria mentioned earlier, we believe that for the inner belt of the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area the last alternative is the appropriate one. The implementation, at the beginning, can be within the Israeli part of the Metropolitan Area, and later on the Palestinian part will join the GMC structure. For the rest of the area a more flexible alternative might be the right solution for the time being.

The GMC will coordinate all of the subjects that have a Metropolitan impact such as: physical and transportation planning, economic development, industrialization in the region, tourism, public health and environmental issues. The GMC will define its relations with the central governments, will develop tools to assist weaker municipalities in the region, will implement infrastructure projects and major roads.

The GMC will have a small staff while most of the projects will be implemented by urban companies or by the municipalities themselves. The GMC will decide on the major policies to be adopted for the future of the metropolitan area and the ways of involving all of the other members in consolidating these policies. The relationships among the GMC members will be defined by contracts. The delegation of power from the municipalities to the GMC will be minimal and the municipalities will remain independent as much as possible.

Structural Models for the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area



Voluntary			Compulsory
• Voluntary Cooperation	• Differential Cooperation	• Metropolitan Authority	
• More of the exciting <i>ad hoc</i> Joint committees • Sporadic agreement on Major regional issues	• Creation of common companies or NGO's for specific issues • Participation by the project	• GMC - Established by the Governments • Democratic representation • Election of formal bodies • Bi-national • Responsible for all regional issues	
• Tasks	• Tasks	▪ Tasks	
• Infrastructure • Environmental issues • Tourism	• Infrastructure • Environmental issues • Tourism • Selected economic issues • Public health	• Physical planning • Economic Development • Roads and infrastructure • Environmental issues • High education • Higher health services • Fire brigades • Dumping • Industrial development • Tourism and the protection of historical sites	

• GMC = Greater Metropolitan Council

Criteria for the evaluation of Metropolitan Area Models

Efficiency	Effectiveness	Quality of life	Democracy	Equality	Feasibility
• More Municipal Services • Better accessibility to public services • More money resources • More efficiency in Municipal structure • New roads and infrastructure • Introduction of new technologies • Better maintenance of public services • Less bureaucracy	• Achievements of more goals • Reducing wasted time • Larger range of services for more population groups • More autonomy of municipalities from the central government • More economic projects	• Less conflicts • More livable area • More recreation and open spaces • Improved public transportation • Better education • Improved environmental conditions (less noise and air pollution)	• More and better representation of population groups • More public participation • Greater influence of the citizens • Better public inspection of the authorities	• More equal division of resources among the municipalities of the region • More equality in taxation • More equality in the dispersion of public and commercial functions over the region	• Time to implement the new structure • Legal obstacles and possibilities • Political obstacles and possibilities • Economic feasibility • Social feasibility and Public acceptance

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Management of a Divided Metropolis: Lessons from Berlin to Jerusalem

Rassem Khamaisi

The purpose of this paper is to offer various models or ideas of urban management and administration in metropolitan areas. This paper will focus on the specific case studies of Berlin and Jerusalem as divided metropolitan areas and will compare and contrast the models of urban management used in each of the two cities. The paper will also describe the stages of change in urban management in Berlin and Jerusalem during selected periods, specifically the division/reunification stage in Berlin and the annexation period in Jerusalem. The paper will also offer some alternative models of urban management in Jerusalem based on various geo-political scenarios. Finally, the paper draws lessons from the changes in the urban management in Berlin after re-unification and evaluates their applicability to the situation in Jerusalem.

The paper will develop multi-dimensional models to manage the urban areas of Jerusalem, after identifying some lessons from Berlin that possibly could be implemented in Jerusalem to effect a transformation of the situation there. Any transformation should aim at changing the current situation of Jerusalem from one characterized by conflict and a divided urban fabric to one of co-existence and a shared urban fabric. These changes ought to take into account the geopolitical and national demands of both Palestinians and Israelis living in Jerusalem. The ideas underlying the different models reflect a method of managing and resolving the conflict in divided cities: the suggested multi-dimensional model to manage the Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalem metropolitan area includes different tiers and levels in the territorial and functional spectrum. The

spectrum of scenarios runs from a divided situation to an integration and sharing situation. In the final part of the paper we discuss a general functional model of urban management which focuses on spatial planning. The paper presents some principles of the various models that need more elaboration in further research.

Urban Management Between Centralization and Decentralization

The topic of urban management and administration of cities and metropolitan areas offers fertile ground for exploring various models of urban management. The models are influenced by diverse factors: political systems, relationships between the central and local government, political regimes, cultural traditions and norms, social structure and economic developments. These are just some of the many factors that determine the ways in which urban management models are shaped. Hence, in different countries we can find different models of urban management. The timing, the political circumstances, the socio-economic structure and situation have direct impact over the urban management. Indeed, the situation is more complicated in divided cities or cities in political, social, ethnic conflicts.

Studies on urban management evolve around the distribution of roles between the central government and the local government, the level of their intervention in the lives of people, as well as the extent of their ability to provide an appropriate urban fabric environment for their development.¹ Centralization and decentralization are usually influenced by the higher organizational and management levels and the monopolization of the decision-making authorities and their control over resources. In turn, centralization and decentralization are very much influenced by the geographical and spatial aspect and the geographic distribution of the decision-making centers. This means that urban management is linked to four central issues. The first is administrative and involves the power division inside the government and administration rules and apparatuses. The second is connected to the spatial distribution of the decision making centers. The third aspect is connected to the structural relation between the private sector, firms, elites and public; and the fourth is related to the functional relations of

1. McCarney, 1996; Rashid, 1981.

the components of the urban fabric.² There is no doubt that the relationship between these four issues is complex and dynamic: the more decentralized the administrative structure is, the more spatially distributed it is. Moreover, the extent of centralization and decentralization, and concentration and de-concentration are linked to many components, including:

- a) the ideological, political and social composition of the ruling regimes
- b) the types of decision making processes
- c) the size and area of the country
- d) the social and economic development of the citizens and their general awareness of their role.³

Central governments have political, economic, social and service considerations that influence their decisions concerning centralization versus de-centralization, or centralization of the decision making process versus transferring and delegating it to the local government and administration. Therefore, we find that changes in the ruling regimes or changes in the ideological, political, economic and social factors in the central governments lead to adjustments and reformations in the relationship between central and local governments.⁴ This is why urban management is not static; it is dynamic, changeable and shaped by the political, ideological, social and economic regimes of the country. For example, it can be seen that developed countries have chosen decentralization for the sake of ensuring democratic values in determining their priorities and developing their urban environment according to their preferences.

The literature on this subject reveals that centralization and decentralization in the societies and countries that suffer from political and ethnic conflicts have political and administrative implications. Hence, countries that suffer from political and ethnic conflicts inside and outside their cities use different mechanisms to deal with centralization and decentralization. While democratic countries and societies adopt pluralistic processes and grant administrative autonomy to the ethnic or national groups in their countries, some countries avoid pluralistic processes, and hence undertake oppressive measures and ethnic cleansing operations for the sake of tightening their control over the minority and/or the

2. Khamaisi, 2003.

3. Pickvance, 1997; Alzogby, 1988; Alakash, 1988; Algerbawy, 1996; Rashid, 1981.

4. Razin, 1994; Gunlicks, 1981.

disempowered groups in their countries. Some of the policies adopted in these cases may deny those groups any territorial administrative autonomy or even autonomy inside their cities.⁵ In fact, the process of managing cities that suffer from ethnic conflicts poses challenges for decision makers who seek to ensure peace, stability, progress and prosperity in their cities. The conflicts have direct effects on their abilities to attract economic development.

Conflicts in large cities are usually more intense than conflicts in small cities because large cities are characterized by the concentration of ethnic or national groups within one divided urban-social space. Members of those groups immigrated to large cities and were unable to be integrated with the native groups or the citizens of the host countries. In other cases, large cities have included since their establishment, ethnic groups who remained separate, as in the cases of Nicosia, Belfast, Johannesburg, Berlin and Toronto.⁶ The management of large divided cities suffers from two central issues: The first is related to the management of an urban space that is split into different administrative-municipal units but forms a united urban-functional space. The second issue is related to the means of devising administrative mechanisms in a socially and ethnically divided urban space. Social fragmentation in an urban space creates disparities among the social and ethnic groups with respect to their ability to obtain resources, to control the use of space, and to manage their affairs by obtaining administrative autonomy. The location of some cities - such as Berlin before 1989 and present day Nicosia - between two independent political entities affects their management, especially if they were divided and did not previously enjoy distinct boundaries. Such cities are located on the boundaries of the countries to which they belong and they are divided between two countries, each having different political and administrative regimes. These differences affect the urban management of politically divided cities.⁷

If the current situation in Jerusalem is viewed through the literature referred to above, one finds that Jerusalem has become a large metropolitan city comprised of political and social units that suffer from deep-rooted ethnic, political and national conflicts. The people are geographically separated even though they

5. Hasson, 1996; Boal, 1997; Boal, 1996; Dunn, 1994.

6. Hasson, 1997; Barlow, 1997; Bollens, 1998; Bollens, 1998.

7. Pounds, 1962; Gallusser, 1994.

Figure 1: Central Issues Addressed by the Proposed Solutions to the Issue of Jerusalem and Berlin from 1921-2004: From Incorporation to Partition to Partnership

Cities	Central Stage / Central Issue	Political Arrangement / National Ambitions	Religious Sites
Jerusalem	Until 1948: Foreign Administration	- Jerusalem to remain outside the partition scheme, under international custody.	- Guaranteed access to all religious sites. - Responsibility over managing religious sites to be in supra-national hands.
	1948-1967: Stage of Partition	- Partition of Jerusalem into an Israeli city and an Arab-Jordanian city. - Realization of the Israeli ambitions on parts of Jerusalem, failure of the Palestinians to realize their ambitions even in parts of the city. - Partition rejected by all bodies having interests in Jerusalem.	- Under Jordanian control, in the eastern sector of Jerusalem. - Restriction of access to religious sites for certain groups. - Demands to allow international observation in the religious sites in Jerusalem.
	1967-2004: Stage of Annexation, Israeli Sovereignty	- Realization of Israeli sovereignty and ambitions. - Recognition of some of the Palestinian ambitions and the Palestinian functional sovereignty. - Capital for two states.	- To remain under Israeli sovereignty. - Freedom of religious groups to manage their religious sites. - Guaranteed freedom of access to religious sites for worship.
Berlin	Until 1949:	Berlin is central city of Germany, politically, culturally and economically.	- In Berlin there are no religious sites in dispute.
	Between 1949-1961: Partition period.	- Partition of Germany into two states (West and East). Berlin divided in to two cities. East Berlin is the capital of East Germany	- The old part of Berlin is East Berlin; includes archeological and ancient sites.
	Between 1961-1989: Division by a Physical Wall	- The political capital of West Germany changed to Bonn, and Frankfurt became the economic capital. In the two divided parts of Berlin dual functionality develops, such as two operas.	- Free movement of individuals across the border until 1961.
	Between 1989-2004: Unification stage	- Demolishing the Wall, state unification, developing Berlin as a global city; Berlin capital of united Germany by parliamentary decision.	- To address the issues of unification.


live next to each other in the same space. Additionally, Jerusalem is located on the fringes of the Israeli and Palestinian states and was physically divided during the period 1948-1967. Although in 1967 Israel annexed the eastern sector of Jerusalem and united the city under Israeli sovereignty, this measure was rejected both on the Palestinian and the international levels. In fact, there are practically two political-social regimes in Jerusalem that are based on two different ideologies: decentralized management in the western-Israeli sector of the city, and centralized management in the eastern Palestinian sector. The ramifications of this situation are examined next.

It is appropriate to conclude this section by underlining the fact that the official international, Israeli, Palestinian and Arab legal stances on the issue of Jerusalem are divergent. The international legal position on Jerusalem, which is supported by most international legal experts, evolves around the resolution of the international legitimacy that was affirmed by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, known as the Partition Resolution. This resolution granted Jerusalem a special status (*Corpus Separatum*) under the custody of a special international body - the UN. This means that the international authorities must approve the imposition of the Israeli or Palestinian sovereignties and laws on Jerusalem. In contrast to that position, the post-1967 Israeli position is that of a united Jerusalem that is the capital of Israel and under its sovereignty and administration. On the other hand, the Arab and Palestinian position on Jerusalem is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 242 for the year 1967 and Partition Resolution 181 for the year 1947. This means that the official Arab and Palestinian position conflicts with the Israeli position and is congruent with the international resolutions of legitimacy. Clearly, local and urban management arrangements and boundaries for the urban space of Jerusalem must take into account the legal status of Jerusalem and the official positions regarding it, as well as the current imposed reality.

Cities Management Transformation Process

Urban management of divided cities is a dynamic process. This process changes when any of the levels and components of division are changed. The literature that describes the urban management of divided cities displays a diver-

sity of models that vary according to the level and type of division. Jerusalem and Berlin are located on different levels of segregation and integration, and are presented on the scale below. The urban management in these cases could be classified based upon the principle that divided cities are affected by the levels of division, the political regime, the economic developments, social cultural structure and ethnic belonging.



The present reality in Jerusalem must be noted before proposing alternatives and models regarding arrangements for the local urban management of Jerusalem and its district. A brief overview of this reality follows:

1. Presently, about 685,000 people live inside the boundaries of the expanded Israeli Jerusalem Municipality. This figure includes 235,000 Palestinians. The remaining are 450,000 Israelis, 25 percent of whom are identified as religious Orthodox.
2. In spite of the spatial and functional sharing, neighborhoods are divided on a national-ethnic basis. Jerusalem's neighborhoods are classified as secular Israeli, religious Israeli and Palestinian, but they are situated in the same space.
3. No ethnic or social group is willing to intermingle with another.
4. Israel controls the Jerusalem Municipality, whose area is about 126,000 dunam (or approximately 31,000 acres), about half of which are built up.
5. There are about 45 local authorities in the Jerusalem area, which extends from Bethlehem in the south to Ramallah in the north. Each of those authorities forms a separate and independent urban unit that does not cooperate with its neighbors.
6. Jerusalem is located on the periphery of Israel and in the heart of the West Bank.

7. The Israeli governmental and official institutions are concentrated in Jerusalem, and the official Israeli position that asserts Jerusalem to be its capital reflects a national consensus regarding the city's status. In return, most Palestinian public institutions have been concentrated in Jerusalem but, because of the Israeli ban on the establishment and operation of official Palestinian institutions in the city, the Palestinian Authority is concentrating its official institutions in areas outside of Jerusalem.
8. Jerusalem enjoys a unique spiritual, religious and symbolic status for the Muslims, Christians and Jews. Nevertheless, arrangements regarding its administrative and political future can be made basically through a Palestinian-Israeli agreement.
9. International, Arab and Palestinian rejection of the official Israeli position, and suggestion of an alternative structure that forms a basis for making future arrangements regarding the management of Jerusalem.
10. The administrative and institutional conflicts in Jerusalem are closely linked to the geopolitical, spatial and ethnic conflicts.
11. Distribution of the space during the transitional phase between several political and legal regimes, which creates dualities of references that guide the operation of the urban administrations.

The above facts have a direct impact on the present and future urban management of the municipal urban fabric and space, and they must be the starting points for the suggestion of administrative alternatives in Jerusalem. This reality of Jerusalem should be compared with the situation and status in Berlin to get the lessons from the experience of Berlin to be developed. The urban management in Jerusalem and Berlin is affected from the status and situation of the two cities. The table below offers some of the main differences between the two cities.

Figure 2: Urban Management in Berlin and Jerusalem 2004

Variables	Berlin	Jerusalem	Comments
Topography	Flat	Mountainous	
Climate	Temperate and comfortable.	Mediterranean and semi-arid.	
Demography	3.4 million people. Negative to stagnating population development; ethnic minorities with higher reproductive rate.	0.680 million people. High population growth, based on high natural increase and immigration. High natural increase among the Palestinians and Jewish Orthodox. Low natural increase among the secular Jewish population.	Between the Israeli and Palestinian populations there is a demographic conflict and competition. The demographic balance sought by the Isreal consists of 70 percent Israelis and only 30 percent Palestinians. This goal underlies Israeli demographic, territorial and planning policies for Jerusalem. For Berlin the higher minorites' birthrate can stabilize Berlin, if social and cultural segregation can be stopped.
Citizenship	All the residents have specific residents' rights, migrants must apply for citizenship.	Israelis have citizenship, while Palestinians have residency.	The Israeli policy aims to reduce the Palestinian residency in Jerusalem.
Urban management structure	A metropolitan district, divided into 13 municipalities. The decentralized policy is main part of urban managments, manifold division of functions between central administration and municipalities based on law.	One official municipality and some official and informal administrative boroughs. Still, the centralized approach guides the urban management policies.	Israel abolished the East Jerusalem municipality and the local Palestinian councils in 1967 after the occupation. The Berlin municipalities with their own local councils serve as integrating bodies through a high level of peoples' participation.
Area	891.7 square km.	126 square km.	The area is under dispute.
Legitimacy	Has international legitimacy as capital of federal Germany.	The international community did not accept the legitimacy of Jerusalem as Israeli capital. The Palestinians claim Jerusalem to be capital of their state.	The international solution is to divide Jerusalem and to create two capitals, one for Israel and one for Palestine.
Land Ownership	Most of the land is privately owned, except for public functions.	Most of the land is public and governmental. A great amount of land was confiscated from the Palestinians and transfered to the Israeli state.	Israel confiscated the Palestinian land. Land ownership constitutes one of the main issues of conflict.

Figure 2. Continued

Variables	Berlin	Jerusalem	Comments
Stability	Has political stability after unification 1989.	No security or political stability; remains part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	The Israelis propose to give the Palestinians some equality, while the Palestinians seek to end the occupation.
Belonging	Prior to 1949, East and West belong to the same people, religion, national narrative, language, cultural history and vision, but partition period created partitioned belonging. United civil and public institutions have intentionally worked on uniting the people. Growing migrant population with different languages, religions, cultures.	The Palestinians and Israelis are different people. They have different religions, different language, national historical and cultural narratives, and therefore seek a different future.	The Palestinians belong to same national, language, cultural, history and narrative of the people and countries surrounding them, but the Israeli are foreigners. Berlin started interesting programmes to foster social integration and respect among the cultures.
Level of Development	Highly developed, with many opportunities.	Poor city, limited opportunities.	Berlin is part of the developed world, while Jerusalem is part of developing world.
Boundaries	Open, accepted and demarcated, the demolition of the Wall was longed for by the East and the West.	Still under dispute; municipal boundary consists partly of the national boundary. Today the Israelis are building a physical wall which will separate Jerusalem from its Palestinian surroundings.	The boundaries of Jerusalem have changed at least eight times during the past fifty years.
Urban Planning	Participation and decentralized planning.	Centralized, official and partisan planning.	In Jerusalem urban planning is a tool of control and limitation.
Images	Historical and national center. It is considered a developed city. The Berlin Constitution binds the Berlin government to creating equal living conditions in all communities.	An image as a religious, cultural and historical center has changed to one of a city composed of two political capitals.	Jerusalem is center of the three main religions.
Metropolitan	Functions as normal metropolitan area with large hinterland and catchment area.	Small, metropolitan with limited and poor hinterland. Boundary and peripheral city.	Berlin was border and peripheral city. Since the unification it has changed to become a national and international center.

Proposed Principles for Alternative Models of Urban Management in Jerusalem Urban Area

Setting principles regarding the urban management of Jerusalem is a must because such principles are needed as a basis for suggesting alternatives for managing the urban space of Jerusalem. Such principles have been outlined in Hasson's study (1997), but they are given a different explanation in this study. The following is a brief overview of those principles:

1. **The space:** any administrative arrangement in Jerusalem must have a spatial and a geopolitical expression in addition to the functional expression. In this context, the author differs with Hasson (1997) who argues that any municipal-administrative alternative in Jerusalem must accept that the expanded boundaries of the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality are final and unchangeable. Borders that have never been agreed upon internally divide this space. Additionally, this space includes villages, cities and neighborhoods inhabited by Palestinian and Israeli residents in an inter-mixed manner in spite of being separated on national-ethnic grounds. This principle can be summarized as: "any urban management arrangement must include re-demarcating the borders between the local authorities, which should include those currently inside the boundaries of Jerusalem as well as those in the areas surrounding it."
2. **Changes along the time axis:** this principle has two dimensions. The first is that any administrative arrangement to be agreed upon would not be carried out immediately; a long time would have to elapse before it would become a reality on the ground. During this period, unexpected incidents could happen, but they should not affect the nature of the desired administrative arrangement. However, the reality is that the occurrence of unexpected incidents along the axis of time usually hinders the realization of the desired administrative arrangement. And thus the second dimension of the principle of time, this having to do with the suggestion of alternatives. Proposed alternatives must set flexible frames that can ensure their realization in a different time and under different conditions. The principle of time points to the possibility of adopting new methods and mechanisms of urban management that could contribute to guaranteeing successful urban

management. Moreover, the principle of time can make way for transition from the present reality of deep-rooted conflict to a reality of coexistence even under conditions characterized by spatial separation.

3. **Reciprocal relationship:** between urban changes that occur inside Jerusalem and those that occur outside it and in areas that have interests in or can be affected by what happens in Jerusalem. Therefore, the principle of the reciprocal relationship must characterize the direct and daily relationship between Jerusalem and its urban surroundings, and demonstrate the indirect effects of certain administrative arrangements on countries and institutions that have interests in Jerusalem and what happens in it.
4. **Settlements:** the principle of settlements entails that neither side could get everything that it wants, but it could get some of what it wants. Due to the deep-rooted conflict over Jerusalem between the Palestinians and the Israelis, which is more than one hundred years old, each side has its position and demands. This means that any urban management arrangement must achieve goals for both sides. The starting point for the settlement is the resolutions of the international legitimacy, represented by the UN General Assembly Resolution number 181 for the year 1947 and the UN Security Council Resolution number 242 for the year 1967. Although these two resolutions have been passed at different stages, the settlement must not neglect the reality in Jerusalem as outlined earlier.
5. **The special status of Jerusalem:** Jerusalem must be managed in accordance with a plan based on its spiritual, religious and symbolic uniqueness because plans carried out in different urban spaces in the world cannot be copied and transferred to Jerusalem. Nevertheless, there is a need to learn lessons from the experiences gained from managing different urban spaces and devising processes of different levels of cooperation, such as Berlin, so as to develop a plan that suits the unique reality of Jerusalem. Hence, Jerusalem's uniqueness and special status must be taken as a principle in its urban management.

The Political Structure of the Jerusalem Urban Area

The political structure of the urban space of Jerusalem and its surroundings can be organized on two basic levels: the national level and the local level. The national level entails devising a geopolitical solution between the national leaderships of Israel and Palestine, while the regional level entails devising political arrangements and solutions between the different municipal-administrative units within the space, which include municipalities, local and village councils, and regional councils. These administrative units are practically local political units representing residents living within the urban- management space, and in order to provide services in them, they must reach agreements. The local and national levels are linked by an adversarial relationship that must be taken into consideration at each level. In order to ensure a productive relationship between the different political units inside the urban space, several mechanisms can be adopted. These mechanisms include:

1. Devising geopolitical solutions on the national level through demarcating sovereign political, functional or service boundaries.
2. Re-dividing the national political units in accordance with functional concepts and considerations - instead of the regional or geopolitical considerations - as an axis guiding the demarcation of borders.
3. Reviving mechanisms and processes that facilitate cooperation and partnership between the national political units and the local municipal units. This can be done through:

A) Establishing joint municipal foundations or organizations between several municipal political units or between the two political regimes in order to create mechanisms for coordination and partnership, and even merging some such units with reference to urban planning, management and development. Such foundations or organizations should deal with issues like planning, establishing, developing and maintaining the infrastructure, economic cooperation, quality of the environment and providing a variety of services.

B) Concluding comprehensive or specific official and unofficial agreements

between different municipal political units for the sake of dealing with specific issues.

- C) Privatizing the services by providing them through the private sector, or creating partnership between the private and public sectors for the sake of providing services and upgrading infrastructures, leading towards economic prosperity. Local authorities can establish municipal economic companies for the sake of achieving economic prosperity within their space. Such economic companies could be joined between several neighboring local authorities.
- D) Conducting urban management reforms in the national or local political units through redistributing the roles between the municipal-administrative levels. Such reforms could include the establishment of a metropolitan or district government or administration for the sake of managing the urban space and planning it. Administrative reforms include dividing the urban units into administrative units on several levels in order to ensure effective management, to conserve resources and to facilitate direct representation of the residents.⁸

The creation of a comprehensive administrative metropolitan frame comprised of several municipalities and local councils is considered a favored alternative in politically fragmented urban spaces.⁹ Studies indicate that this frame could include certain issues and could be either compulsory or voluntary. In the following table, (**see Figure 3**) the possible alternatives for the formation of a metropolitan management in a politically fragmented space are presented.

⁸ Martins, 1995; Salet, Thornley and Kreukels, 2003.

⁹ Salet, Thornley and Kreukels, 2003.

Figure 3: Models for the Formation of an Urban Management Metropolitan Frame in the Space of Jerusalem

Cooperation ← → Commissioning of Authorities & Vesting of Responsibilities					
Models	Voluntary or Elective Cooperation	Selective or Issue-oriented Cooperation	Umbrella Metropolitan Municipality	Metropolitan Frame	Metropolitan Authority
Brief Description of Duties	- Creating voluntary or elective cooperation between the currently operating municipalities through joint coordination apparatuses and reaching agreements and letters of understanding.	- Establishing cooperation institutions and apparatuses. - Establishing municipal and sectoral foundations & organizations. - Limits and scopes of cooperation to be determined according to sectors.	- Establishing municipal body forming an umbrella for different municipalities in the same space. - The role of the umbrella municipality is to coordinate and enforce cooperation, which is not compulsory or obligatory.	- Forming metropolitan government for the sake of: Providing and organizing services covering the boundaries of all municipalities; preparing urban and spatial plans. - The role of the local municipalities evolves around public affairs.	- Establishing metropolitan authority that devises and initiates development and administration policies in all administrative-municipal fields, including the collection of municipal taxes and the funding of projects and programs related to public affairs.

International experience in reorganizing urban and political spaces indicates that there are two dimensions: the geographic and the organizational. The geographic dimension focuses on the process of re-dividing the space into geopolitical administrative units, while the organizational dimension focuses on creating a hierarchy of authorities and responsibilities. The following table summarizes the relationship between the geographic and the organizational dimensions in the process of managing urban spaces.

Figure 4: The Relationship between the Spatial and the Organizational-Administrative Dimensions in the Process of Managing Urban Area

Level	Division of the Geographic Space into Levels	The Organizational and Administrative Hierarchy in the Geographic Space	Duties
1	The State - with its borders and sovereignty.	The Government.	Passing laws, allocating resources, security.
2	Regional and functional metropolitan space.	Metropolitan authority or umbrella municipality.	Passing municipal laws, collecting municipal taxes and funding projects, coordinating between municipalities in comprehensive or sectoral issues.
3	District.	Regional-district authority.	Coordinating between municipalities, supervising the operation of municipalities, ensuring continuity and integration of the infrastructure and the services.
4	Municipality - area of jurisdiction.	Municipality.	Passing local laws, representing the residents, collecting taxes and funding projects, maintaining the urban space and developing it.
5	Neighborhood.	Functional and organizational neighborhood administration.	Implementing laws, representing the needs of the residents, organizing public activities.

The above table reveals that the relationship and the distribution of roles between the urban space and the organizational hierarchy can be linked to the political regime and the social and economic ideology of the state with reference to the principles of concentration, deconcentration, centralization and decentralization since the roles of the administrative apparatuses in the space depend upon the nature of the relationship between the central government, the local government and the individuals.

The following table presents the possible alternatives in the process of managing the urban spaces within cities.

Figure 5: The Relationship between the Geographic Division and the Popular Division inside Cities

Geographic Division ← → Popular Division			
Alternatives	Neighborhoods	Administration of Quarter	Popular Sectors
Brief Description of Contents	Division of the city into secondary areas that present the diversity of the residents and their affiliations while connecting them with mutual interests. A neighborhood enjoys high functional independence.	Division of the city into numerous units of quarters that enjoy relative independence in managing their internal affairs. Quarters tend to be homogeneous in terms of residents and interests.	Division of the city into population groups with reference to homogeneous interests and social and ethnic affiliations. Each group enjoys independence in managing its internal affairs.

Hence, the political division of an urban space is a central guide for suggesting administrative alternatives regarding its management. This relationship shall form a basis for devising alternatives for our discussion below.

Suggested Alternatives Models for Managing the Urban Area of Jerusalem

The process of developing alternatives for managing the urban space of Jerusalem must depend on geopolitical hypotheses. The following is an overview of the geopolitical alternatives which have ramifications for Jerusalem's urban management:

1. Continuation of the present reality. The implications of this are: a) continuation of the Israeli administrative and functional sovereignty over the Jerusalem Municipality; b) parts of the boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipality continue to form parts of the boundaries of the state of Israel; c) continuation of the development and expansion of settlements outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem and inside the Palestinian territories and

- consolidation of their linkage with Jerusalem; d) continuation of the Palestinian National Authority's (PNA) efforts to extend its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Palestinian territories; e) Jerusalem continues to be the capital of only Israel; and f) continuation of the PNA's development of its official institutions in Ramallah or Gaza.
2. Expansion of the borders of the Jerusalem Municipality eastwards to include the Jewish /Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as well as expansion of Jerusalem District eastwards.
 3. Jerusalem becomes an open city and a capital for two states; the Israelis and the Palestinians to accept a political settlement regarding Jerusalem in accordance with which Jerusalem becomes spatially and functionally united, but demographically and socially divided in accordance with its ethnic and religious diversity.
 4. A divided, but permeable city - this means re-dividing the city into a Palestinian side and an Israeli side, and ensuring the permeability of goods and residents between the two sides in a controlled and supervised manner.
 5. A divided, separate and impermeable city along the 1967 borders with or without alteration - in this case each side of the city becomes a capital for a state without linkage or partnership between them as in the case of the present Nicosia or the pre-1967 Jerusalem.

Several forms of solutions can be thought of since each alternative has different municipal-administrative arrangements. Figure 6 summarizes the ramifications of each alternative or political solution on the urban management of Jerusalem and its district.

Figure 6: The Political Solutions Regarding Jerusalem and its District

Ramifications on the management and the positions towards it Political Alternative	Ramifications on the urban management of Jerusalem	The Israeli position	The Palestinian position
Continuation of the present reality including the impact of the Wall which is being built now in Jerusalem area and separates Jerusalem from Palestinians surrounding.	- Continuation of the fragmentation and separation between the Palestinian and the Israeli municipalities and local councils, and overruling cooperation or coordination between them. - Establishment of a metropolitan authority that includes Israeli towns and settlements, but excludes Palestinian towns. - Palestinian subjugation to the local Israeli administration.	Seeking to keep it, attempting to make adjustment on the local management towards a metropolitan management.	Rejection, efforts to adjust it.
Expansion of the boundaries of Jerusalem and annexation of other territories to it to become parts of Israel.	- Expansion of the boundaries of Jerusalem Municipality and imposing its jurisdiction on other Jewish settlements. - Formation of administrative urban units in the neighborhoods. - Annexation of Palestinian towns to Jerusalem District, but keeping them independent and separate from the metropolitan umbrella municipality.	No consensus on this solution. Demanded by the settlers and some leaders of the right.	Absolute rejection, prepared to use every possible means to prevent it.
Open city and capital for two states.	- Establishment of two municipalities: a Palestinian and an Israeli, and an umbrella municipality linking them. - Functional, service partnership. - Partition of the city into urban neighborhoods and quarters.	Official rejection, existence of groups that seek to realize it.	Official rejection, partial acceptance within the frame of comprehensive settlement
Divided but permeable city.	- Partition of the city into two separate municipalities. - Establishment of two metropolitan authorities without overruling the possibility of cooperation or partnership between them. - Partition of each municipality into administrative neighborhoods or secondary municipalities.	Official and public rejection.	Acceptance.
Divided, separate and impermeable city.	- As in the case of the permeable city, but without cooperation or partnership between the two municipalities.	Rejection.	Rejection, but there are many alternatives that will be accepted.

The proposed political suggestions concerning the means of solving the issue of Jerusalem have suggested several types of sovereignty, each of which has a certain type of urban organizational and management structure. However, only four types of sovereignty can be applied to the case of Jerusalem:

1. Absolute Israeli geopolitical sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, or partition of the city and restoration of the pre-1967 situation with some adjustments to enable coordination and cooperation between some parts of the city. In the latter case, the Palestinians enjoy sovereignty in East Jerusalem and its surroundings, while the Israelis enjoy sovereignty in West Jerusalem and its surroundings.
2. Functional sovereignty whereby some functions or services are carried out or provided by either the Palestinian or the Israeli sides in all of Jerusalem or in certain parts of it. Functional sovereignty can be applied in a sectoral manner or in a gradual manner with reference to the different geopolitical units: metropolitan space, district, municipality, neighborhood or quarter.
3. Joint sovereignty whereby sovereignties over the space are mixed and the political boundaries are geographically, functionally or sectorally overlapping based on the residents' concentrations and affiliations.
4. Limited sovereignty whereby the sovereignty of a certain side in the urban space is controlled by the other in the case of open or permeable borders.

This diversity of sovereignties can open new horizons on the way to suggesting alternatives and arrangements regarding the urban management of Jerusalem. This means that the traditional sovereignty which both the Palestinians and the Israelis seek to exercise in Jerusalem, before determining the form and nature of the cooperation and partnership between them, is a traditional solution that probably suites the present reality of Jerusalem, even though the principle of sharing the sovereignty over Jerusalem is rejected by the Israelis but demanded by the Palestinians. This diversity of sovereignties can be illustrated in the relationship between the urban management levels, which range from the national level to the level of neighborhood administrations, going through the district, metropolitan and municipal levels.

Application of the Functional Model in Urban Management in Jerusalem

Resolution of the dispute over political sovereignty and control of Jerusalem constitutes one of the main issues to be settled in the final negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. While sovereignty over Berlin is clear and was clear during division of the city into two different systems, the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem includes unsettled national, religious and symbolic considerations. The concentration or distribution of powers is a sovereignty issue on which neither of the two parties want to compromise. Each has a very clear attitude and established stand point. In spite of that, the parties of the conflict are still looking for a way to bridge the gap between their polarized geo-political attitudes. The departure points of their respective functional models only deal with the topic of geo-political sovereignty and do not lead to reaching a compromise over Jerusalem. In order to pave the road for a future geo-political solution, or at least a geo-political compromise, we need to look for alternatives that could reduce the conflict and the tension. These alternatives could encourage the two parties to accept a future compromise.

The alternative which we want to discuss in this part of the paper is the implementation of the functional (as opposed to a geo-political or territorial) model in the urban management of the metropolitan Jerusalem area. The administration and management of the Jerusalem metropolitan area is complex and multi-faceted. It requires a multi-disciplinary approach and cooperation among various factors, which will lead it toward a peaceful and prosperous future. We have chosen to present here the functional model to municipal administration because, in our view, it will open an opportunity for the area and its inhabitants to enjoy a promising common future.

Generally, three alternatives for interim arrangements for the administration of Jerusalem and the metropolitan area are usually advocated. The first view argues that there is no need to deal with municipal administration as long as there is no political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians about the city. The issue must be postponed for the present and dealt with after a geopolitical agreement about the future of the city has been reached. (The story of Berlin during partition - even hostility - and the nevertheless ongoing practical rela-

tions could be interesting for this phase). The second argues that arrangements about municipal administration should be a part and a component in the geopolitical agreement over the city and the metropolitan area. (Here the arrangements of the Four-partite Control Council during the four sector phase of divided Berlin could be interesting to study). The third proposal argues that we should not wait for a geopolitical agreement on the conflict over Jerusalem: arrangements on the level of municipal administration must be found along with, or even before, reaching a geopolitical solution. (Some implications could be found in Berlin at the interim phase of two collaborating municipal administrations before election of a joint government.) Each of the three versions has its own logic, reasons and meanings, in addition to positive and negative positions of both Israelis and Palestinians towards each version. It is difficult to determine rationally that one version is superior to another in all aspects.

In this part of the paper we wish to deal with the issue of urban management of the city and the metropolitan area of Jerusalem as a central issue. In preparation for this discussion, we shall focus on a set of proposed principles for the administration of the city and the metropolitan area. These principles derive from and emphasize the functional approach. The assumption behind these principles is that the second and third proposals mentioned above should be combined. That is to say that during the search for a geopolitical settlement, the daily life of the Palestinian and Israeli inhabitants will continue, and therefore the need for fulfilling their requirements by a joint or separate municipal administration is crucial. It may also be argued that the regulation of the municipal administration - regionally, functionally and through the division of jurisdictions and missions - will be an important component in the amelioration of living conditions of the inhabitants of the city and the metropolitan area. It may also be argued that the establishment of a municipal administration acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians may pave the way for enhancing trust and lessening the mutual threat - important elements in arriving at geopolitical agreements between the two opponents: A lesson that could be learned from every segregated society. We shall present in this part of the paper the application of the functional model - a reasonable alternative in our eyes - as a tool for operating the municipal administration in Jerusalem, under the present circumstances and those that may develop.

Our discussion is a continuation of previous work, in which we analyzed some alternative models of urban management in the Jerusalem area; some of them are lessons derived from the Berlin experience. In this part we have chosen to propose operative principles for cooperation in urban management in urban planning. We shall present the general conception, characterize the present state of municipal administration, define the roles and jurisdictions for the administration of the city and the metropolitan area, indicate a basis for division of authority in the different municipal functions, and propose control mechanisms to ensure achievement of the goal of administering the metropolitan area according to these domains. The domains were selected as simple examples of the application of the functional model, since time constraints forced us to focus on a limited number of topics for examination later throughout the paper.

General Background for Examining the Functional Model of Urban Management

The municipal administration in Jerusalem and the metropolitan area is characterized by:

1. **Centralization by law:** In this framework, the central government controls the municipal authority and administration, which is subordinate to it financially and administratively.
2. **Municipal decentralization:** Since 1967, the area of jurisdiction of the city was expanded, and the new area - Israeli and Palestinian - became part of the Jerusalem Municipality under Israeli sovereignty. There are today 45 municipal authorities within the Jerusalem area, different from each other in municipal traditions, in the scope of resources available to them and in their operative structure. The Wall which is being built today by the Israelis will cut this surrounding functional area from Jerusalem city, from both its West and East sections.
3. **Separation on the national basis:** A frontier area between political entities. In the Jerusalem area, the separation between the settlements is on a national basis as well as on a municipal basis, and the boundaries between them are also boundaries between different political entities.
4. **Legal duality:** There are three effective legal systems in Jerusalem: Israeli

- law, Palestinian law, Jordanian law and the military decrees modifying those laws since the Israeli conquest of the West Bank in 1967.
5. **Variations and gaps:** In the level of administration and the quality of development of infrastructure and services within the city; between the Palestinian and Israeli neighborhoods; and among the authorities and settlements in the Jerusalem area.
 6. **General weakness:** According to Israeli classification, Jerusalem is considered a poor city, graded at the bottom of the list of poor settlements in Israel, after Bene-Beraq. According to the Palestinians, Jerusalem is a city with great potential, but because of the low economic status of the Palestinians compared to that of Israel, the Palestinians do not contribute to raising the economic level of the city.
 7. **Split in the social structure:** There are many social groups in Jerusalem, with a varied social background (national, religious and economic affiliation, origin, degree of urbanization etc.).
 8. **The Wall:** Is being built around the Jerusalem area, creates a new reality and physical barriers in the face of continuity and functional activity between Jerusalem city and the localities that surround it.

The above characteristics affect the examination of applying the concept of functional model to the administration and urban management of the city. The effect of such application includes:

- i. The type of administration or local government.
- ii. The character of the delegated authority.
- iii. The geographical, administrative or institutional borders of the units.

Thus, in spite of the attempt to propose solutions and arrangements for local municipal administration, which express the aspirations of each national and political side and reality, there are many constraints that lie at the base of any arrangement, such as inequality between Palestinians and Israelis in the city and the metropolitan area.

Assumption for the Application of the Functional Model


Below are some guidelines for the application of the functional approach in the municipal administration of Jerusalem:

- Establishment of a flexible administration and local government that can function under various geopolitical arrangements.
- The local government and administration have a central role in local development, in easing social tensions and in representing and fulfilling the needs of the inhabitants.
- Under global economic conditions, cooperation enhances local opportunities and contributes to local development.
- Jerusalem will continue to constitute a single functional area even after reaching geopolitical agreements between Israel and Palestine. This may cause a communal or national separation or even the creation of geopolitical borders permeable or open to people and goods.
- In both governments - the Palestinian and the Israeli - there will be a policy of decentralization and delegation of authority to the local governments and administration.
- Both the Israeli and Palestinian governments have an interest in reaching an arrangement for municipal or geopolitical administration that takes both sides into account and views them as entitled to demand fulfillment of their needs with due consideration to the needs of the other.

The Functional Model

The functional model emphasizes the advantages of cooperation and acts in terms of conflict resolution and conflict management between nations and local authorities. The aim of this model is to ensure win-win agreements in which both sides feel that they have not lost. In order to achieve this end, we must identify critical functional areas that enable an instrumental cooperation to be applied and achieved-this in contrast to a cooperation based in values and norms.

Figure 7: Cooperation Spectrum Directing Functional Cooperation



Along this spectrum, one may situate functional areas for cooperation between authorities, nations or even individuals. The spectrum is a continuum and enables situating the proposed domains of municipal administration or urban management in different layers and levels.

The functional model is based on the application or operation of the principle of “trade off” - receiving equal value in exchange. The received value may be part of the same domain or from a completely different area. The functional model is also suitable when two political rivals struggle for total sovereignty over a territory, where both sides are given factual rights in the territory. The question is what is the prospect of applying this approach in Jerusalem?

Figure 8: Three Possibilities of Division of Municipal Administrative Jurisdictions by Applying the Functional Model to the Urban Management of Jerusalem




Figure 9: Schematic Representation of the Many Functional Boundaries by Domain or Role in Municipal Administration or Urban Managmet



The Functional Model in Jerusalem

The idea of using functional sovereignty in solving or settling the conflict over Jerusalem has been developed in many papers and in many ways. Cohen (1980) proposed to establish a municipal administration in Jerusalem based on the idea of the functional model operating on five levels: The national level, representing communities or national groups; the level of metropolitan authority or a district capital; the level of a municipality; the level of boroughs, and the level of neighborhoods. Cohen's working hypothesis was that Jerusalem will continue to be united in its present borders and under Israeli sovereignty, while granting self-administration to the Palestinian community. Hasson (1997) also proposed a structure of local administration, with application of the functional approach as a basis for Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem under the sovereignty of the state of Israel.

Several interest groups are involved in the application of a political agreement over Jerusalem between the Palestinians and the Israelis: the European Community, the Vatican, the USA, Jordan and the Arab states etc. The application of functional sovereignty in Jerusalem does not negate overall political sovereignty, but can be one step on the path of application of a sovereignty agreement in its various forms.

The functional approach allows a focus on local municipal administration that does not necessarily conflict with a political agreement on the national level, and may enhance local involvement in municipal administration. Decentralization between the central and the local government may also be applied in this framework.

Two components may be discerned in the application of functional cooperation in Jerusalem: an administrative institutional component and a territorial component. Each has a different spatial and administrative expression. The attitudes of the rival parties - Palestinian and Israeli - to each component are different. Thus, arrangements for functional administration may be expressed in administrative-institutional terms between the Palestinians and Israel only, or they may have a spatial-territorial expression. In this framework, we may situate various functional services along the administrative or territorial aspect or component.

Figure 10: Connection Between the Administrative and Territorial Component, National Affiliation and Type of Cooperation

Component* State	Administrative	Territorial
Israel	A	B
Palestine	C	D

Component* Type of cooperation	Administrative	Territorial
Cooperation	A	B
Separation	C	D

** The administrative or territorial components between Palestinians and Israelis may be joint or separate. In each state, there are implications for the functional approach.*

We may discern even in the two components of local administration the possibility of establishing administrative cooperation as against administrative separation or splitting, and also territorial cooperation as against territorial separation. We may recognize among these components a functional cooperation that may enable the application of functional sovereignty.

Dimensions for Reference in Applying Functional Cooperation

The following part of this paper focuses on a proposal of principles for preparing the urban administration and management to examine the application of the functional model. This requires a broader theoretical understanding of the dimensions and models of the functioning of local government and administration in the world. Research points to five dimensions characterizing local government systems:¹⁰

1. The territorial dimension
2. The functional decentralization dimension
3. The political autonomy dimension
4. The financial dimension
5. The local democracy dimension

These dimensions are expressed differently in various countries, according to four models:

1. The model of the welfare state
2. The American model of self-government
3. The centralized model typical of developing countries
4. A decentralized model in developing countries

The governance model in Jerusalem and its metropolitan area, as with every other issue dealing with Jerusalem, is complex. There are three types of central government in Jerusalem, each with different characteristics. The Israeli government tends toward the model of the welfare state. The Palestinian Authority has not yet crystallized a clear governmental model, and functions in a central-

10. Razin, 1997; Terhorstand Vande Ven, 1997; Martins, 1995; Viating, 1995.

ized mode. The military government, which still administers Area C, also follows the centralized model. In applying the functional approach to municipal administration in Jerusalem, these differences must be taken into account.

One should examine four models for Jerusalem, in order to create one which will fit both present conditions and those being crystallized toward a political settlement. Conditions in Jerusalem are a mixture between models 1 and 4. In order to apply the functional model, functional cooperation should be proposed to urban management, which will include several levels to be applied in different territories. We shall present here the functional approach in the domain of spatial planning as an example.


Spatial Planning

Statutory physical-spatial planning in Jerusalem has a special meaning, and it is one of the main issues in the conflict. Planning in Jerusalem today is restricted, and limits development by the Palestinian inhabitants. For the Jews, however, spatial planning is proactive and developing, aiming to achieve geopolitical and demographic objectives for the Israelis. The Palestinians in Jerusalem, on the other hand, today lack the ability to plan their environment. The Jerusalem Municipality, acting as the Local Planning and Building Commission, holds authority and responsibility for all master plans, outline plans and detailed plans serving as a basis for the granting of building permits by the municipality. Moreover, spatial planning is a tool in the hands of the municipality and the government, through the District Planning and Building Commission, to deter local spatial planning and limit Palestinian demographic and functional growth in the city.

Two mechanisms operate in metropolitan Jerusalem in the realm of planning and building. The first is the mechanism of planning institutions connected to the Israeli military government operated by the civil administration in Area C, including the settlements. The second belongs to the Palestinian Authority, and operates in accordance with the Jordanian Town, Country and Building Planning Law of 1966 and the Palestinian regulations of 1996. When applying the functional approach, there will be no need to cancel the existing planning mecha-

nisms, as their main concepts of planning are similar.¹¹ However, adjustments and agreements will have to be made between the bodies cooperating in administering spatial planning in each settlement. Moreover, it will be necessary to reorganize the planning mechanisms on the different levels as far as boundaries of authority and responsibility are concerned. According to the Israeli and Palestinian-Jordanian planning laws, there are three levels of planning. **Figure 11** represents the levels of existing planning institutions and the levels of plans, both Palestinian and Israeli.

Figure 11: Levels of Planning Institutions and Plans - Palestinian and Israeli



The levels of planning institutions and plans presented according to the Palestinian-Jordanian and Israeli planning and building laws are regulative, and their planning product is mainly physical (land-use maps and regulations serving as building guidelines). The plans are required to be derived from spatial master plans and strategic plans that must be prepared as a basis for physical planning. For this purpose, strategic plans must be prepared and the authorities and responsibilities of the planning institutions must be changed.

11. Khamaisi, 2003.

In the application of the functional model, changes must be made in the planning institutions, in the planning process, in the character of the plans, and in the authority and responsibility of the planning commissions. The principles guiding the application of the functional model to spatial planning are based on cooperation, reciprocity, interchange of authority and responsibility between Israelis and Palestinians, and application of the principle of de-centralization of authority. For this purpose, the planning topics may be divided into four levels: issuing of building permits, detailed spatial and infrastructure planning, outline planning and master or strategic planning. Four levels would operate these plans: neighborhood, locality, municipal and supra-municipal. Expanding them on the supra-municipal level and dividing them into planning localities and neighborhoods must thus change the boundaries of the present planning authorities. The principles guiding the division into localities are physical as well as landscape-related, and are guided by the continuity of municipal infrastructures. The division into neighborhoods is based on a principle of community and national affiliation. The boundaries of the localities and the neighborhoods may extend beyond the present boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipality, and may include other neighborhoods in the area.

Division into Planning Zones and Authority of Planning Commissions

As stated above, the application of the functional model in the domain of planning requires division of metropolitan Jerusalem into different planning zones. It is proposed to divide the planning levels into four levels: local, locality, municipal and supra-municipal or metropolitan.

The criteria for the geographical division of the planning zones are:

1. Main population group: Jews, Arabs, Ultra-Orthodox Jews.
2. Rural vs. urban areas.
3. Population size of 40-50,000.
4. Identity of neighborhood.
5. Fair land-uses.
6. Physical localities and landscapes comprising a complete entity, which must be treated as such.

7. Affiliations inside and between neighborhoods.
8. Localities requiring development of whole entities and continuity of infrastructure development (sewage, roads, drainage).

Local commissions should be established, with representation from the local population.

Our aim in this paper is not to enter into detail and to set boundaries - these we propose to handle later in a separate and detailed paper. Yet it seems to us that there is a possibility of applying the functional model according to the principles delineated above, and that both Israelis and Palestinians may be included in the process of its application. Below is a table summarizing the division of authority between Palestinians and Israelis by the different levels, in the domain of spatial planning.

Figure 12: Summary of type of Palestinian-Israeli cooperation in spatial planning of Jerusalem by planning and administrative management levels

Planning level	Administrative level	Type of functional cooperation
National plan	National	Coordinated
Overall master plan	Metropolitan	Joint
Master outline plan	Municipal	Joint
Infrastructure planning	Local-quarters	Separate *
Building permits	Local-neighborhood	Separate *

** In Berlin a joint planning authority between Berlin and the surrounding state of Brandenburg has to be consulted when local infrastructure planning or building permits would indirectly affect outline and master plans of the other organs.*

As a short concise analysis of the application of the functional model in the realm of planning and building, we wish to raise a few questions or issues for discussion. The following issues derive from the contents of the present paper and learning from the experience of Berlin's division and unification, in addition to other divided cities.

1. A discussion about making changes in the Jerusalem city administration, prior to a solution or arrangement on the issues of sovereignty and geopoliti-

- tics, acceptable to Palestinians and Israelis? What are the advantages and disadvantages of examining such an arrangement in municipal administration prior or parallel to a political agreement over Jerusalem?
2. The functional model of urban management is based on the application of a pragmatic approach. Can it be applied under the conditions prevalent in Jerusalem and in what domains, including a building a wall that separates, particularly East Jerusalem from its Palestinian hinterland? What are its advantages and disadvantages under the present circumstances of municipal administration and political reality of Jerusalem?
 3. Spatial planning in the Jerusalem area is a loaded political issue, encompassing many considerations - among them political, division and control of resources. Is an agreement possible by both adversaries struggling over Jerusalem, to share their authority and join in planning and managing the spatial development of the city? Is the application of this model possible without a change in legislation? What are the criteria for determining the boundaries of the planning zones and the criteria for each locality or neighborhood?

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Al Quds Economic Perspective

Sameer Hazboun

Overview

The economy of Al-Quds is under severe strain. Income levels have stagnated over the past decades, unemployment and under-deployment levels are unacceptably high, public infrastructure and social services are poor. Structural imbalances in the economy are manifest in its heavy dependence on outside sources of employment, and an unusually low degree of industrialization.

Income Class

Social structure in Jerusalem also seems to be weak due to the classifications on income levels in the city.

There is around 30 percent of the population in Jerusalem belongs to the middle class and living mainly in Beit Hanina, Shu'fat, At Tur and Wadi al Joz. This social class has been shrinking in the last 10 years because of the closure policy and the collapse of the tourism industry and its related service sector. The middle class comprised of more than 50 percent of the population.

The majority of the Palestinian Population of Jerusalem nowadays belongs to the Low Income Class. This category includes the majority of the Old City residents, as well as those in the neighborhoods of Silwan, Al Thuri (Abu Tur), and the Shu'fat Refugee Camp. As a result of the Israeli policy of confiscating Jerusalem ID cards from those who live outside the municipal borders, many were forced to move to these neighborhoods to avoid losing their residency rights.

The ID confiscation policy, which has been widely implemented since 1996, has forced 62 percent of the Palestinians to live in overcrowded conditions. If we apply the Israeli standard of living norms, 71 percent of the Palestinians in Jerusalem live below the poverty line.

Institutions Operating in Jerusalem

Statistics indicate that 267 institutions operate in the Palestinian part of the city. This figure comprises of schools and educational institutions as well as public libraries, neighborhood councils, social welfare institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

For motives rooted in the aspirations for a Palestinian nation state, Palestinians refused to vote in the municipal elections. Their belief was fearing that the act of voting in the Jerusalem municipal elections would give legitimacy to the Israeli occupation. Consequently, less than 5 percent of the population exercised their right to vote; most of these voters worked in the municipality itself, in the education sector, or held minor positions. (Only a few Palestinians occupy middle-ranking positions, which are limited to supervising educational and social welfare operations in the municipality).

Institutions in Jerusalem are working in many fields, including; starting from religious affairs, such as the Supreme Islamic Council – Al Waqf institution; works within the field of unions, such as the Palestinian Professional Associations, housing associations, which work in the field of housing and credit facilities field, and about another 100 NGOs operating in Jerusalem, which provide public services on the health, educational, social services, sports and cultural level.

In May 1993, these NGOs were forced to move their offices out of the city mainly for two reasons. First, the majority of the Palestinians who worked for these NGOs, as well as the majority of those who received services from these institutions, were holding West Bank/ Gaza strip ID cards. Only Jerusalemites holding an Israeli ID card were allowed to go in and out of Jerusalem. As a result of this policy, Jerusalem's urban centrality for the West Bank ended; new suburbs developed close to the checkpoints, separating Jerusalem from its hinterland and from the West Bank. Second, the Oslo agreement stated that, according to the Israeli law, Palestinian National Authority (PNA) official and semi-official activities were not allowed to exist and function inside Jerusalem.

In August 2001, Israel closed important institutions in Jerusalem, chief among them were the Orient House, the Federation of the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and several other institutions.

Service Sector and Labor Force

The service sector plays a major role in the employment of Palestinians in Arab East Jerusalem. More than 65 percent of the labor force is employed in the following sub-sectors: trade, restaurants, hotels, transportation and communication and public services. The industrial and construction sectors utilize only 33 percent of the labor force. Approximately 2.1 percent of the labor force in Jerusalem is employed in the agricultural sector.

Figure 1: Labor Force Distribution in Jerusalem District (Governorate), 1999-2003

Indicators	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Labor Force Participation Rate		37.1	37.2	35.6	38.5
Employment Rate		84.9	80.6	76.9	82.0
Employed in Manufacturing, Mining and Quarrying	14.6	14.6	14.4	13.9	12.0
Employed in Commerce Hotels & Restaurants	27.0	26.6	26.5	27.9	27.9
Employed in Transport, Storage and Communication	7.2	8.2	7.8	7.6	8.5
Professionals Technicians and Clerk Workers	20.2	21.1	18.5	22.2	21.3
Services, Shop and Market	6.4	15.2	16.5	16.0	18.5
Elementary Occupations	32.9	23.7	23.2	18.5	16.7
Craft and Related Trade Workers	23.2	22.7	23.5	23.4	22.8
Plant & Machine Operators and Assemblers	11.2	12.4	12.3	13.1	14.3
Employed in Israel & Settlements	44.8	36.4	38.7	39.1	36.3
Employers	4.3	3.1	3.3	4.0	3.5
Self employed	13.3	15.4	18.3	19.6	19.6
Wage Employees	78.9	76.2	72.6	71.3	71.5
Unpaid Family Members	3.5	5.3	5.8	5.1	5.4
Unemployment Rate (ILO Standards)		15.1	19.4	23.1	18.0
Unemployment Rate (Relaxed Definition)		27.9	33.6	38.1	26.9

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. (6), 2004.

The review of the statistics shows that there has been an important increase in scientific occupations in the period from 1987 to 1994, while there has been a marginal decrease in the freelance and technical professions, as well as in the professions of directors and managers. The increase in scientific and academic professions might be attributed to the political changes; i.e., the establishment of the PNA which has created service and administrative jobs in the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. Further, the restrictions on to the entry of Palestinians into the city have reduced the demand for freelance and technical professions, as well as for salespersons and agents. The latter category has begun moving its economic activities outside Jerusalem, especially to Ar Ram, al 'Eizariya, Abu Dis, and even to Ramallah and Al Bireh town.

Women participation in the labor force amounts to approximately 10 percent in East Jerusalem, and decreases to 4 percent in the rest of the Jerusalem District. The type of work done by women labors varies: within the municipality borders, women work in the services sectors; in the villages around municipal Jerusalem and in the district, they work in agriculture.

The labor force in Arab East Jerusalem is relatively young. Approximately 78 percent of the labor force working population belongs to the 18-44 age category. Surveys also show that 44 percent of the labor force in Arab East Jerusalem is under the age of 15 years (37.4 percent are males and 48.1 percent are females). Only 15 percent of this labor force has had more than 12 years of education (18 percent males and 12 percent females).

Tourism sector

Until the year 2000, the most popular tourist destination in the region was the Holy City of Jerusalem: 93 percent of the incoming two million tourists visited the city yearly. Moreover, a significant percentage (91 percent) of these tourists prefer to stay in Jerusalem for a period that is more than just a short stopover visit since Jerusalem has many things to offer to the tourists.

Formerly, East Jerusalem accommodated 7 percent of the total number of tourists coming to Jerusalem; in the year 2000, it accommodated 17 percent. The goal now is to double this share, nearly doubling it to 30 percent in the future. In order to accommodate these large numbers of tourists, hotel-room capacity would

had to have been increased from 1972 rooms to approximately 9000 rooms in the very short term. The number of restaurants serving tourists is just presently ten, while 50 are needed in the immediate future. Most hotels in East Jerusalem do not have plans for renovations and extensions.

The attraction of pilgrimage to Jerusalem is offset by the political instability. Again, political uncertainty is severely hindering the tourism sector from reaching its full potential. Moreover, due to the existing political situation, a significant proportion of revenue generated in the tourism sector in Jerusalem goes to the Israeli economy in the form of income tax, value added tax and Arnona (municipal property tax). The tourist sector is thus facing a financial crisis at present. Although the Arnona rate is the same for East and West Jerusalem, the difficult financial situation of Palestinian hotel owners is exacerbated by their relatively lower revenue basis, due to low room occupancy rates, which are, 20-50 percent lower than in West Jerusalem. As a result, many Palestinian hotels are in debt to the Municipality for accrued tax payments.

Objectives

The overarching goals of the future development vision are; to provide tangible benefits to the Palestinian population quickly, equitably and effectively, whilst laying the foundations for sustainable development over the long term.

The future development vision is connected to three overall vision ideals for development of the Palestinian society, as listed below:

- The system of production needs to be enhanced in order to create economic growth in the society, increase the income level and sustain the basic human needs.
- Natural resources and the environment should be safeguarded in order to direct the future development into sustainable tracks through monitoring, rehabilitation, protection and preservation.
- Economic growth and development under the guidance of sustainability should be allocated and distributed to achieve balanced development, as well as functioning utilization of resources over time, and a fair distribution of income and welfare among individuals for the benefit of all.

Approach

The approach used in designing the vision has been heavily influenced by four considerations:

First, Jerusalem is inheriting very weak and fragmented institutions with little capacity for preparing and implementing development programs. Currently, most policy-making and senior administrative positions are in Israeli hands.

Second, there are unusually large uncertainties about a number of issues critical to economic development in Al-Quds. These uncertainties include: (a) the modalities and the timetables for the transfer of authority to the Palestinians; (b) future economic relations with Israel, particularly in areas concerning labor flows, trade and tariffs and financial sector development; and (c) the speed with which appropriate institutions can be created in Al- Quds.

Third, there is a need to strike a balance between the imperatives of showing tangible results in the short-term and laying the foundation for sustainable growth in the long-term.

Fourth and last, after years of occupation, there is an understandable desire among the Palestinians to manage their own affairs and a reluctance to rely heavily on foreign inputs.

SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) Analysis

Strengths:

- ***The importance of the city for the three religions and the impact of that on the economy.***

Jerusalem is, one of the oldest cities in the world, with a history of more than 4000 years, it is the heart of three major religions, and it is also a place where the West meets the East. Jerusalem cannot be seen as a city of one group, whether Palestinians, Israelis, Arabs, Jews, Christians or Muslims: It's a city for all of these people and for the whole human race. And it's the religious and spiritual capital of the world due to three elements;

1. The celebration of religious feasts and events of the three religions.
2. The visit to the holy sites of the three religions. The religious sites of the three religions are located in Jerusalem and the West Bank. They form an attraction by themselves.
3. The center for religious and spiritual discourse. Jerusalem should be the place where religious and spiritual groups meet with each other, exchange views and experiences and develop thinking, ceremonies and rituals by inspiring one another.

With all the cultural and religious heritage of Jerusalem, this city is always a primary attribute, and this should be used to create more opportunities for the city. However, it's the responsibility of the city planners to prepare Jerusalem to develop in the third millennium as a world city.

An economic perspective for Jerusalem is able to be based on developing tourism in relation with the service sector using modern information technology, and this should be developed with the parties concerned both in and outside Palestine, and finally, this perspective will be the basis on which to deal with the Israelis on the future of Jerusalem.

■ ***In a peaceful era, there is a possibility for cooperation with Arab and Muslim countries... (Economic Potential).***

Palestinian territories in general, and especially Jerusalem, were forbidden from taking advantage of a possible tourism activity for quarter of the world, and in the peace era, there is a possibility of about one billion Muslim pilgrims entering Jerusalem, in addition to another two million citizens of other countries having no diplomatic relations with Israel.

In the peaceful era, there would be a huge tourism activity in Jerusalem, which will lead to an annual income of about one billion dollars yearly, which also in turn means that the labor force working in the tourist sector in Jerusalem and the surrounding territories will increase from 1 to 11 percent.

Weaknesses

■ *No Control for the Palestinians in the City.*

Jerusalem is demographically, economically, and socially controlled by Israel, and Palestinians are unable to make any changes to the situation in this city.

Demographically, studies shows that the number of Arab residents in Jerusalem has declined while the number of Jewish residents has increased. The main reason for the increase in the number of Jewish residents and the decrease of the Arab residents was the immigration of Jews to the city for religious reasons, and the decrease in the number of Arabs was for political and colonial motives. Any increase in the Arab population can be attributed primarily to natural growth. Economically, Jerusalem is not able to increase its own economic base due to the political situation it faces, the productive industrial base of the economy is relatively small in size compared to West Jerusalem, and Tourism is strongly influenced by political and seasonal factors. Security measures and closures are preventing the economy of East Jerusalem from developing and integrating into the neighboring Palestinian urban economies. East Jerusalem, however, continues to supply the Israeli economic sectors with cheap labor.

■ *The Economic Difference between the two Parts of the City.*

There are various differences within the boundaries of Jerusalem. East Jerusalem has a low quality infrastructure, quoted and non-existent in some areas. Maintenance is very limited, while in West Jerusalem it is always developed and constantly maintained. Other differences could be seen in the average monthly income for the population in both sides of the city. In East Jerusalem, the monthly salary is low, therefore the per-capita income is low because the family size is large. The GDP per person is approximately USD 16,000/yr, in West Jerusalem there are two workers in the family. The family size is medium or low, therefore, the average GDP per person (PPP) is high: USD 20,000/yr or NIS 5,000 per month. The third difference one can notice is in the provision of economic and commercial centers; in East Jerusalem, economic, commercial, and services center are available despite their weaknesses. In fact they form secondary centers

compared to the Israeli center to which they are also affiliated, while in West Jerusalem, there is a validity of a strong economic, commercial, and service center, which forms a center for the entire metropolitan area. This center is independent and includes administrative and commercial services.

■ *The settlements problem*

GDP, GNI, and GNDI per Capita in Jerusalem Area in Constant Prices, 2001-2002 (1997 is the Base Year).

	GNDI per Capita		GNI per Capita		GDP per Capita	
	2001	2002	2001	2002	2001	2002
Jerusalem (J1) area	2,250.3	2,195.8	2,101.0	2,003.8	1,434.5	1,364.6

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. (6), 2004.

The Israeli policies and new facts on the ground have led to a physical division of the city. They have created two separate communities in Jerusalem which have distinctively conflicting characteristics. An example is the Israeli settlements which are established to achieve political objectives such as control over territorial and resources control. The establishment of these settlements was planned and initiated by the Israeli government, which provides incentives for Israeli Jews to move and settle there. Administrative bodies for each of these settlements are created to represent the resident, informally, in the municipality. This policy was adopted by the Jerusalem Municipality in order to increase the settlers' participation in the decision making process.

Opportunities

■ *Peace will bring a big bonus for the economy (cooperation, coordination, new investments etc.)*

Economically, peace will lead to a tremendous reduction production costs, because of many reasons; one is that these costs will be low due to direct exporting of core products from other countries. Another reason would be the low wages of laborers because of the increase in the labor force supply, and a third

reason would be the low operating expenses such as electricity and water. Also, the Capital Expenses will be reduced as a result of the low prices of lands, which will encourage new investments in the Industrial sector. Cooperation and coordination can be undertaken in a wide variety of sectors, including: housing, infrastructure, services, the environment, human resources, higher education, tourism, information technology, and most importantly, urban and architectural policies.

■ *Tourism will flourish*

Jerusalem will be marketed as the largest living museum in the world; a place where “East” meets “West” in the cultural sense; recreation marketing will link the desert and dead sea environments; and all products will support Jerusalem as an international conferencing center. Tourism packages will create a connection for large Islamic communities around the world. For Christian communities, packages will offer adventures to Jerusalem, Bethlehem and other holy sites.

■ *Services will improve*

The service sector will be developed in such a way that it will make intensive use of modern information and communication technologies. Transport services will be strengthened to make Jerusalem a distribution center in the region. Financial companies will provide the full range of services, from auditing, insurance policies and mortgages to investment loans and credits. The presence of the Palestinian Government centers, such as ministries and other agencies, will ensure the provision of typical public services. Jerusalem will become a place that provides high quality social and educational services.

Threats

- *The political condition.*
- *One side domination.*
- *Separation, (Wall + Settlements).*

Two Different Scenarios

Continuation of the Current Political and Economic Situation

The labor force will still be facing the following restrictions:

1. Israeli laws and regulations. Will still determine working conditions.
2. Financial inter-mediation will remain as in-effected as it is now.
3. Industrial expansion, and thus growth will be minimal.
4. Trade will be limited to exporting and importing to and from Israel.
5. Foreign Investment will be discouraged by the political instability, and they are helping to perpetuate the economic instability.

The rise of the informal economic activity in Jerusalem is related to general economic recession.

- **Culturally**, there is a multi-ethnic society without either unity in diversity, cultural equality, or mutual respect. In fact, the multi-ethnic society of Jerusalem is a segregated society of other groups, and prevents the free cultural development of “the others”.
- **Socially**, the city is divided into a relatively poor eastern part and a rich western part. The social institutions of the parts would not operate on an equal footing with each other. Even the level of services is not a par between the two sides of the city. Although equal tax rates and levies will continue to be paid by the east side, the amenities and services will continue being unequal to those in the western sector.
- **Politically**, Jerusalem will continue being divided in two parts: the Israeli political authority over east Jerusalem will continue being enforced by military means. The Palestinians political aspirations for a joined and undivided administration of the East and West will be frustrated by the Israelis. Political unity would mean sharing the city instead of dominating the city.
- **Economically**, there will be no unity between East and West Jerusalem. The East will be left economically underdeveloped while all efforts of the Israelis will be directed to the West. The economic division of the city is to a large extent also the result of neglect by the Israeli authorities.

An economic plan for East Jerusalem cannot be divorced from the social, cultural and political aspects of the city. The economic potential of Jerusalem can only be fully exploited when the city is undivided socially, culturally and politically. Stimulating social, cultural and political equality will bring the best of the economic potential forward. The diversity of the city can then be used as a strength instead of a weakness.

If Jerusalem is to be an open city in the future, trade relations between the two sides would be based on the following principals:

1. Compliance with an implementation of principles GATT, GATs and TRIPs.
2. No taxes, customs, duties, charges or other measures shall be imposed on the transfer of goods and services between the two sides.
3. The National treatment principle (equal treatment for goods and services).
4. To avoid the usage of Non- Tariff Barriers (NTBs).

Any treaty between Palestine and Israel on Jerusalem should have a comprehensive annex on economic issues, the annex should include articles on the economic policies adopted by both sides targeting Jerusalem. These articles should cover issues such as joint planning, trade and taxation. A custom union or a free trade agreement, are possible options. The custom union option will have a positive impact on the standard of living through increased employment and by reducing the number of persons who live close to the poverty income level. This option will keep the economic activities in Jerusalem vulnerable to external shocks.

Another possibility of cooperation is the implementation of the Free Trade Area (FTA) between the two sides. FTA is expected to have a positive impact on the standard of living levels.

The private sector has to play a central role in the development of Jerusalem's economy. The main goal of economic development must be to evaluate the standard of living of the individual and to enhance the communal affluence and wealth. The specific economic targets are set by economic organizations—principally the markets whose basic goal, is profit making. We can apply different models for the short and the long run.

The short run approach is targeted towards meeting the Jerusalemite's current and immediate needs, mainly fighting poverty and providing housing and jobs. The long run approach has to be targeted towards generating jobs and economic opportunities that will insure a future with a higher standard of living and a reduced need for social programs.

So, in the intermediate period, the public sector role will be declining while the private sector is increasing.

Vision

The economic vision for Jerusalem, "Al-Quds", has to be established on the following considerations:

1. Creation of Al-Quds as a World trade and tourism attraction center.
2. Base the economy of an undivided city on a set of investment opportunities.
3. Develop the service sector in relation to industry (Health, Finance, Education etc.).
4. Catch up with global developments in technology and develop the information technology.
5. Long term planning (Joint Master Plan).

Judging the Perspective

When we take into account the criteria for judging the economic vision we see that this vision fits into these following criteria:

1. The economic perspective does contribute in realizing the social and economic potential of Jerusalem, Al-Quds.
2. The economic perspective does create jobs for the people of Jerusalem, Al-Quds. The service sector in general provides opportunities, both for low and high-skilled labor.
3. The economic perspective provides for a clean living environment. An economic perspective has to be translated in a practical program. And Palestine cannot stop preparations for future long term economic planning. The rationale for planning for future economic development by concluding

joint principles for economic co-ordination and co-operation is two-fold:

- *First*, to present the suggested future arrangements that reflects win-win scenarios concerning Jerusalem, Al-Quds for Israel and Palestine.
- *Second*, to prepare for the “day after” the opening up of the political dialogue with concrete proposals.

The arrangements and the preparations will find its common basis in the long-term perspective and the long-term strategy.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding present difficulties, negotiations over the final status issues initiated should aim to reach a new, balanced Israeli-Palestinian relationship based on reciprocity and cooperation. The mixture of coordination and separation that underlies the path to an improved economic relationship between the PNA and Israel could also point to an approach for elaborating between the two sides in the future.

Regardless of the Israeli division of the city, its characteristics and location, indicates that this city should be open as a capital for the two states. It is the heart of events in the area and it is the spiritual capital of all people over and around the world. The Hebron City model of two separated sovereignties is an unacceptable model for the Palestinians, because of the negative impact on the relations between the two sides.

An economic perspective for Jerusalem should be based on developing tourism, in relation with the service sector using modern information technology. This perspective, from a Palestinian point of view, should be developed with the parties concerned both in and outside of Palestine.

The perspective is the basis on which to deal with the Israelis on the future of Jerusalem.

Table 1: Selected Indicators by Region (Land + Population)

Indicator	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jerusalem Governorate*	Palestinian Territory
Land				
Land Use				
Area of Agricultural Land (km ²)	126.6	1,389.5	17.5	1,516.1
Area of Forests and Wooded Land (km ²)	3.2	88.5	2.0	91.7
Area of Palestinian Built-up Land (km ²)	53.8	531.9	38.6	585.7
Area of Built-up Land in Israeli Settlements (km ²)	26.7	154.7	41.2	181.4
Population Density in Built-up Land (person / km ²)	47.4	264.4	108.9	186.0
Percentage of Area of Built-up Land per km ² of Total Area	14.7	9.4	11.2	9.7
Population density (Capita/km ²)	3,464.5	390.4	1,105.1	576.8
Percentage of Area of Agriculture Land per km ² of Total Area %	34.7	24.6	5.1	25.2
Number of Israeli Settlements	25	254	36	279
Number of Natural Reserves	—	19	—	19
Area of Natural Reserves	—	54.4	—	54.4
Population				
End of Year Projected Population (in Thousand)	1,370.3	2,367.5	402.9	3,737.8
Average Population Growth	5.2	4.5	3.6	4.7
Total Fertility Rate	6.8	5.5	5.2	5.9
Average of Household Size	6.8	5.9	5.7	6.1

Source: PCBS – Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. (6), 2004

* According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of statistics, the Jerusalem Governorate has 51 localities and is divided into two parts: J1, which includes the part of Jerusalem that was annexed forcefully by Israel following its occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967 (known as East Jerusalem). The second part, J2, includes the remaining 30 localities in the West Bank area of the Jerusalem Governorate. Thus, the Jerusalem Governorate is the combination of the two statistical areas (J1 + J2).

Table 2: Selected Indicators by Region - General

Indicator	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Jerusalem Governorate	Palestinian Territory
Labor Market				
Percentage of Labor Force from Total Persons 15 Years and Over	37.6	41.9	38.4	40.4
Percentage of Women in Labor Force	9.2	14.7	8.8	12.8
Employed Persons by Economic Activity:(%)				
Agriculture	17.4	14.9	1.0	15.7
Industry	9.2	14.0	12.0	12.5
Construction	10.4	14.3	19.0	13.1
Commerce Hotels and Restaurants	16.9	21.4	27.9	20.0
Transportation Storage communication	5.2	6.0	8.5	5.8
Services	40.9	29.4	31.6	32.9
Percentage of Workers in Israel (From Total Workers)	3.1	12.5	36.3	9.7
Unemployment Rate (ILO Standards)	29.2	23.8	22.3	25.6
Unemployment Rate (Relaxed definition)	36.4	32.0	33.1	33.4
Reasons for Staying Outside Labor Force: (%)				
Old/ill	8.6	10.4	10.9	9.8
House Keeping	50.3	51.1	54.7	50.8
Study and Training	34.3	29.9	24.3	31.5
Other	6.8	8.6	10.1	7.9
Economic Sector				
Number of Economic Establishments	22,067	58,054	4,869	80,121
Tourism				
Number of Hotels	15	60	20	75
Number of Rooms	492	2,558	907	3,050
Number of Beds	915	5,705	2,147	6,620
Number of Guests	4,556	58,256	29,970	62,812
Number of Guest Nights	11,267	188,008	94,227	199,275
Percentage of Rooms Occupancy	2.6	13.7	20.7	11.7
Percentage of Beds Occupancy	3.4	9.1	12.2	8.0
Education				
Number of Schools	506	1,603	168	2,109
Number of School Students	415,502	601,941	56,704	1,017,443
Number of School Teachers	13,339	23,887	2,687	37,226
Number of Sections in Schools	9,726	18,944	2,046	28,670
Student Rate Per Teacher	31.1	25.2	21.4	27.3
Student Rate Per Class	42.7	31.8	27.3	35.5
Drop-Out Rates (%)	0.67	1.28	0.73	1.03
Repetition Rates (%)	1.46	1.29	1.47	1.36
Number of Universities and Colleges	3	13	2	16
Number of Community Colleges	6	16	3	22
Literacy Rates (15 Years and Over)	91.9	91.8	93.8	91.9

Source: PCBS – Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook No. (6), 2004

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The Shared Cultural Significance of Jerusalem

Michael Turner

1. Introduction

This paper takes a preliminary look at the wider options for the definition of Jerusalem's cultural significance and will present a possible scenario that employs the almost globally accepted UNESCO World Heritage Convention¹ for the foundations of consensus building. It hardly touches the edges of the holy mountain of knowledge and therefore requests the indulgence of the reader. The conservation of heritage in general and of Jerusalem in particular, can be perceived either as a consensus or as the essence of the *casus belli* of the cultural and political reality of the city. I believe that the former has more to offer and with the necessary sustainability, of conserving the city for future generations, the mutual recognition can transcend the barriers of conflict. The introduction of the World Heritage Convention and its application to the city of Jerusalem might also be a possible tool for transcending the political quagmire allowing the convention mechanisms to fill the void and generate a resolution hereto undisclosed. These reflections are therefore made in the spirit of consensus and should be read accordingly, in the hope that they might provide the capacity for sharing. Sustainability, as defined by Professor Randall Thomas, is about *poetry, optimism and delight*; energy, CO₂, water and waste are secondary... and, in the words of Louis Kahn, the measurable is only a servant of the immeasurable.² I evoke that poetry, optimism and delight for the conservation of our city.

1. *The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, 1972; www.unesco.org
2. Thomas, R. (ed.) (2003); *Sustainable Urban Design - an environmental approach*, Spon Press.

As a World Heritage Site since 1981, the Old City and its Ramparts needs to be reconsidered within the context of the relevant criteria of the Convention and its evolving texts and experiences. The Ottoman city is the visual tip of the iceberg revealing the latter-day cubes of the mosaic of time. This reappraisal might provide a focus for a clearer definition of its cultural significance, peeling the palimpsest, thus giving revised boundaries, relevant buffer zones and a mechanism for management.

The Operational Guidelines of the Convention³ seek to define the justification of the values of the site, while the complimentary Burra Charter⁴ details the processes in determining the cultural significance of a place by defining, top-down and alphabetically, the aesthetic, historic, scientific and social meanings. But these categories need to be developed, bottom-up, from the qualities that are site-specific and that enhance the indigenous characteristics of the place. While the significance of religious myth and symbolism is high on the list it should be put into the spatial perspective balancing the sacred and profane. I would also draw the attention of the reader that it is not my intention to develop a religious dissertation; rather, to use the total human experiences whereby even moderns living in the profane world are still subconsciously embodied in the memory of the sacred.⁵

How might these boundaries be redefined and how can this allow us to reappraise and contemplate the city from an entirely different perspective? Looking at the urban fabric of the city, it appears as a homogenous unit with a few architectural hints or clues to assist us in identifying the particular qualitative and tumultuous history. By identifying all the historical layers of the city over a period of more than 3,000 years and the traces of events, we can generate a full appreciation of the meaning and significance of the city. A dynamic interpretation demands a mutual recognition by all concerned citizens of all those events, thus allowing the same historic score to be played with different emphases and different instruments by each of the players.

3. See *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention*, (Revised edition, March 2004).

4. Australian ICOMOS, (1999); *The Burra Charter- Charter for Places of Cultural Significance*.

5. Eliade, M. (1987); *The Sacred and the Profane - the nature of religion*, Harvest/HBJ, New York.

In the spirit of the Burra Charter it can be determined that conservation of an historic site demands a series of actions - understanding the significance, developing policies and defining the management. We shall use these headings to elaborate on the evaluation.

2. Understanding significance

The complexity of the significance of the city might be better understood through their examination in three facets - natural, physical and ethereal.

2.1 Natural - the geo-morphology

Jerusalem is the crossing point of the Pennine ridge, at 750 metres above sea level, it is the lowest point between Ramallah to the north and Hebron to the south, both over 1150 metres above sea level. The naissance of the city on this saddle is bound up in the natural east-west connecting route between the Via Maris in the west, through the Great Rift Valley to the Limes Palaestinae in the east, being the ridge of Jarash, Philadelphia and Petra. It is at the cross roads of cultures on a mesa defined by hills and valleys.



Figure 1 The Jerusalem Mesa.




Figure 2 The Axes of the City - between Hills and Valleys.

Water, as the source of life, is an inherent part of the significance of the city. The geomorphology allows us to understand the rationale behind the complex water sources of the area and which have contributed to its development. The rainwater from the upper hills allows Jerusalem to collect water in reservoirs and by over 80 kilometre aqueducts from as far away as Ein Fajar in the Hebron Hills. The springs and wells, that collect water from the Judean Hills to the west, are apparent in a geological paradox whereby the lower aquifer of the geological layers slopes to the east, returning the run-off rainwater of the topography from the west.

The backcloth of this drama, the juxtaposition of the Judean Hills and Desert, is unfolded in a space of less than ten kilometres. It is the disparity of precipitation between 650mm per annum in the hills and that of 250mm in the desert. This is made even more apparent by the dark brown *terra rosa* soils and the light green olive trees towards the Mediterranean Sea in the west against the stark contrast of the chalk stones of the arid desert with their yellow and light brown coverings towards the Dead Sea in the east. This has provided the world with an image coined as Biblical Landscape.

It is in this context that Jerusalem is understood as the navel of the earth. It is the *Axis Mundi*.

2.2 Physical - the valley/gei

The city arises above the valley. It is defined not only by its built form but by its void, the emptiness of the space and the depth of understanding. This valley creates the strength of its ramparts, its foundations and threatens those who seek to destroy its defenses.

The location of the city and its relationship to the surrounding valleys creates its splendour and majesty. This is the proscenium to the history and events that evoke the spirit of the city. Considering the comparisons of the region, the paradigm might be the form of the Greek city. The powerful urban forms, with the Temple Mount / al-Haram ash-Sharif at the heart, are analogous to Hellenistic concepts that related to the three constituents of the city - the Polis, representing the communal life of the people, political, cultural, moral and economic, the

Necropolis and the Acropolis.⁶ As transformed in the local context, this could relate to the valley of the city, the valley of the dead and the valley of vision. Around these valleys, the three religions initiating the Holy City have set three distinct city forms in time, including the walls of the Davidic, Herodian and Suleiman periods.




Figure 3 The three historic components of the city




Figure 4 The city space of Jerusalem

The Valley of the City

It is the valley that defines the city. It is an integral part of its defenses and generates its physical form and architectural character. This was the polis.

And all the people, *even the people of war that were with him*, went up, and drew nigh, and came before the city, and pitched on the north side of Ai: now *there was a valley between them and Ai*. *Joshua 8; 11*

The valley of Jerusalem is identified for the first time in Joshua:

And the border went up by the valley of the son of Hinnom unto the south side of the Jebusite; the same is Jerusalem: and the border went up to the top of the mountain that lieth before the valley of Hinnom westward, which is at the end of the valley of the giants northward. Joshua 15;8

6. Kitto, H.D.F. (1951), *The Greeks; chapter - the polis*; London.

Stanley in his personal descriptions and insights of the region manages to convey to us that passion for the comprehension of the symbiosis between geography and history. Its fragility is at the soul of the conservation of the historic city.

*"The other, wider and greener, was "the ravine" (Ge), in which probably some ancient hero had encamped, - "the son of hinnom; and from the name thus compounded, "Ge Ben Hinnom". "Ge-Hinnom", was formed the word "Gehenna" and thus what Milton truly calls "the pleasant valley of Hinnom", was through its late associations given its name to the place of future torment. These deep ravines, which thus separate Jerusalem from the rocky plateau of which it forms a part, are a rare feature in the general scenery of the Holy land. Something of the same effect is produced by those vast rents which under the name of "Tajo", surround or divide Toledo, Ronda, Alhama, and Grenada, on the table-lands which crown the summits of the Spanish mountains. But in Palestine, Jerusalem alone is so entrenched, and from this cause derives, in great measure, her early strength and subsequent greatness."*⁷

The Valley of Death

Burial was one of the ceremonies of life. It took place outside the polis at a walking distance of up to around three kilometres. The rock-cut family tombs were naturally at the edge of the valley where the soft stone allowed their excavation. The burial of Moses is mentioned:

And He buried him in a valley in the land of Moab, over against Beth-peor: but no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day. Deuteronomy 34; 6

These patterns of human settlement generated narratives overlapping each other with mixed metaphors between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. But the necropolis was subservient to the forms of the valley. It was not a single space, but reflected the geo-morphological forms of Jerusalem:

*The city, where ever else it spread, could never overleap the valley of the Kedron or of Hinnom; and those two fosses, so to speak, became accordingly, as in the analogous case of the ancient towns of Etruria, the Necropolis of Jerusalem.*⁸

And it became the Valley of Hinnom, where according to the Talmud, there was situated one of the four gates to Hell⁹; a poignant message for those in the

7. Stanley, A.P (1889); *Sinai and Palestine -in connection with their history*, John Murray, London 172.

8. *Ibid*,173.

9. *Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin*, 19 a.

city who do not walk in the path of the Lord. Here the narrative of death was not only part of the history; it was also part of the spirit of the place.

And it shall come to pass in that day, that I will give unto Gog a place there of graves in Israel, the valley of the passengers on the east of the sea: and it shall stop the noses of the passengers: and there shall they bury Gog and all his multitude: and they shall call it The valley of Hamon-gog. Ezekiel 39; 11

And the Valley of Death had comfort:

Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil; for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me. Psalms 23; 4

The Valley of Vision

The Acropolis, the upper city, was the part that the people could look up to and revere. It evolved from the fortified hilltop strong-point, built for protection against invaders, to a place for assembly, religion and commerce. For Jerusalem, it was the physical and spiritual symbols creating the Axis Mundi linking the Heavenly and Earthly cities.¹⁰ A valley of vision is the obverse form of the holy space - a form of yin/yang. From deep in the valley, the resurrection for the three religions will commence. It is depicted as a bitter-sweet end with symbolism linking space with place; time and motion. The narrative moves from vengeance to pacification in the silence after the massive earthquake and the final war, to end all wars, of Gog and Magog.

And his feet shall stand in that day upon the mount of Olives, which is before Jerusalem on the east, and the mount of Olives shall cleave in the midst thereof toward the east and toward the west, and there shall be a very great valley; and half of the mountain shall remove toward the north, and half of it toward the south.

From the Valley of Jehoshaphat to the Mount Olives, Earth and Heaven are linked.

... and the Spirit lifted me up between earth and heaven and brought me in the visions of God to Jerusalem, to the entrance of the north gate of the inner courtEzekiel 8:3

This is crowned with the Decalogue of promises for Jerusalem by the prophet

10. Turner, M *Conflict of the Heavenly and Earthly Jerusalem, Places*, Vol 8 No.1, 1992.

Zechariah.¹¹ The Christian vision also develops a three-dimensional understanding of the metaphysical space, once again linking Earth and Heaven.

He who conquers, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God; never shall he go out of it, and I will write on him the name of my God, and the name of the city of my God, the new Jerusalem which comes down from my God out of heaven, and my own new name. Revelation 3:12

The gates that were the functional nodes of the city transform into a transparent metaphysical opening:

The one who spoke with me had a gold measuring rod to measure the city, and its gates and its wall...

And the twelve gates were twelve pearls; each one of the gates was a single pearl. And the street of the city was pure gold, like transparent glass.....

In the daytime (for there will be no night there) its gates will never be closed;

Revelation 21:15-25

Muslims have traditionally regarded Jerusalem as having a special religious status, as the “farthest Mosque” (al-masjid al-Aqsa), in verse (17:1) of the Qur’an, is interpreted as referring to the Holy Mount in Jerusalem, on which the mosque of that name now stands:

Glory to (Allah) Who did take His servant for a Journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless.¹²

The night journey of the Prophet, once again, represents the union of Earth to Heaven.

2.3 Ethereal - Spirit and Events

The events and epic history of Jerusalem are well documented in numerous tomes, travellers’ diaries and atlases and in this paper only a few personal vignettes are offered. Having avoided the popular, I make no excuses for the personal choices and invite the reader to fill in the gaps with their own experiences to perfect the quilt of patch-work. These events create ceremonies while the accompanying tradition evolves through time and habit. Pilgrims arrive and pay homage to the city and the entrances, the visual and vocal boundaries become

11. Zechariah Chapter 8;1-17.

12. Translation of Yusuf Ali.

entwined in a maze of borders that are shared by the many visitors. The ceremonies of the city accrue over the years, while the role of pilgrimage to Jerusalem plays a very important part in the life of the city. It is the inter-relationship between the concepts that *people sanctify place* and *place sanctifies people*. The processions and celebrations are the re-enacting of the events of bygone years and encompass all the religions. To name but a few, and without prejudice:

*Abraham to Mount Moria and the Eid el Adha,
the pilgrimage foot festivals and the water drawing on Succot/ Tabernacles,
the pronouncement of the New Moon and the bonfire communications,
the forty days of wandering in the wilderness,
Jesus' last walk on the Via Dolorosa and
the night flight of Mohammed to Al Aqsa.*

Today, the processions of history are re-enacted in a diachronic manner comparable to the Shakespearean play in modern dress. The rejoicing of the water drawing ceremony of Succot/ Tabernacles; the last walk of Easter on the Via Dolorosa and the night flight to Al Aqsa have physical meaning in the two dimensions of the city. But it is the third dimension of the Axis Mundi in Jerusalem that lends itself to the metaphysic and the heavenly journeys of Elijah, Jesus and Mohammed, albeit that the former is attributed to an off-centre jump from Gilgal.

The contemporary paths call us to create a symphony from the cacophonic echo of the prayers of the followers. The eschatological origins are clouded in the far perspectives of pre-history while a shared heritage of Jerusalem must truly start with Abraham, the father of the monotheistic religions. Melchizedek, the king of (Jeru-) salem, with local protocol, greets Abraham after his victory over the four kings who had besieged Sodom and Gomorrah and had taken his nephew Lot prisoner. In return, Abraham gives Melchizedek a tithe of the bounty that he took in battle:

Then Melchizedek king of Salem brought out bread and wine. He was priest of God Most High, and he blessed Abram, saying, "Blessed be Abram by God Most High, Creator of heaven and earth. And blessed be God Most High, who delivered your enemies into your hand." Then Abram gave him a tenth of everything. - Genesis 14:18-20

Passing over the early Biblical history, I use my prerogative to choose the story of Sennacherib (705-681 BCE) who lays siege to Jerusalem as is told in II Kgs.19:35.

And it came to pass that night, that the angel of the LORD went out, and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred fourscore and five thousand: and when they arose early in the morning, behold, they were all dead corpses.

And it was poignantly penned by Lord Byron in his poem on the Destruction of Sennacherib which is so alive for me from my schoolboy memories:

*The Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold,
And his cohorts were gleaming in purple and gold;
And the sheen of their spears was like stars on the sea,
When the blue wave rolls nightly on deep Galilee.*

.....

*For the Angel of Death spread his wings on the blast,
And breathed in the face of the foe as he passed;
And the eyes of the sleepers waxed deadly and chill,
And their hearts but once heaved, and for ever grew still!*

.....¹³

The Second Temple period witnessed the trials and tribulations of the Jewish people, with a developing web of arts, architecture, culture and literature. Not only had the physical form of Jerusalem received the patina of time but so also its metaphysical form. The corners of the city¹⁴ were considered the benchmarks, and the boundaries were furrowed defining its space. All the early cultures of the Mediterranean evoked this pattern. To increase the size of the city special powers needed to be evoked by the Sanhedrin or the City Fathers. These points became the markers that allowed for the control of the city-space and as point of entry to the city.¹⁵

13. George Gordon Lord Byron (1788-1824), *The Destruction of Sennacherib*.

14. Rykwert, J. (1988); *The Idea of a Town*; MIT Press.

15. Babylonian Talmud, Erubin, 56b.




Figure 5 To square the City-the tangible and intangible space.




Figure 6 The ceremonies of the city.

So the new boundaries become at the same time, spiritual, physical, functional and visual; gates and thresholds to an urban space of cultural significance.

Jerusalem as the navel of the Earth, the cradle of religions, becomes the scene of the ministering of Jesus and the Apostles. The stage is set for the last years of Jesus arriving from the Galilean town of Nazareth. The crescendo of events with passionate cries, documented movingly in the New Testament, is a fitting backcloth to the lessons of Christianity and the hopes of resurrection.

Now, my vignette is focused on the Crusaders reaching the summit of the road overlooking Jerusalem with its walls and towers, at the Shrine of the prophet Samuel, on the evening of Tuesday, 7th June 1099, when the Christian army encamps before the Holy City.¹⁶ Here they knelt and prayed. This is a stark prelude to the massacre of the inhabitants of the City some four weeks later.

Arriving at the entrance of the city presented the visitors with their first view. Here they would bless their entry, kneel in deference or even rent their

16 Runciman, S. (1951); *A History of the Crusades*; Cambridge University Press.

garment, while the hosts would receive the guests, with bread and salt or, alternatively, batten down the hatches for the anticipated stormy siege. The gates of the city became the market place and the epicentre of interaction between the urban and rural dwellers. Here the great seats of justice would be found together with the citadel, not just to keep the invaders out but also to keep the residents in and subdued.

However, it is the vision of Suleiman the Magnificent that has left its indelible imprint on the city. The rebuilding of the walls was a massive achievement which raised palaces, revived foundations and breathed new life by re-defining the city once again. According to legend, Suleiman had a dream one night that lions were tearing him apart. On awaking, he took the dream as a warning from God that he should take better care of the holy city of Jerusalem, so Suleiman began building the walls. The lions on the gate were a reminder of that dream. The urban fabric subsequently developed in the cultural style of the Ottoman Empire with the hierarchy of spaces reflecting the social norms from the house, the *hosh*, or courtyard to the *harat* or block.




Figure 7 The hierarchy of the urban space 1- below ground, 2- to the rear, 3- on roofs.

Figure 8 A section through a typical hosh showing areas of change.

It developed into a conglomerated mass as seen by Mark Twain in his indelible account of *The Innocents Abroad*.

*.. The appearance of the city is peculiar. It is as knobby with countless little domes as a prison door is with bolt-heads... Wherefore, when one looks down from an eminence, upon the compact mass of houses (so closely together, in fact, that there is no appearance of streets at all, and so the city looks solid,).....It looks as if it might be roofed, from centre to circumference, with inverted saucers.*¹⁷

The social and technological patterns of domes and balconies have come together to endow the icon known as the Old City of Jerusalem. Islamic cities are defined not by geography, but by the combination of social structure, the status of women, and the decentralized decision-making about land use and social control.¹⁸ The present day development pressures of building above, below and around the present day buildings, as indicated in the section, together with the changes in life-style make the debate on its relevance all the more essential. The continuity is unique, the city being described by Raif Nijem as a veritable School of Architecture.¹⁹

Latter-day visionaries, including Theodor Herzl and Professor Boris Schatz, created literary images of the social liberal reformations including the transpositions of the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, the New Atlantis of Francis Bacon and the Garden City Movement of Sir Ebenezer Howard. They published their ideas in the treatises *Altneuland* and *Jerusalem Rebuilt - a daydream*. But the foremost aspirations were those of the British Mandate; a Jerusalem with Charles Ashbee, as the Civic Advisor, Sir Patrick Geddes, city planner and Sir Ronald Storrs KCMG, the Governor of Jerusalem all bent on the establishment of the Pro-Jerusalem Society. *The London Times*, in reporting the event in 1919, wrote of the high hopes for the triumvirate in capturing the Napoleonic Vision of the Survey of Egypt.²⁰ Recognising that:

...it is difficult to imagine a sharper contrast between the Jerusalem of man's imagination, whether he thinks of it in terms of Mahomed's vision and ascent to Heaven, of Solomon's grandeur or of Christ's Sermon on the Mount and the

17. Twain, M. *The Innocents Abroad*, p. 445, *The Library of America*, New York, 1984.

18. Abu-Lughod, J. (1987); *The Islamic City; Historic Myths, Islamic Essence and Contemporary Relevance*; *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol 19 pp 155-176; Cambridge University Press.

19. UNESCO Experts Meeting, Paris, (January 2005).

20. *The Times*, (5th February 1919); *Reconstruction in Jerusalem - far-reaching plans*.

actual Jerusalem left by the Turk..... this magnificent work embraced hygiene, engineering, archaeology, arts and crafts, music - all the things that make for the finer life of a people.

Later, Ronald Storrs on returning to England, when asked to what position he will be promoted, was quoted as saying that after Jerusalem there can be no promotion.

My last vignette belongs to General Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham KCB, DSO, MC, the last High Commissioner for Palestine, writing the foreword to the Jerusalem City Plan, 1948 as the British flag is lowered from the mast at the High Commissioner's residence overlooking the Old City:

The City of Jerusalem, precious as an emblem of several faiths, a site of spiritual beauty lovingly preserved over the ages by many men's hands, has been in our care as a sacred trust for 30 years....Let old Jerusalem stand firm, and new Jerusalem grow in grace! To this fervent prayer, I add the hope that the accomplishments and labours of the years... may be considered worthy to act as an inspiration and an example to the future generations in whose care our Holy City must rest.

3. Developing Policies and Management

Policies have sense when there is the poetry, optimism and delight of sustainability. The legacy of the fathers is the inheritance of the further generations. It is the understanding of the cultural significance and its translation into reality with a conservation policy that meaning can be given to those actions. They might answer the humble prayers of Sir Alan Gordon Cunningham. To do justice, and based on the significances identified, we will have to redefine yet again the boundaries of the city both mentally and physically; to understand the city *ab initio*, the ancient city, the old city and the contemporary city. This mammoth effort can only be achieved by consensus.

While the events of history cannot be neatly compartmentalized, it is convenient to divide the history of the city into six periods - each of some 500 years. The physical evidence allows us to comprehend three major eras which reflect the three religious epochs of the city - the Davidic, Herodian and Suleiman Cities.




Figure 9 Jerusalem between hills and desert - a new definition for the regional space including political nodes.



Figure 10 The shared space of the public realm - a new definition for the World heritage site.

I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Jebus Davidic	II Temple Herodian	Roman Byzantine	Early Arab	Crusader Mameluke	Suleiman Ottoman British Modern
1000	500	0	500	1000	1500
					2000

The sharing of the cultural significance means recognizing all these periods and events and weaving them into the common image of the city. Thus its visual comprehension becomes the means whereby the historic space will become the public realm. The open spaces and its visual notation are composed of the shared significance of the valley, the city of death and the vision, thus representing the geography and history of the city.

The main axes north-south and east-west link the surrounding hills while the valleys of Refaim and Kidron generate the diagonal axes of Mount Scopus and Nebi Samuel. These should not be symbols of administration or sovereignty but nodes of cultural and social activity that are in balance between the common places.

Currently, the Old City and walls are a declared World Heritage site according to criteria (ii) (iii) and (vi).

(ii) exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design;

(iii) bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared;

(vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance (the Committee considers that this criterion should justify inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction with other criteria cultural or natural);

With the extension and re-evaluation of the cultural significance of the site it could encompass all six criteria. By extending the image and boundaries we create the Ancient City of Jerusalem and its environs and encompass all the religious stakeholders of the city. Criteria (i), (iv) and (v) might be added together with the necessary Buffer Zone which could be part of the significance of the term ‘valley’ and which defines the very city. The possible sites that could reflect these criteria are given below.

<i>(i) represent a masterpiece of human creative genius;</i>	<i>the Dome of the Rock - al-Haram ash-Sharif and Temple Mount retaining walls</i>
--	--

<i>(iv) be an outstanding example of a type of building or architectural or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history;</i>	<i>the technological achievements of the water systems for Jerusalem including the aqueducts and Hezekiah's tunnel</i>
--	--

<i>(v) be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement or land-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change;</i>	<i>water systems for Jerusalem including the aqueducts and Hezekiah's tunnel</i>
--	--

The intangible criteria (vi) would need to be extended based on mutual acceptance and a common denominator of respect and recognition for the mosaic history of the city. An interfaith forum would be welcomed to define this facet of the cultural significance without treading on the toes of the new UNESCO sister convention for the Protection of Intangible Heritage and Oral Masterpieces of the World.

It is interesting to note that the British Mandate planning regulations identified this extended area as the Jerusalem archaeological zone. This zone was subdivided into four parts, three of which related to the area of the Old City and its Environs and determined the following conditions on its development:²¹

1. *The Old City within the walls. Mediaeval aspect to be preserved; new buildings to be permitted only under special conditions.*
2. *Areas immediately abutting on the city walls. No new building to be permitted and the locality to be eventually cleared of undesirable buildings and left in its natural state.*
3. *An area principally to the north and the east of the Old City. Buildings may be erected only with special approval and under special conditions rendering them in harmony with the general scheme.*

The second zone covers the Kidron Valley, the Garden of Gethsemane, the Pool of Siloam, Mount Zion and the Valley of Hinnom. The third zone includes the Mount of Olives and the village of Bethany.

No site will now be inscribed on the World Heritage List without the necessary buffer zones and management planning. The management mechanisms required by the World Heritage Convention could be a tool to allow a more comprehensive solution for the *modus operandi* of Jerusalem. It should be more than a regular two-dimensional zoning plan. It deals not only with the third dimension but also with the structures for implementation, the processes of consultation and the mechanisms for evaluation and monitoring. It should be a non-governmental tool for grass-roots activity and stake-holders involvement. The format of a Management Plan is determined after careful documentation, both physical and spiritual, and will relate to subsequent evaluation. It looks at the authenticity in setting and the authenticity in design. It will weigh the evidence, assess the treatment and recommend on the implementation.

The accepted format of the management as described by Bernard Feilden and Jukka Jokilehto²² includes structure for administration, cost control and policy, legal instruments and programming. The maintenance programme should address the issues of preventive care and risk preparedness while staffing and per-

²¹ Kendall, H. (1948); *Jerusalem City Plan*, HMSO.

²² Feilden, B., Jokilehto, J. (1993); *Management Guidelines for World Cultural Heritage Sites*, ICCROM, Rome.

sonnel services should provide for the maintenance, usage and protection of the site under its control. With a little effort, these guidelines can be equally applied within the context of a wider municipal role and in this way a 'Site Commission' may be established according to these recommendations.

One component *sina qua* non are the citizens of the city, they are the 'concerned parties' and stakeholders and they are the spirit of any plan. The acceptance by the authorities of this involvement will be an important step in the safeguarding of the cultural heritage of the city. Each constituent has a vital part to play, including commercial and environmental interests, the private and public realm together with religious and academic bodies. It can be relevant only with the active and positive motivation of these constituents, whereby each adds their colour and perspective creating that dynamic and on-going tableau of Jerusalem.

4. Afterthought

Jerusalem, a World City, sanctified by the three religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is held in sustainable trust for future generations. It is only through ending the deadlock, shuffling the cards and re-dealing is there a possibility to break the impasse. This requires courage and humility, respect and recognition from its citizens, those who inhabit the city and those who love the city. Jerusalem is no longer east and west or north and south but a heritage for all. We need to propose and introduce an element of consensus that will allow us to join forces for the celebration of the City of Jerusalem, its historic past and spiritual values, for future generations. The diverse parts as a concinnous whole.

Article 11 of the World Heritage Convention states that:

'The inclusion of a property situated in a territory, sovereignty or jurisdiction over which is claimed by more than one State shall in no way prejudice the rights of the parties to the dispute.'

This disclaimer might easily form the basis for the changes and extensions for a joint declaration of Jerusalem and its Environs to the World Heritage List while allowing each of the parties to develop their indigenous - though parallel - scenarios. While comparisons can be odious, parallels can be found in the joint

inscription of the Historic Centre of Rome by the Holy See and Italy, which includes the addendum - 'each according to its jurisdiction.' This inscription includes non-contiguous sites under the heading of the *Historic Centre of Rome, the Properties of the Holy See in that City Enjoying Extraterritorial Rights and San Paolo Fuori le Mura*. A joint nomination for *Jerusalem and its Environs* could be an inscription extending from Mount Zion to Bethany and from Mount Scopus to the outskirts of Bethlehem. Similarly, this might provide the sustainability for a peaceful, shared cultural significance of Jerusalem.

The Pro-Jerusalem Committee constituted by Storrs was reported as unique inasmuch as 'Muslim, Christian and Jew pull together', not even achieved in the enlightened days of Frederick II, in the thirteenth century or the more brilliant period of the Great Khalif Mamoun in the eighth century.²³ The new citizens of Jerusalem who cherish, love and care will become the founding members of a reconstituted Pro-Jerusalem Society that might provide for the future of our city and;

*... one thing we whose concern is civics must always remember. In the conservation of a city, whether it be like London, Paris, Rome or New York, well within the stream of the world, or whether like Jerusalem set upon a hilltop and remote: What we are conserving is not only the things themselves, the streets, the houses, spires, towers and domes, but the way of living, the idealism, the feeling for righteousness and fitness which these things connote and with which every city with any claim to dignity and beauty is instinct.*²⁴

*.... [so we] will strive unceasingly to quicken the public sense of public duty; that thus, in all these ways, we will hand on this city, not only not less, but greater, better, and more beautiful than it was given to us.*²⁵

²³ *The Times*, *ibid*.

²⁴ C.R.Ashbee, *Proceedings of the Pro Jerusalem Society, 1919-1922*.

²⁵ *The Athenian Oath*

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Psalms Chapter 122

- 1. A song of ascents. Of David. I rejoiced when they said to me, "Let us go to the house of the LORD."*
- 2. And now our feet are standing within your gates, Jerusalem.*
- 3. Jerusalem, built as a city, walled round about.*
- 4. Here the tribes have come, the tribes of the LORD, As it was decreed for Israel, to give thanks to the name of the LORD.*
- 5. Here are the thrones of justice, the thrones of the house of David.*
- 6. For the peace of Jerusalem pray: "May those who love you prosper!"*
- 7. May peace be within your ramparts, prosperity within your towers."*
- 8. For family and friends I say, "May peace be yours."*
- 9. For the house of the LORD, our God, I pray, "May blessings be yours."*

Science-fiction Against the Annexation and Expansion Wall!

Jerusalem: Towards a City of Equals and a Capital of Two States

Omar Yousef

Introduction: The Dilemma of a Peace Activist

Sitting today in 2005 and reflecting on the optimistic ideas and hopes expressed for Jerusalem during the late 1990's, I wonder how naive I was but cannot help feeling extremely disappointed and uncomfortable. This feeling comes from looking at the worsening socio-political and urban situation in East Jerusalem after the Israeli policy of building the walls and fences of the Jerusalem envelope. As a city of equals and a capital of two states, Jerusalem could have been the candidate for promoting peace and coexistence between the Palestinians and the Israelis; but instead East Jerusalem (the Palestinian part of the city) is becoming a bunch of isolated urban enclaves struggling to exist under the devastating trail of the Israeli Segregation Wall. Situated on the epicenter of the Israeli Palestinian conflict and holding the balance between the tectonic plates of the conflict, Jerusalem is the central political and urban bridge connecting both sides.

"Sketches for Jerusalem...Towards a City of Equals and a Capital of two states" was a presentation based on research done in the late 1990's. The scope of the work was to identify some basic interventions for the urban rehabilitation of East Jerusalem towards creating a balanced urban environment for a territorially and morally acceptable peace settlement. At that time, I was one of those who shared the vision of equality and peace, those who dreamed of ending the discrimination and the cessation of the Israeli occupation. We also believed that a two state solution would be a major step towards a sustainable peace settlement.

Now, I belong to those who are stunned by the latest political and urban developments and by the short sighted and opportunist policy of the Israeli occupation. This policy is taking advantage of the conflict to promote its greedy agenda by the unlawful settlement building in the occupied Palestinian territories and the forceful walling and fragmentation of East Jerusalem. By ignoring UN resolutions and International treaties such as the Geneva Convention and the Universal Charter of Human Rights, Israel is undermining the minimum base of any morally acceptable future solution.

As a peace activist, I was involved in several debates about scenarios of possible solutions, and in one of the heated discussions about the latest developments somebody quoted Napoleon saying, “Don’t humiliate your enemy.” Maybe it was Napoleon and maybe not, but whoever said that was a wise political strategist: One who knew that whenever you force your adversary into a humiliating solution, you are creating a temporary formal settlement that lacks the material and moral basis of sustainability. And, this is exactly what is happening now in Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian territories - the opposite of a genuine peace agenda as envisioned in Taba and Geneva.

The Oslo negotiations, culminated by the Taba talks in the beginning of 2001, framed a solution where the Palestinians would recognize the state of Israel on 78 percent of historic Palestine and accept the creation of a Palestinian state on the remaining 22 percent with Jerusalem as a shared capital of the two states. This solution found reasonable public resonance and was echoed by the detailed unofficial peace agreement called the Geneva Accords. The agreement was worked out by the main negotiators of Taba in addition to a wide group of Palestinian and Israeli politicians and intellectuals who then had no official status as Ariel Sharon won the elections in February 2001. The Geneva Accords showed an acceptable solution for both sides based on the Taba content, and proved that there is still a partner for peace on both sides.

Science Fiction is the Solution

Reality now looks gloomy. Hopes and aspirations for a two state solution with Jerusalem as a shared capital seems to be science fiction. The wall and the Israeli settlement blocks divide the Palestinian territories into separate isolated

cantons and the Palestinian conurbation of East Jerusalem is chopped and fragmented through the wall of the “Jerusalem Envelope” and the surrounding Israeli settlement belt. History teaches us that walls can be erected in months but need tens of years to be torn down; and thus any pragmatic realist would lose hope and resign into helplessness today. But thanks to my nature, realistic pragmatism has never been my strength; so I will keep drawing sketches of mutual coexistence and plans of future Jerusalem as a city of peace that will incorporate the aspirations of both the Palestinian and the Jewish people.

Accordingly, I am resurrecting the naïve dream of justice, equality and peace which will save both people from the atrocities of occupation, violence and mutual destruction - even if it seems now like science fiction. Dreams of a better future are an essential means of resistance against prevailing depression. Finally, what can the future be, if not the one we can dream?

Sketches for Jerusalem

Towards a City of Equals and a Capital of Two States

The attempt to write about the future of Jerusalem, or to create visions for its development, is a difficult process, close to schizophrenia. It is a journey in a huge void, separating the dreams of a balanced city from the realities of the divided and fragmented urban tissues forming it.

In Jerusalem, the ingredients of planning are sharpened and complicated artificially by the political situation, the propaganda and by the claims of sole dominance of the Israeli authorities over both sides of the city (West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem). This goes to the extent of hindering the natural flow of life needed for its healthy and balanced development by restrictive regulations and the closure. Development plans are usually prepared according to a political plan serving the ethnic policy of the Ministry of Interior.

“Israel as a Jewish state has been building an ETHNOCRACY (according to Oren Yiftachel, Geography Professor at Ben Gurion University). Here we can observe that the legal and political foundation of the Jewish state has created a distorted structure which ensured a continuing uni-ethnic seizure of a bi-ethnic state.”

Driven by the Zionist mythology of a land without a nation, to a nation without a land, the Israeli settlement worked on marginalizing the Palestinians (Christians and Muslims). It hampered their development by “employing sophisticated institutional settings in order to facilitate the continuing immigration of Jews (and only Jews) to Israel/Palestine. This was done by the uni-directional transfer of land from Palestinian to Jewish hands.” (Oren Yiftachel, Professor at Beer Sheva University).

The same macro-policy applied in Israel/Palestine is used in micro-Jerusalem East/West. Such a policy can be detected and read easily in East Jerusalem by scanning the socio-urban manifestations on the ground, where we can read a long story of ethnic bias and marginalization towards the Palestinian community.

In order to understand the realities of Jerusalem and its developments let us go through the:

Dictionary of East Jerusalem

Historic city

Jerusalem is a city that dates back too far into the factual and cultural history of this world. It survived many reigns and dominances that left their prints on its walls and typologies producing a rich mixture that gives it also its cultural uniqueness and underlies its conflicts.




Figure 1: Jerusalem with the monuments of the three monotheistic religions: the Wailing Wall (Jewish) to the left, Dome of the Rock (Islamic) in the middle and churches on Mount of Olives (Christian) to the right.

Divided City (1948-1967)

In its recent history, Jerusalem was divided in 1948 after the war into “two cities”, which developed separately and autonomously into two different entities, different in levels and patterns of development.

- West Jerusalem (Under the Israeli Authority)
- East Jerusalem (Under the Jordanian Authority)



Figure 2: The green line dividing Jerusalem into East Jerusalem (in red) and West Jerusalem (in blue).




Figure 3: Map of the “divided city”.




Figure 4: Aerial photo showing West Jerusalem roads following a grid in planning.

East Jerusalem

East Jerusalem developed gradually in the hilly and less urbanized part in the east. Following the traces of topographies and the patterns of landownership, the villages developed into city-neighborhoods around the Old City. This produced a loose network of communities on the surrounding hilly topography.

West Jerusalem

West Jerusalem took over the more urbanized and developed western side, with its relatively flatter topography. The urban development in West Jerusalem is influenced by the master plans of the British Mandate. Those plans were more elaborate on that side due to the fact that the first Palestinian attempts to expand out of the walls of the Old City were going west. Western planning and building mentality produced a more dense and ordered tissue.




Figure 5: Aerial photo showing East Jerusalem roads following topography.

The Old City

The Old City stayed in between, belonging to East Jerusalem, but flanked by both sides. **No development nor rehabilitation plan** yet after 35 years of occupation, the Old City is dilapidating with the exception of the Jewish quarter, the new settlers in the Muslim and Christian quarter and some “lucky institutions.”



Figure 6 : Panorama showing the old City of Jerusalem.

Occupation / Unification

As the result of the war in 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Shortly after, Israel declared Jerusalem as “unified”, in spite of the international law and the UN Security Council resolutions which do not recognize this act. Shortly after 1967, the Israeli authorities annexed 70 square kilometers of occupied Palestinian land, including the municipal area of six square kilometers of the pre-war East Jerusalem.

The Israeli national euphoria of unification did not regard East Jerusalem as a neighboring city, but as a conquered landscape with some Palestinian inhabitants that should be tolerated. The Palestinians are seen to stay as a minority which should not exceed 25 percent of the Jerusalem population, leaving a Jewish majority of 75 percent, according to the ethnic policy of the Israeli authorities. So the planning vision for East Jerusalem was to be transformed into fragmented islands, isolated into the urban grid of West Jerusalem and the Jewish

settlements beyond the Green Line. So, the “unification” meant, turning East Jerusalem into the rural underdeveloped backyard of the “unifier”.




Figure 7: Jerusalem 1967 municipal boundary (in yellow) after the “unification”.

Expropriation and the settlement belt

A wide confiscation and expropriation campaign was launched on the Palestinian owned land, tearing the city network of East Jerusalem apart.

One third of East Jerusalem was expropriated and designated for the sole use of the Jewish population.

The land was used for building the “dense residential” settlements of Ramat-Shkol, French Hill, Neve Yacov, Gilo, east Talpiot, Ramot, Reches Shoafat and recently in its final stages, Jabal Abu Gneim (Har Homa).

These settlements were spread across the Green Line through East Jerusalem, creating a network of Jewish ghetto-neighborhoods advancing towards the Jordan Valley. These ghetto-neighborhoods are well connected urban grids but

isolated from the surrounding Palestinian communities, which are restricted from development and are forced to remain as semi-urban and rural densities.

The isolated urban grid is intersecting with the south/north coherence of the city of Jerusalem and creating a congestion point at the French Hill intersection area. It also produces fragmented neighborhoods in the city of Jerusalem, a factor that affects the life and the vitality of East Jerusalem and its social and economic coherence.




Figure 8: Map showing the location of the Israeli settlements (appearing as red dots). These settlements are forming an inner belt (in dark blue) and an outer belt around Jerusalem.



Figure 9: The settlement of Ma'ale Adumim sitting like a fortress on top of the hill; the ship containers in the picture were given to the Bedouin families to compensate them for their lands which they had to evacuate for the sake of this settlement.

Exclusion by the selective municipal borders

The annexed area forming East Jerusalem was chosen according to military expansive interests and not to urban considerations. The municipality borderline cuts through the landscape, disguising a policy which aims to include as much land and as few Palestinian inhabitants as possible. In effect, surrounding villages were excluded from interacting actively with their urban mother, the city of East Jerusalem.

This situation was aggravated after imposing the closure and placing the military checkpoints on the eastern municipality borders, denying those communities even the right of access to the city.

This affected the vitality of East Jerusalem in a negative way and deprived it from a large part of the essential backing of its commercial and social base. Such negative effects can be clearly detected by studying the developing clusters of agglomerated, commercial and public activities around the checkpoints and the municipal borders. The closure pushed the energy from the center to the periph-

eries where many businesses found it more convenient to move in order to reach customers from inside and from outside of Jerusalem.

This phenomenon is manifested in areas like:

- Ar Ram (at the northern border);
- Al 'Eizariya (eastern border); and in
- Bethlehem (to the south).




Figure 10: Map showing the exclusion of Palestinian neighborhoods in the Jerusalem area from the municipal boundary, thus causing an urban discontinuity within the Palestinian urban fabric.



Figure 11: Settlement of Neve Ya'akov - Jerusalem and Ar Ram excluded area with the potential confrontation line.

Green is dangerous!

In order to limit Palestinian growth and development and in order to isolate and “protect” the Israeli settlements, wide belts of open space and exaggerated “green areas” (i.e. no building is permitted) are imposed on East Jerusalem, and are colored green on the official maps. Such zones create allergies by most of the Palestinians who intend to build a home and find out that most of their hopes are painted green on the mayor’s table.

The experience showed that the so called “green” areas are used as a reserve, serving later the expanding interests of West Jerusalem and its Jewish population, while the Palestinian neighborhoods are congested with a restricted building capacity. This situation encouraged illegal building in spite of the brutal threat of demolition.

This has affected East Jerusalem and its inhabitants and forced them to slip away towards its outer boundaries. Many Jerusalemites who could not find a space in East Jerusalem had to look for housing outside the municipal line like in the Al-Ram area and Al-Ezarieh, in the shadow of Jerusalem.




Figure 12: Map shows that the green around the Palestinian areas is zoned for **open spaces**, i.e. no future expansion by law. While around the Jewish settlements is zoned as **unplanned**, i.e. available for any future proposals. So, **even their green is different than ours**.



Figure 13: Shows an “illegal” house looking towards a “legal” settlement built on the confiscated land of its owner.

Captive City

Checkpoints and their architecture are a widespread daily encounter in the landscape of East Jerusalem and its flowing patterns.

“The Israelis are creating facts on the ground in Jerusalem, but we are the facts” (Faisal Hussaini, Palestinian political leader in Jerusalem).

Jerusalem cannot be a viable city based on a zero sum game of the planning regime. There has to be a more equitable mix of national interest. Such a mix can only be obtained by empowerment of the national Palestinian community in East Jerusalem.

This can be achieved by political negotiations between the two sides on the basis of the UN resolutions 242, 338 (land for peace) and by accepting the Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem. So, we will recognize the realities of two sovereign cities, which have been by-passing each other for a long time instead of weaving together. Until now, East and West Jerusalem are two differ-

ent worlds, the world of the **occupier** and the world of the **occupied**.

Emphasis should be given to maximum planning autonomy for Palestinians requiring little intervention from the Israeli side, except on the level of coordination and in those areas in which there are shared and/or conflicting national interests.




Figure 14: Map showing the location of checkpoints in the Jerusalem Area

“Imagine.....” (John Lennon)

..... that East Jerusalem gains its independence and will be free.

It is time to end the occupation and recognize the Palestinians and their right of sovereignty over East Jerusalem. This will help both cities to begin interacting with each other as equals and on the basis of **mutual interests**, **autonomous decisions** and **constructive coordination**.



Figure 15: Qalandiya Checkpoint North of Jerusalem.

This brings us to a **Twin-City**-model:

- Capital of two states, Palestine and Israel.
- Two municipalities under a coordinating council.
- Open for freedom of religion.
- World center for multicultural activities, and a model for conflict resolution.
- Open to the world and its regional context.
- Well connected to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Tel Aviv.

This means an **open city** accessible to all visitors and pilgrims from the Western World as well as the Eastern and Islamic World. It will require more than just a political agreement in order to realize this vision. A serious engagement for peace and the good will from both peoples will be necessary.

The **Free Zone-Jerusalem County** will be incorporating the East and the West Cities, enjoying a special status and autonomy in managing the Twin-City life, serving the goals of peace and co-existence. This would also save Jerusalem from being a propaganda instrument of any side. One can see both parts as Siamese twins who cannot be divided but have their independent different minds. This way Jerusalem will be moving towards an open City of Equals.




Figure 16: Map showing the frame of the “Free Zone-Jerusalem County”.

Five projects

Following the footsteps of such a dream, some necessary interventions are important and they can be spotted as five packages of projects, seen as priorities in developing East Jerusalem as an equal partner.

Package 1: Assess / Upgrade Healing East Jerusalem

Socio-economic and environmental assessment and rehabilitation of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem are necessary to satisfy their needs for growth and development:

- Encourage Arab businesses and Palestinian managed institutions to participate in the Jerusalem mosaic.
- Develop Palestinian-managed industrial zones.
- Raise the density of the existing neighborhoods preserving its mixed character of living and work.




Figure 17: Map showing the frame for upgrading access and services.

- Upgrade the level of services in East Jerusalem.
- Add new levels of urban functions suitable to the status of a world open city.
- Develop the public transportation systems connecting East Jerusalem neighborhoods together and to West Jerusalem.
- Locate areas for future growth and development potentials.

Package 2: Heritage

The Old City and its Basin

An immediate **Development and Revitalization Plan** for the Old City and its environments should be prepared, considering it as a UNESCO World Heritage site and looking for a balance between the needs of a living city and a heritage site.

Special attention should be given to its surroundings, especially to the high rise tower policy, adopted recently by the municipality of West Jerusalem. The discourse about this policy must include the Palestinians.




Figure 18: The circled area shows the zone that requires an immediate Development and Revitalization Plan

Package 3: Forum

Sewing the cities together by developing the East Jerusalem City Forum in Sheikh Jarrah

With its already existing rich mixture of tourism, diplomatic, international, institutional and educational facilities, Sheikh Jarrah offers a chance for the forum as a pulsing heart and optimal as a connecting bridge between north-south and east-west.

More commercial and service oriented areas in Wadi Al Joz “industrial zone” would be the adequate complementation. This would blend well with the educational institutional aspect of the Mount Scopus area (Hebrew University and Hadassah-Hospital).




Figure 19: Map showing the suggested location of the City Forum in Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood.

Package 4: Co-existence

French Hill Bottleneck

Aiming **towards** a coherent viable city the most decisive Bottleneck connecting both the Palestinian and Israeli built-up corridors should be a useful urban junction for both cities. **Bi-national occupational** and **residential patterns** in the French Hill area are to be encouraged and supported.

This means a **pilot project** for the change of use and a **new master plan** aiming at developing the residential area of the French Hill into a work/living environment. This junction should be interacting with the East Jerusalem Forum and the campus of the Hebrew University.

Its position on the main spines, passing through East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, offers good chances of success as a **multicultural** pot. Palestinian students at the Hebrew University, who are living in the French Hill, could be the grassroots of such a tendency in the city.




Figure 20: Map showing the location and influence area of the multicultural pot.

Package 5: Bilingual

Open the ghetto settlements in East Jerusalem

After solving the questionable status of the settlements according to the UN resolutions:

- Settlements should become “normal” neighborhoods open to the housing market for all city residents, Palestinians and Jews without discrimination.
- Gradual interaction between them and the surrounding neighborhoods should be encouraged.
- Rigid repelling Edge Zones are to be softened to create areas of common interest offering mutual services and commercial, cultural and youth activities.
- Bilingual schooling should be encouraged, preparing the new generation for a future of peace and co-existence.




Figure 21: Map showing the location of the Settlements which would become “normal” neighborhoods open to the housing market for all city residents, Palestinians and Jews without discrimination.

According to an old slogan of the Sixties: “Let us be realistic, let us look for the impossible.”




Figure 22: Map showing all the suggested “packages” described in the five projects above.

Jerusalem in the Beilin-Abed Rabbo Understanding

The Geneva Initiative

Ruth Lapidoth

1. Introduction

It is generally accepted that the permanent status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians to be concluded in the future has to solve the dispute about Jerusalem.

This has also been foreseen in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements of 1993¹, **in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West-Bank and the Gaza Strip of 1995² and in the Roadmap of 2003.**³

The main issues which will have to be dealt with concern the question of sovereignty, the holy places, the Old City, the Temple Mount, municipal administration, security arrangements, planning and conservation, and international involvement.

Another important question concerns the relationship between the city and areas around it: since the border between Israel and the future state of Palestine will probably be in or near to, Jerusalem, the question of the contact between Jerusalem and its surroundings will also have to be tackled.

Some of these questions have been dealt with in a number of proposals, such as the draft Framework Agreement on Permanent Status of the Israeli delegation

1. 32 *International Legal Materials* (1993), 1525.

2. 36 *International Legal Materials* (1997), 551.

3. <http://www.nfa.gov.il>

to the negotiations 1999-2001, the Clinton Minutes (2000), the Nusseibeh-Ayalon Statement of Principles (2002), the Peace Initiative of the Arab States (2002), and the Geneva Initiative (2003). The most detailed discussion is in the Geneva text. This text deals with many of the above mentioned questions, and they will be analyzed in the following pages.

2. General outline

The Geneva text is based on the following principles: a territorial division of sovereignty in the whole city. The freedom of action of the sovereign is, however, subject to some limitations which vary from area to area; in some areas even a division between sovereign and administrator is foreseen. At holy places existing arrangements should continue to be applied. A special regime has been foreseen for the Temple Mount, with an important international involvement.

On the municipal level, separate Israeli and Palestinian municipalities should function, with a joint organ ensuring coordination where necessary. The Old City, though divided between the parties, should enjoy a special regime.

Security is the responsibility of the respective sovereign in the various areas, but with an important international ingredient in the Old City and on the Temple Mount.

Similarly, in the sphere of conservation a considerable international involvement has been foreseen.

3. The “Religious and Historical Significance”

Certain Palestinians, including some of their leaders, have denied that Jerusalem and in particular the Temple Mount, are of religious and historical significance to Jews. The Geneva initiative, on the other hand, has recognized the religious and cultural significance of Jerusalem to Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Article 6(1)), and in the context of the Temple Mount has especially mentioned its significance to the Jewish people.

This recognition is of great psychological importance since the denial of the Jewish attachment to the Temple Mount was one of the reasons for bitterness at

the 2000 Camp David negotiations.

In view of the recognition of the significance of Jerusalem to the main three monotheistic religions, the Geneva text proposes the establishment of an interfaith consultative body. No details about this body have yet been drafted (Article 6(1) (6)).

4. Sovereignty

In the last decade, many ideas have been put forward about the possibility of a compromise on sovereignty in Jerusalem, such as joint, shared, suspended, differential, functional, co-operative, divine, sovereignty.⁴ The Geneva initiative, on the other hand, has adopted none of these proposals. It has recommended that sovereignty be divided territorially pure and simple; even in the Old City despite its small dimensions (less than one Km²).

However, in various places in and around the Old City, the freedom of action of the sovereign should be limited. This limitation is to take several forms:

- a) Some places, while under the sovereignty of one party, are to be administered by the other party, e.g. the Mount of Olives cemetery (Article 6 (8)), the Western Wall tunnel (Article 6 (10)) and the Citadel (Article 6 (7) (f) (11)).
- b) In other areas freedom of access and of movement for Israelis has been secured, usually with the help of an international organ, i.e. the passage on the road from Jaffa Gate to Zion Gate (Article 6 (7) (f) (i)), and on the road to the Mount of Olives cemetery (Article 6 (8) (a)).
- c) The entry points to the Old City should be within the sovereignty of the adjoining state, but an international body would monitor the operation of the points and the facilitation of the movement into the Old City (Article 6 (7) (d)).
- d) The implementation of the regime on the Temple Mount is to be monitored, verified and assisted by an international organ, which will in particular be active in matters of security and conservation, for which it will draw up

4. See Ruth Lapidoth, "Jerusalem: Some Legal Aspects" in Marsh, 12, Breger and Ora Ahimeir eds., (2002) *A City and Its Future*, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Syracuse University press, 95-88.

rules and regulations (Article 6 (5) (a)).

- e) Conservation in the Old City has to be in accordance with the regulations established by the competent organ of the World Cultural Heritage list of UNESCO (Article 6 (7) (a) (ii) and (b) (i)).
- f) For digging, excavation and construction on the Temple Mount, the sovereign – Palestine – would need the approval of Israel (Article 6 (5) (b)).
- g) Security in the Old City and on the Temple Mount involves an international force (Article 6(5) (a) (iii) and 6 (7) (b)). It should be remembered in this context that a limitation on freedom of action by agreement does not necessarily involve a limitation of sovereignty.

5. Holy Places

As already mentioned, the text has foreseen a special regime for the Temple Mount (to be studied later). It has also dealt with the Mount of Olives cemetery as well as two additional cemeteries – on Mount Zion and in the German Colony (Articles 6 (8) and (9)). As to holy places in general, the text has foreseen a “commitment to safeguard the character, holiness and freedom of worship”.

Actually, the text wishes to preserve the existing situation (the status quo), since under the text the parties should “respect the existing division of administrative functions and traditional practices between the different denominations” (Article 6 (1) (a)).

The text has not dealt with the difficult question of what is a holy place or, more precisely, to which holy places should a special regime apply. This question is of great importance since major holy places are subject to a somewhat special regime, concerning, for example, building and zoning, mining and taxes. In 1950 the UN drew up a list of the main holy places in Palestine; 30 of them were in Jerusalem. But in 2000 three scholars listed more than 328!⁵

Members of the different religions may of course attach ‘holiness’ to as many places as they wish, but the number of places that enjoy a special regime should

5. Yitzhak Riter, Marlen Eoraegian and Marwan Abu Khalaf, “The Holy Places”, in Moshe Maoz and Sari Nusseibeh, eds., (2002) *Jerusalem: Point of Friction- and Beyond*, Kluwer, 95,155-164.

be limited, either by a general definition or by an agreed list. The Geneva text has not dealt with this issue.

The holy sites have been mentioned in the text also in another context: the text has granted freedom of movement in the Old City, but subject *inter alia* “to rules and regulations pertaining to the various holy sites” (Article 6 (7) (c)). This provision is not quite clear. It could refer to the limitations on access due to the “historic status quo” ⁶, or perhaps to the severe limitations on access of non-Muslims to the Temple Mount.

6. Municipal Administration

Since Jerusalem is to be divided under the Geneva initiative, the text has also foreseen the establishment of two separate municipalities. No joint super-municipality has been suggested, but coordination should be secured in various fields with the help of a joint organ – the Jerusalem Coordination and Development Committee (JCDC) (Article 6(11)(b)).

This Committee should have several sub-committees, such as one for the planning and zoning, hydro-infrastructure, transport, the environment, economic and development, police and emergency services, and the Old City. The Geneva initiative further stipulates that all the sub-committees should have an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian members.

The text has not determined how these bodies should function, or what should be the effect of their resolutions (binding decisions or recommendations).

7. Security

The authors of the Geneva text have not included special security arrangements for the entire city (or cities) of Jerusalem, but only for the Old City and the Temple Mount as well as for the road from Jaffa Gate to Zion Gate, to be discussed later.

6. On the historic status quo, see L.G.A. Cust (1929, reprinted by Ariel in 1980), *The status Quo the Holy places*, London, H.M. Stationery office; Walter Zander (1971), *Israel and the Holy Place of Christians dom*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 53-54, 51,69-70-71; Paul Mohn, (Oct. 1950) *Jerusalem and the United Nations*, 464 *International Conciliation*, 421-471.

Thus, the general security provisions should probably apply to Jerusalem (Article 5).

The most important provisions have called for Palestine to be a “non-militarized state”, with a strong security force whose arms should be specified in an annex which has not yet been drafted. In addition, a multinational force (MF) should be stationed in Palestine in order to provide security guarantees to the two parties. This force should have wide powers and responsibilities in Palestine (Article 5 (6)).

Details about the composition of the force, its structure and its size have yet to be drafted.

8. The Old City

The future of the Old City has been the subject of much debate and many proposals.⁷ Neither Israel nor the Palestinians seem willing to agree to relinquish their claims to this very special area. It should be remembered that this is a very small area – less than one square Km – with a population of about 38,000 living in four quarters; a Muslim, a Christian, an Armenian and a Jewish one. In it are located some of the most sacred shrines of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Some experts have suggested that a special regime with a flexible notion of sovereignty should be established for the Old City,⁸ but others, like president Clinton in his 2000 Minutes⁹ and the authors of the Geneva text, have preferred a territorial division of the area. The freedom of action of the two parties in their respective parts should, however, be limited, both by some substantive rules and by a considerable international involvement (Article 6 (7)).

Despite the territorial division with the help of color-coding (Article 6 (7) (g)), the text has determined that “the parties view the Old City as one whole”

7. See Moshe Hirsh, Deborah Housen Couriel and Ruth Lapidoth, (1995) *Writher Jerusalem? Proposals of Positions concerning Jerusalem*, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Kijhoff, 25-136; and the texts mentioned in the introduction to this paper.

8. See various papers in Francesca Nard, ed. (2001), *Israelis, Palestinian Coexisting in Jerusalem*, Centro per la pace in Medio Oriente, Milano.

9. <http://www.Haaretzdaily.com/arch/objects/data/logonEng.Jhtml>

(Article 6 (7) (a) (i)). They should commit themselves to preserve the unique character of the place and to promote the welfare of the inhabitants (Article 6 (7) (a) (i)).

Three subjects have been dealt with in some detail: conservation, security and movement of people. The text has given great importance to conservation, preservation and restoration. These should be ensured in accordance with UNESCO's rules for places included in the World Cultural Heritage list, in which the Old City and its walls have been registered in 1981.¹⁰

The main international body to be involved under the Geneva text – the Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) – should monitor and verify the preservation in accordance with the above mentioned UNESCO rules. The IVG should work in this field together with the joint municipal committee (Article 6 (7) (b)).

The second important issue is security. An agreed number of Israeli and Palestinian policemen are to patrol their respective area. This provision is problematic. First, is it justified that each party should need the approval of the other party for its decision on how many policemen it may station in the Old City. Second, what happens if the parties do not reach agreement on this matter? Probably, an international organ would have to help the parties to reach a compromise. This would be the task of the international “Old City Policing Unit” (PU) to be established by the IVG, in order to “liaise with, coordinate between and assist the Palestinian and Israeli police forces”. It should also “defuse localized tension” (Article 6 (7) (b)). Moreover, it should also “perform policing duties in locations to be specified”. Probably the parties had the most sensitive areas in mind, but the list of the locations and the relevant procedures have yet to be established.

Moreover, this police force – the PU – should administer the special training of the Israeli and Palestinian police force who serve in the Old City (Article 6 (7) (h) (iii)). In order to “facilitate liaison”, it should also establish a special joint situation room.

10. See Ruth Lapidoth and Amnon Ramon, *The Old City* (2002), Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 49-53 (in Hebrew).

It thus seems that a multinational force is to coordinate the activities of the police detachments of both parties, but no direct cooperation has been foreseen.

Probably the lack of any reference to cooperation is the consequence of the lessons learnt from the security arrangements under the 1995 Interim Agreement: the Joint patrols foreseen under the system were a failure.¹¹

A limitation of arms has been foreseen for the Old City: only the police forces may carry arms, but the text has also permitted each party to grant special written permission to carry or possess arms in areas under its sovereignty (Article 6 (7) (i)). It seems as though there is a contradiction between these two provisions. Moreover, no special provision on supervision has been included. In any case, such supervision could barely be effective.

Last but not least, under the Geneva initiative the parties should establish intensive intelligence cooperation regarding the Old City, and for this purpose a trilateral committee composed of the two parties and the U.S. should be established (Article 6 (7) (j)). It is interesting that on this delicate and important issue, the foreign involvement has been entrusted to the US, and not to one of the many international bodies to be established under the text. Probably the parties were led on this matter by past experience.

Another important matter about the Old City concerns movement of people: into, within, and out of the Old City.

Although the text does not say so expressly, it seems that no formalities should be involved with entry into the Old City, but the party in whose territory the entrance is located has to ensure the preservation of the security in the Old City. The international Old City Policing Unit (PU) should monitor the regulation of the entry points (Article 6 (7) (d)).

As to exit from the Old City, a person – whether a citizen of the parties (Israel or Palestine) or not – can enter only a country for which he/she has the required documentation (Article 6 (7) (d) (iii)).

11. Kobi Michael (1994), *Israeli- Palestinian Joint Patrols in Gaza*, 6; *Jerusalem the Truman Institute* (2004), *A foregone Failure?*

Within the Old City, freedom of movement has been foreseen. But this can be suspended by a party in case of emergency for one week, and even longer (after consulting the other party and the IVG in a trilateral committee) (Article 6 (7) (c) and (e)). The term “emergency”, however, has not been defined. Perhaps it should be interpreted by reference to a similar expression in the various human rights conventions. The extension of the suspension is, according to the text, subject only to consultation with the other party and the IVG; consent is not required.

The text has spoken only of the movement of people; it has not dealt with the entry or exit of goods.

9. The Temple Mount (Haram Ash Shariff “The Compound”)

The most difficult subject in the context of Jerusalem is the Temple Mount. It is the holiest place for Judaism, where the Shehina – the divine presence – hovers forever.

For Muslims it is the third holiest site, the place where Muhammad ascended to heaven for a visit. Although Jesus was active on the Temple Mount, it seems that for Christians it is not an object of pilgrimage or worship.

For centuries, the Temple Mount was under Muslim control and Jews were not allowed to enter. Most Jews were not disturbed by this prohibition because the Jewish religious authorities used to warn Jews against ascending the Mount due to lack of purity of human beings. However, recently certain rabbis have come to the conclusion that only a small part of the Temple Mount should be excluded from visits for religious reasons.

The Mount was occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six-day war, but soon after, Israel returned the administration of the place to the Muslim religious authorities (the Waqf). The latter allowed Jews and Christians to visit the Mount during hours when no Muslim prayers took place. This arrangement, however, was subject to many changes – a curtailing of the hours of visit and at times a complete prohibition. The permission related only to visits, and Jews were prohibited to pray there. The prohibition imposed by the Waqf was implemented by the Israeli police force which wanted to prevent disturbances by Muslims.

This background may help us to understand the arrangements for the Temple Mount included in the Geneva initiative.

In principle, the text intends to grant the Palestinians sovereignty over the Mount, but certain limitations on their freedom of action have been foreseen, related to security, conservation, digging, construction and visits (Article 6 (5)). Two international bodies should be established in order to look after the Temple Mount: an International Group (IG) in charge of monitoring, verifying and assisting in the implementation of those special rules. That IG should also draw up rules and regulations to maintain security and conservation of the Compound.

Nevertheless, Palestine should be in charge of security and has to ensure that no hostile acts against Israel or Israelis are committed. This special duty has probably been expressly mentioned since from time to time Muslims on the Mount have thrown stones at Jews praying at the Western Wall.

The freedom of action of the Palestinians on the Temple Mount is limited not only by the above mentioned rules and regulations to be established by the IG, but also by the fact that the IG should also be authorized to establish the list of weapons and equipment permitted in the Compound.

In addition to the IG itself, a multinational presence is to be established by the IG. Its two detachments are to deal with security and with conservation respectively. The functions and mandate of these bodies have not yet been established as this paper is being drafted (March 2005). The multinational presence has, however, already been authorized to “immediately resolve problems” that may arise (Article 6 (5) (a) (iv)).

The only arms permitted in the Compound are those carried by the Palestinian police and by the multinational presence (Article 6 (5) (b) (ii)).

Thus, security and conservation have an important international ingredient. Moreover, even rules on maintenance and emergency repairs are to be established by the IG; probably because of past difficulties in this sphere.

On one issue, Israel itself would have a say: as mentioned earlier, any digging excavation and construction on the Mount would require Israel’s approval. This

provision is probably intended to preserve the *status quo*, on which the compromise on the Temple Mount has been built by the Geneva initiative. The limitation on digging is based on the fear that digging may ruin remnants of the Jewish Temple, and the reference to construction probably relates to the possibility that the Muslims may wish to build another mosque on the Mount.

Unfortunately, the text has not foreseen for Jews the right to establish a small synagogue on the Temple Mount, not even the right to pray there. Again, the existing situation is being preserved. Even bare visits are subject to the discretion of the Waqf (Article 6 (5) (b) (iii)). According to the text, visits shall “generally be in accordance with past practice” – which can mean anything and nothing due to the enormous differences in the practice at different times.

Would Jews still have the right to pray at the Mahqameh – a small building overlooking the Temple Mount, situated next to the outer wall of the Compound just outside it? The text does not mention it. We will come back to this matter in the context of the Western Wall.

10. The Western Wall

The text includes just one line concerning the wall: “The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty” (Article 6 (6)). No limitations on Israel’s freedom of action have been mentioned. However, the general, overall, involvement of the IVG in the implementation of the whole initiative applies also to the Western Wall.

However, two points are subject to some ambiguity. Why does the text speak of the “Wailing Wall” and not of the Western Wall – the name usually used by Israelis? Maybe the term was used without any special intention, but it is also possible that it is intended to hint that Israel’s sovereignty applies only to a small area which Jews currently use to pray.

This leads us to the second question: What is included in the term “Wailing Wall” in the text? The Western Wall of the Temple compound is 390m. long. The area used for praying is 60m long, but 147m of the Wall has been registered in

the name of the Government of Israel in the Land Registrar.¹²

Since the text does not define the Western Wall, one has to refer to the annexed maps. According to the copies available to us, only a part of the praying area is included in the Israeli area.

The Mahqameh, which is very close to the northern part of the praying area, is under Muslim sovereignty.

11. International Involvement

The Geneva text foresees several international bodies intended to assist in its implementation. Some concern the agreement in general while others are intended to be in charge of activities in Jerusalem. The main international body with overall responsibilities is the Implementation and Verification Group (IVG). Its function is very comprehensive – to “facilitate, assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of the Agreement” (Article 3 (i) (a)). This is a very large mandate. Membership is to include the US, Russia, the EU, the UN (namely, the quartet which has adopted the 2003 Road map), “and other parties... to be agreed on by the Parties” (Article 3(1) (b)). The IVG is to include a Contact Group, a Special Representative, a Multinational Force, and a dispute settlement mechanism (Article 3 (2)).

The organs especially foreseen for Jerusalem have already been outlined above, in the various chapters. They will, however, be mentioned here again. For the Temple Mount the text has foreseen an International group, composed of the IVG and other members to be agreed by the parties, including members of the organization of the Islamic Conference (and what happens if the parties do not agree?). The International group should establish a Multinational presence on the Mount, with specialized detachments for security and conservation.

For the Old City the text has foreseen an Old City Policing Unit to be established by the IVG.

The various special organs are connected to the IVG. Their powers and re-

12. Shmuel Berkovitz (2005), *The Battle for the Holy Places: The Struggle over Jerusalem and the Holy Sites in Israel, Judea, Samaria and the District*, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and Hed Arzi, 112-113 (in Hebrew).

sponsibilities have- with some exceptions- more or less been defined. There may, however, come up questions, e.g.: Palestine is responsible for the security on the Temple Mount, but the International group and its Multinational Presence should be involved in Security on the Compound (as shown above). Questions might arise on the exact division of powers. Perhaps the answer is that, as already mentioned, one of the main functions of the Multinational presence is to “immediately resolve any problems” (Article 6 (5) (a)). This may include disputes between the local state and the international organ itself.

12. Border Regime

Whoever deals with Jerusalem has to deal with the accessibility of the city, for citizens of the adjoining states, for pilgrims, merchants and for tourists. The provisions on this subject in the Geneva initiative have been rather meager. The article on Jerusalem has referred us to the general provision on the border regime (Article 11) and has added a few general remarks (Article 6 (4)). The details of the border regime have still to be established.

Movement across the borders should take place only through the designated border crossings. Procedures should be established to facilitate strong trade ties, including labor movement between the parties.

With regard to Jerusalem, a border regime should be established “taking into account the specific needs of Jerusalem” (e.g. “movement of tourists and intensity of border crossing use including provisions for Jerusalemites” (Article 6 (4))), but so far (March 2005) this regime has not yet been drafted. It thus seems that until a special regime is established, crossing between the parties in the Jerusalem area is subject to the general rules concerning border crossing outlined above.

13. The Status of Israeli Residents

After the unification of Jerusalem in 1967, the inhabitants of East Jerusalem automatically became permanent residents of Israel and got Israeli ID cards. With these cards they may freely travel in Israel, work there, and enjoy the social and health benefits granted by Israel to its residents.

Citizenship was not imposed upon them, but they could apply for it and receive it by way of naturalization. Not many Palestinians of Jerusalem have applied for Israeli citizenship.

According to the Geneva initiative, once the city is divided, these residents would lose their status as permanent residents of Israel (Article 6 (12)). But the text has vaguely foreseen that socio-economic transitional measures should preserve the accumulated rights of the residents of Jerusalem.

One could of course ask whether these residents would have the right to move to the Israeli part of Jerusalem or to any other place in Israel.

The text has not dealt at all with those Palestinians who have acquired Israeli citizenship, and rightly so, since it is doubtful whether transfer of territory justifies the abrogation of the status of citizen.¹³

14. Settlement of Disputes

As already mentioned, the international bodies in Jerusalem should strive to resolve immediately arising problems. If these efforts are not successful, however, the text has referred to Article 16 which establishes a dispute settlement mechanism: the first stage would be an attempt to solve the dispute by negotiations, namely, without third party involvement. If the negotiations do not lead to a settlement, either party may request the IVG to act as mediators or conciliators. For this step there is no need for the consent of both parties.

If the dispute still persists, another conciliation mechanism, to be agreed upon by the parties, is foreseen. At this stage the consent of both parties is required.

So far, the mechanisms to be used have been of a diplomatic nature, namely, all relevant circumstances may be taken into consideration (e.g. history, demography, economics, religion, etc.), and the resolution of the third party (IVG or conciliation commission) is not binding.

If, however, the dispute persists, any of the parties may submit the case to

13. See "Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States", Report of the International Law Commission on its last session (1999), Chapter IV.

arbitration, namely a mechanism which usually takes into consideration only legal points and whose decision is binding. There is no need for the consent of the other party to activate this mechanism according to the Geneva text. The text has foreseen the mode of appointment of the arbitrators but no additional provisions on the procedure to be followed or the substantive rules to be applied.

One may express some doubt whether binding arbitration activated by one party is the proper mode of settlement. States are usually reluctant to submit to arbitration issues of great importance to them.

15. Conclusion

The Jerusalem issue can be approached in at least two possible ways. Either a special regime (e.g. joint administration by the Parties with international involvement) is established without division of sovereignty, or sovereignty is divided but freedom of action of the two sovereigns is somewhat limited. The authors of the Geneva initiative have preferred the second approach. They have made great efforts and have succeeded to reach a compromise on a problem which until recently was considered unsolvable. They certainly have to be warmly congratulated.

Without derogating from this great achievement, one may perhaps mention a few shortcomings which could perhaps be taken into consideration in future negotiations. First and foremost, many questions have (very cursorily) not been dealt with or have been taken care of, while at the same time the reader is referred to annexes which do not yet exist.

Economic matters have not been dealt with; are there any customs barriers between the various areas in the Old City? Or between the Old City and the other parts of Jerusalem? If not, how can one prevent smuggling?

As mentioned earlier, the borders regime has hardly been defined, nor the legal system that should apply in the various areas (except for the Mount of Olives).

Many different regimes have been established, e.g. for the entrance to the Old City; for the road from Jaffa Gate to Zion Gate; for the Citadel; in some places a separation between sovereign and administrators has been foreseen but

the separation requires more detailed arrangements, e.g. who is in charge of security?

Since movement among the quarters of the Old City should in principle be free, questions relating to the law that should apply to transactions between people from different parts and to the jurisdiction of the courts in such mixed cases should be envisaged.

With regard to several important provisions, the text says that these provisions can be changed only by common agreement. This statement could be misleading since it could be interpreted as implying that other provisions may be changed unilaterally, which of course is not the case.

The text has not dealt with the City of David, located south of the Temple Mount beyond the Old City, probably because it is close to an Arab village. However the place is of great historical and archeological significance and hence deserves a special regime of freedom of access, or at least easy access.

In the wake of President Clinton's 2000 minutes, the Geneva text has foreseen a division within the Old City. Is this feasible?

Despite severe limitations on freedom of action on the Temple Mount, the area is, according to the Geneva text, to be under Palestinian sovereignty. It is difficult to imagine how such a provision could be accepted by the Israeli public and the Knesset. It would have been easier to accept a renunciation of sovereignty by both parties and entrusting the guardianship to the Palestinians, as proposed in the Statement of Principles of Ayalon and Nuseibach. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to accept that Jews have not been allowed to pray on the Temple Mount, and the right to visit is problematic.

The authors did well in not using the term "open city" which has been included in other proposals. This is an ambiguous expression and should therefore be avoided.

To conclude, the Geneva initiative has done a great service. It has shown that a compromise is possible. The remarks in the various chapters and in the conclusions are not intended to detract from the great achievement of the Geneva authors. Let us hope that it may inspire politicians on both sides to restart negotiations and look for compromises.

Jerusalem: The Management of Urban Transformation

The Geopolitical and Political Dimensions

Shlomo Hasson

The management of urban transformation in any divided city is a daunting task. At stake are wide and complex issues such as economic, political, cultural and physical structures and patterns of conduct. What makes urban transformation even more problematic in a city like Jerusalem is the extremely fragmented nature of its political and cultural space. It is an international city in terms of religious importance. It is claimed as their capital by two nations; Israel and Palestine. It is internally divided between different cultural and religious communities. In recent years, it turned into a metropolitan city, encompassing an old religious city, a modern-national city and a late modern city.

This paper seeks to explore the political aspects of urban transformation, by focusing on possible geopolitical and political transformations. Geopolitical transformation implies changes in the nature of sovereignty. Political transformation implies changes in the political institutions, the redistribution of power and the political rules of the game in order to make city management more democratic, efficient and effective.

In exploring these transformations, one has to deal with the following issues:

1. Identifying the current situation;
2. Exploring possible changes in the current situations and their meanings;
3. Defining the ideal or desirable situations, that is, ideal models;
4. Proposing strategies to enable the move from the current and possible situations to the desired situation.

In attaining these goals, one has to use different methodologies: to explore current patterns and processes; to develop scenarios regarding future changes; to devise ideal models; and to advance a set of strategies.

Relying on these findings one can suggest a transformation strategy that would enable a move from the current state of affairs (or possible states of affairs) portrayed by the scenarios, to the ideal model of urban management. The ideal model thus provides a yardstick against which the specific experiences, scenarios and proposals with regard to Jerusalem's future can be compared and assessed.

Urban Transformation: Two Dimensions

The management of urban transformation in Jerusalem involves two major changes: geopolitical transformation in the political relations between Israel and Palestine and political transformation that promotes urban democracy, efficiency and effectiveness. Such a transformation necessitates a change in the political institutions, redistribution of power and rules of the game. The two transformations are inseparably linked in so far as geopolitical transformation is essential for urban transformation and, in and of itself, is insufficient to produce a democratic, efficient and effective system.

The Geopolitical Transformation

The issue of urban management in Jerusalem is extremely complex due to the fact that a large segment of the population, the Palestinians and some Israeli groups, regard the current Israeli regime as unrepresentative and even, in the case of the Palestinians, as illegitimate. A precondition in this view for any urban transformation is geopolitical transformation, which would enable the Palestinians to establish their own institutions and device their own rules of the game without interference from the outside. Hence the need for a change in the political relations between the two entities from a situation in which sovereignty lies with Israel alone, to a situation in which there are two sovereignties in the city. A viable city, though, requires another change wherein the relations between the two communities move from conflict to tolerance. Figure 1 portrays these political and social changes, and presents six scenarios with regard to

possible geopolitical futures in Jerusalem:

1. United capital under Israeli sovereignty, which is a perpetuation of Israel's domination of the city, reflects the continuation of the current political and social conditions.
2. Informally divided capital is based on informal division of authority in the city, coupled with tension and conflict between the two communities. Certain parts in East Jerusalem, and some of the holy sites, already function according to this model.
3. Two separate and impermeable capitals reflect a geopolitical division of the city with no improvement in the relations between the two communities. The result will be two isolated cities.
4. Two separate and permeable capitals reflect a geopolitical division with an improvement of relations between the two communities.
5. Shared capital(s) reflect a geopolitical decision to avoid separation, by preferring functional division and cooperation to territorial division.
6. United capital under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian control reflects a situation where formal sovereignty is retained by Israel but the city is controlled by the Palestinians by force of demography and participation in municipal elections.

It should be borne in mind that these are possible futures, that is; scenarios and not solutions. My own preferred solution is to see an Israeli and a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem that strives as an open city (Scenario 4). But this is not necessarily a vision shared by everyone on the two sides. A joint Israeli-Palestinian poll, published in January 2005, shows that, **among the Palestinian public**, 44 percent support and 54 percent oppose a Jerusalem compromise in which the city, including the Old City, is divided. **Among Israelis** the rate of support for such division is even lower, only 39 percent support and 60 percent oppose to this arrangement.¹ Yet, overtime, a slight increase has been registered in the

1. *Joint Palestinian-Israeli poll, 18 January 2005.*

rate of Israelis supporting such a division: from 25 percent in 2003 to 39 percent in 2005.²

The geopolitical futures may be arrived at in different ways. Figure 2 presents several paths of possible transformation leading to the possible futures portrayed in Figure 1.

1. Perpetuation of the status quo through the use of military power and the distribution of some economic resources: health care, social security, access to the Israeli labor market, provision of some services.
2. Conflict and protest against the status quo through civil disobedience, military struggle, appeal to international institutions.
3. Peace Agreement 1 implies an agreement between Israel and Palestine that divides sovereignty and authority, and separates the two capitals.
4. Peace Agreement 2 implies an agreement between Israel and Palestine that divides sovereignty and authority, and turns the city into an open city.
5. Cooperation implies functional division of functions between different levels: international, national, metropolitan and neighborhood. Territorial separation is replaced in this path of transformation by functional cooperation.
6. Demographic change and inclusion implies Palestinian domination over the city by force of demography and adaptation to the political system. This might be an unavoidable result of an Israeli decision to maintain the status quo, and a Palestinian acquiescence with this tendency. At a certain point the Palestinians would decide to realize the democratic principle of one man one vote and, due to their demographic supermacy in the city, will be able to take over the entire municipality. Current demographic trends clearly show that this transformation is quite plausible. In 1967 the Palestinians formed only 24 percent of the city population, while in 2002 they surpassed the 32 percent mark.³

Against this backdrop, my recommendation to Israeli policy makers and the public at large would be to avoid the continuation of the status quo. Actually,

2. Ifat Maoz; 2005. *The Impact of Psychological Factors on the Willingness to Compromise with Palestinians in the Jewish-Israeli Public*. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies.

3. Maya Choshen; 2004. *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem*. No. 20. Jerusalem: the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 46.

Israel faces an uneasy dilemma. Opting for a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, an Israeli state committed to the democratic principle of one man one vote might lose the Jerusalem municipality. Opting for a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty, while maintaining the Jewish character of the municipality, Israel would give up on its character as a democratic state. If Israel wishes to maintain its organs in Jerusalem as both Jewish and democratic, then it must consider seriously the possibility of division.

Figure 1. Geopolitical Futures in Jerusalem: Possible Scenarios





Figure 2. Paths of Geopolitical Transformation in Jerusalem: Possible Scenarios



Political Transformation

There is no guarantee that geopolitical transformation, or even the establishment of two capitals, would ensure a democratic, efficient and effective system. Given the current institutional structure and distribution of power, one can anticipate with high certainty quite the opposite: a democratic deficit; inefficiency; and ineffectiveness on both sides.

Indeed the city of Jerusalem is highly complex and fragmented; so much so that any attempts to establish democratic and efficient regimes could easily be thwarted. It is a city where international, national, communal interests might collide with each other. It includes holy sites and religious communities that have their own traditional rights and procedures that might defy any political intervention.⁴ It has traditional communities, like the ultra-orthodox, who have their own internal system of communal management. All of this may hinder any progress towards an effective urban management.

The issues of urban management and the effectiveness of citizen participation have become, in recent years, a major issue in urban policy making. At stake are critical issues concerning the welfare of the citizens: education, health and welfare services, urban development and economic growth, physical infrastructure and the quality of the environment. The critical issues here are: who gets what, where, when and how. The attempts of politicians and bureaucrats to manage the distribution of services from the top have been seriously challenged by the citizenry. As a result the whole domain of city management and provision of services became a test case for urban democracy, especially the effectiveness of citizens in shaping the nature of the city.

Urban democracy rests on four components: representation, decision-making processes, tax-collection and provision of services, and respect for individual and minority rights. Each of these components assigns the citizens and the elected officials definite tasks and makes certain demands on them. In other words, each component has a double meaning, reflecting the constraints, the duties and the rights of both residents and those elected. The double meaning of each component is now specified.

4. Michael Dumper; 2003. *The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Representation: From the viewpoint of the citizen voter, the meaning of democratic representation is that the City Council is elected in free, general, secret, majority elections, where every citizen has equal weight and the elected delegates represent the voters in the Council. From the perspective of those elected, representation means representing the interests and needs of the various groups in the city.

Decision-Making: From the citizen's standpoint, decision-making processes ought to be open and transparent to the public. Such processes must not take place behind closed doors, far from the public eye and from criticism. Furthermore, the day-to-day realizing of urban democracy means the citizen's participation in decision-making, particularly those affecting their own life. For their part, the elected are required to observe strictly due process in decision-making and to ensure transparency and public accountability.

Tax Collection and Services: From the citizen's point of view, a resident is a client whose duties as taxpayer and whose rights as consumer of services must be treated with fairness, efficiency and sensitivity. For the part of those elected, democracy requires fair taxation and allocation of resources and refrain from preferring one sector to others.

Individual and Minority Rights: The component of rights is secured through international treaties, legislation at the national and local levels (through municipal by-laws), and through the activity of civil society, whose purpose is to enhance individual and minority rights. The courts may review and even criticize the legislation, and frequently do so.

According to this definition, democracy has to withstand not only the electoral process test, but also the day-to-day test of realizing democracy. In a democratic regime, the citizen does not disappear once he or she has voted. On the contrary, he or she continues to act after the election is over. He or she makes demands, participates in decision-making that affects him or her, voices his or her opinion on the quality of the services and sometimes acts to promote individual and minority rights.

Fully realizing urban democracy lays many tasks on the elected. They are

supposed to represent the diversity of needs and interests of the citizens, to maintain proper and transparent processes and to report on their activity to the public. They are also expected to allocate and divide resources fairly among different groups, to shape the environment with the values and feelings of the inhabitants in mind, and to protect and advance individual and minority rights by legislation and by setting proper norms. Table 1 summarizes the components of urban democracy and the parameters for assessing them from the standpoints of both the citizens and the elected representatives.

Table 1: Definition of Urban democracy

Components of Urban democracy

Participants	Representation	Decision-Making Process	Tax Collection and Services	Individual and Minority Rights
Representatives	Representation of public interests and needs	Due Processes, Transparency, and accountability	Allocation of resources, shaping of the environment according to law and accepted norms	Legislation protecting individual and minority rights
Citizens	Free, general, secret, majority and equal elections	Participation in decision-Making; feedback	Degree of satisfaction with quality of services and environment	Civil activity to advance individual and minority rights

Current Conditions in Jerusalem

The ideal model of urban democracy should be used as a yardstick to examine the current situation in Jerusalem. Figure 3 presents the main forms of urban management and citizen participation currently existing in Jerusalem. Urban management may move from a representative-top-down regime to a participatory-bottom-up regime. Citizen participation may move from conflict-oriented to consensus-oriented strategies. The intersection between the two axes form four distinct types of urban regimes: Democratic deficit, ethnocracy, urban partnership and grassroots organizations.

Democratic deficit

Democratic deficit is the current pattern of representative democracy as practiced in West Jerusalem. The secular population, which forms the major segment of the population, is underrepresented in the city council. On the other hand, the ultra-orthodox community, which forms about 20 percent of the city electorate, is in charge of the majority of power positions in the city council, including the mayor position.


The Arab residents of Jerusalem have traditionally boycotted the municipal elections and therefore have no representatives in the city council. Theoretically, the city councilors, whilst all of them are Jews, could have represented the interests of the Arab residents, but – with a few minor exceptions – this has not been the case. The Arab residents have been treated at most as tolerable and at worst as a security threat. Under these circumstances, the political model developed in Jerusalem vis-à-vis the Palestinians can be defined as an ethnocracy.

Ethnocracy

Ethnocracy is a political model that seeks to strengthen the dominant national group by excluding and reducing the impact of the minority group.⁵ Exclusion in Jerusalem takes a variety of forms: economic limitations on development and growth; unequal provision of services; setting limits to migration in order to maintain a certain “demographic balance”. In this case, preference has been accorded to members of the dominant Jewish group in terms of housing provision, economic development, demographic growth, and expression of culture and history.

5. Rogers Brubaker; 1995. *National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe*. *Daedalus*: 124 (2): 107-132.

Figure 3. Forms of Urban Management and Citizen Participation in Jerusalem



Urban Partnership

The theory dealing with urban partnership, known as urban regimes theory, argues that city management cannot be carried out in the old centralized way. Urban development, ecological considerations and the attraction of entrepreneurs and resources require new forms of partnership between the private and the public sector, between groups within civil society and the public sector and between different political levels of the public sector.⁶ The main idea underlying the concept of urban regimes is that urban management requires a move from control and government from above, to cooperation and coordination between several partners. These partners may combine their powers to increase the mobilization of resources and coordinate activity. The type of partnership, as Hank Savitch convincingly shows, may vary across cultures: plural partnership in New York, disjointed partnership in London and hierarchical partnership in Paris.⁷

The idea of partnership between different levels of government has permeated Jerusalem's politics since the early 1980s. It first appeared as a concrete phenomenon in the neighborhood administrations of Jerusalem, known in Hebrew as *minhalot*, and later spread in theoretical writings to encompass metropolitan partnership.⁸

Grassroots Organizations

Failure to foster genuine partnership may exacerbate social and political tension leading to protest activity. Jerusalem's politics has witnessed a stormy wave of Jewish protest movements in the 1970s and 1980s associated with poor people's social movements. The first and second Intifada in Jerusalem, as well as the tax boycott exercised by Arab merchants, may also be interpreted as a form of political protest. The main difference between the Jewish and Palestinian organizations is in that the latter reject the Israeli system and is more conflict-oriented. The Jewish organizations, on the other hand, although challenging the

6. Clarence Stone; 1989. *Regime Politics*. KA: University Press of Kansas; Shlomo Hasson. 1996. *The New Urban Order: Urban Coalitions in Israel*. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer for Policy Studies.


7. Hank V. Savitch; 1988. *Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris and London*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

8. Shlomo Hasson and David Ley; 1994. *Neighbourhood Organizations and the Welfare State*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

system, accept its basic political ideology, and their main concern is the distribution of services. Some of them may resort to conflict strategies and some may look for more conciliatory measures, but at the bottom line they all accept the basic principle of a Jewish and democratic state.

Relying on a previous typology, the grassroots organizations in Jerusalem can be divided into four different groups as outlined in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Forms of Grassroots Activity in Jerusalem



In my view, the Black Panthers and the Ohalim (Tents) movement marked the beginning of strategic protest in Jewish civil society, but they were soon transformed into tactical protest and even clientele organizations.⁹ The first Intifada and the associated grassroots organizations marked a Palestinian strategic protest. In Israel's politics the rise of Shas, a Sephardic ultra-orthodox party marks the rise of radical change within the system. If the Palestinians chose to remain in Jerusalem, take part in municipal elections and establish their own municipal list, they will be able, due to the demographic power, to take over the entire city in 20 years time.

Integration of the geopolitical and political dimension

The management of urban transformation involves a change along the geopolitical and political dimension (see Figure 5). It is evident from Figure 5 that although there are different options for a democratic capital or capitals, and different options for geopolitical solutions, the only option that respects the Israeli and Palestinian rights for self-determination, and ensures a democratic and viable system is the one of two sustainable capitals. The preconditions for this option are two: a) a geopolitical agreement that recognizes the right of each national group for a capital of its own in Jerusalem, and b) recognize that the city, its holy places and surrounding environment, must be partly co-managed, and remain open in economic and social terms.

The move from the current situation to this desired situation involves simultaneous transformation in the geopolitical situation, in the political system, in the social relations between the two communities, and in the patterns of cooperation. Given the current conditions of mistrust, hatred and lack of cooperation it would be extremely unlikely to accept a radical change in this direction. On the other hand, any agreement that fails to establish patterns of cooperation between the two entities which are based on democratic principle is bound to leave the two capitals seriously hampered and underdeveloped. It is recommended, therefore, to think from the outset about forms of cooperation and joint management that would strengthen the economic and social sustainability of the city, promote democracy, efficiency and effectiveness.

⁹ Shlomo Hasson; 1993. *Urban Social Movements in Jerusalem*. New York: SUNY Press.

Figure 5: Urban Transformation along the Geopolitical and Political Dimensions




Table 2: Urban Partnership as a Precondition for a Viable, Democratic and Open City

Political Levels	Forms of Cooperation		
	Actors	Tasks	Criteria guiding cooperation
International	Representative of the three monotheistic religions	Administering the holy places and securing freedom of access	Tolerance, dignity and respect
Metropolitan	Representative of the municipalities in the area	Coordination of planning, protection of the environment, use of water, infrastructure, tourism and economic development	Efficiency and effectiveness, accountability, transparency
Municipal	Representatives of West and East Jerusalem	Coordination of planning and development and provision of services	Efficiency and effectiveness, accountability and transparency
Sub-Municipal	Representatives of the administrations	Participation in decision-making and provision of local services	Efficiency and effectiveness, accountability and transparency

From the Current Non-Democratic to a Democratic System

In previous studies I have put forward four types of urban partnership as possible functional solutions to the Jerusalem problem.¹⁰ These functional solutions envision the division of functions instead of territory between the two parties or, alternatively, the transference of authority to a third party actor. Over the years I have changed my view and no longer see the functional (non-territorial) option as a viable solution to the Jerusalem problem. Nevertheless, I believe that after signing a peace agreement, which will establish two capitals in the Jerusalem area, certain forms of partnership are essential to serve the goal of an open, viable and democratic city. Once an agreement has been struck, the proposals outlined below may advance the welfare of Jerusalem's citizen and help to transform the two cities of Jerusalem into an efficient, effective and tolerant entity. The essence of the partnership (functional) approach is that municipal organization in Jerusalem and the surrounding area should be based on a hierarchy of several geographical levels: international; metropolitan; municipal; and sub-municipal, as outlined in Table 2.

¹⁰ Shlomo Hasson; 1996. *Local Politics and Split Citizenship in Jerusalem*. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*. Vol. 20, No. 1: 116-133. Shlomo Hasson; 2002. *The Municipal Organization of the Jerusalem Metropolitan Area: Conceptual Alternatives* in M. Breger and O. Ahimeir (eds.) *Jerusalem: A City and its Future*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 335-339.

At this point one may criticize the partnership model and raise some questions with regard to this model: What is the purpose of a partnership approach based on a spatial hierarchy? Why not settle for alternatives that focus on the municipal organization of the city itself? The answer is complex.

On the international level, Jerusalem is a spiritual center for the three monotheistic religions, and therefore any form of urban management requires attention to many players, including the Christian and Muslim worlds. To this end, it is necessary to create cooperative management on the international level that takes account of the various players and their interests in the city, especially the management of the holy places. This regime has to secure open access to holy places to all religions, respect the sanctity of the holy places and, treat with respect and openness, people of different faiths.

On the metropolitan level, the Jerusalem area is one of Jewish and Arab settlement, both of them strongly linked to the city. Any form of municipal management in Jerusalem requires thinking about the nature of the political, economic, and environmental ties between Jerusalem and its surroundings. In particular, one must address issues related to transport, preservation of the environment, development of physical infrastructure (water and sewage), tourism, and economic development. Therefore, there must be a supra-municipal entity that takes a comprehensive view, such as a district authority or a metropolitan government. The alternative to metropolitan government and coordination is perpetuation of the present situation. This would mean a lack of frameworks for coordination and cooperation on the supra-municipal level in environmental, economic, and settlement matters. Without coordination and cooperation frameworks on the metropolitan level, the costs to both sides may increase due to the development of duplicate infrastructure systems, and the environment, water sources, and air quality may be harmed. Most serious would be the economic damage caused by lack of cooperation between the two sides, especially in the field of tourism. Finally, uncoordinated development may lead to uncontrolled settlement in the Jerusalem area, accompanied by extensive friction between the two sides.

On the municipal level there should be two local authorities: Israeli and Palestinian, which would cooperate as far as possible in handling and managing common affairs at the physical level, ie: physical infrastructure, transport, and planning, while maintaining independence on social and educational issues.

The two authorities must be developed in a way that will *fairly* serve the diverse population groups that inhabit the city. This system should provide the municipal services (water, sewage, maintenance, and cleaning), help with the provision of state services (education, health, welfare, and religious services), carry out urban planning, and manage the city as an open city. The need for a fair municipal system is salient in view of the enormous disparity that exists between western and eastern Jerusalem in terms of planning, housing, development of physical infrastructure, provision of physical and social services, investment, and the overall attitude toward residents.

On the sub-municipal level, the model of neighborhood administrations must be improved, expanded, developed and made a component of municipal arrangements in Jerusalem. The administrations of the Jewish and Arab neighborhoods in their present form are a perversion of the original idea, and their impact on the municipal system is contingent on the goodwill of functionaries and elected officials. They are not statutory bodies and their formal powers are few. This situation is the result of a deliberate municipal policy that never intended to grant the administrations political power or authority or to include them in any real way in decision-making. The creation of a sub-municipal level therefore requires a new way of thinking that would involve the institutions of the central government, the municipality of Jerusalem, and the inhabitants of the city. The new model would give the city residents a large degree of self-management and participation in decision-making processes.

It is suggested that the model of neighborhood administration in its improved form would be extended to the Old City of Jerusalem, to serve and represent the four traditional Quarters of the city. The four administrations in the Old City would be administered in the physical sphere by the Israeli and Palestinian municipalities, while in the social and educational spheres they will be free to choose between the two.

The result would be a hierarchical system of institutions that have different functions on different geographical levels: international, metropolitan, municipal, and sub-municipal. On each geographical level there would be a specific organization with clear powers; its nature would vary in keeping with the alternatives.

Conclusion

This paper focussed on two dimensions of urban transformation in Jerusalem: the geopolitical and the political. It examines different geopolitical options, presented an ideal geopolitical configuration – two capitals in an open city, and an ideal model of urban management of democratic regime – and examined the current political reality against this model. It has been recommended that both the geopolitical and political situations have to be transformed. The geopolitical situation is a contentious one. The political system fails to meet the standards of urban democracy.

The options that guarantees respect of national demands, a democratic, efficient and effective city, is associated with two separate capitals, that maintain openness and cooperation at the international, metropolitan, municipal and sub-municipal levels. The way leading to this option might be a combination of conflict and cooperation. The specific details of these strategies and the barriers that might hinder their impact are beyond the scope of this paper and should be examined in a separate study.

From a temporal perspective, one can identify several stages in the move from the current situation to the desired one. The current phase can be best described as non-democratic engagement. The Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are discriminated against by the political system and, until recently, have succumbed to this discrimination. The second phase marks the beginning of change from resignation to protest, but this protest was modest in Jerusalem. This is the phase of democratic disengagement manifested in civil disobedience, the creation of civil society and protest. This phase might be further advanced if Israel

and the Palestinian Authority reach an interim agreement that would pass civil responsibilities to the Palestinians in Jerusalem, including the right to run their own affairs through a Palestinian municipality. The third phase, which has not occurred yet, might be the one of democratic engagement where the two parties reach a political agreement and cooperate on critical issues at the metropolitan, urban and suburban levels. Finally, if Israel refuses to accept the partitioning of Jerusalem, it will have to face the consequences of Palestinian demographic growth and be left with two options: a democratic Jerusalem under Palestinian control or Jewish control in a non-democratic city.

Transformations in Jerusalem: Where Are We Heading?

Rami Nasrallah

Whenever Jerusalem is mentioned, agitated emotions and demands for sovereignty surface to the top of every agenda, and dominate headlines and slogans. Whenever the conflict deepens, Jerusalem becomes a “tag” for legitimizing the conflict and making it worth the price paid for its sake. This exploitation of Jerusalem has become a trade-mark of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, used by both sides to extents commensurate with each side’s power and capabilities. Israel possesses the power to impose realities and facts on the ground serving its spatial and territorial control as well as its demographic superiority. The Palestinians will use all survival methods to guarantee their existence in the city. The city itself remains lonely while attention is paid to other issues and aspects of the conflict: it lives at another level of the conflict represented not only on its macro level and its symbolism, but also on every detail and every dynamic concerning the city and its population. Once again, this is not confined to the Palestinian side as it is the weak side, but applies to the strong and dominant side, which has various weaknesses imposed on it by the city itself, its urban fabric and its dynamism.

In this article, I will discuss transformations witnessed in Jerusalem on three levels:

1. Spatial transformations.
2. Transformations on the level of the institutions and their role.
3. Peace Transformations and the city’s function as a center and a capital.

Spatial Transformations

Jerusalem expanded at the end of the nineteenth century and start of the twentieth century as a result of various factors including consolidation of the Western powers' domination and influence, and acceleration of Jewish immigration to Palestine, which in its initial phases concentrated on Jerusalem. Palestinian urban expansion and evolution of new suburbs in Jerusalem was normally overlooked since urban awakening and modernization of Jerusalem are attributed to the West and within the context of Western understandings of the urban transformation process. This was done with no regard to the social, cultural and economic structure of the Palestinian side during that period. No attention was given to the Palestinian and Arab viewpoint regarding the definition of the city and its function. It is definitely possible to state that the spatial transformation in Jerusalem in its organized and institutionalized manner is a Western initiative, but the Palestinian side's concept of development and urban transformation was subject to the following considerations. These considerations determined its nature and characteristics:

1. Palestinian construction at the end of the nineteenth century was based on individual initiatives. It began with the departure of the elites and the upper class from the Old City to build summer mansions outside of the Old City walls. This phenomenon actually started in the eighteenth century as a result of the deterioration of living conditions and shortage of water within the walls, as well as changes on the social structure and way of living. This phenomenon expanded to include the middle class, especially at the start of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, Western (including Jewish) construction was based on organized group initiatives and a colonial style represented by building closed compounds surrounded by walls. This aimed at enforcing control over certain space and then expanding that control to other spaces in other parts of the city, especially west of the Old City.
2. Movement out of the Old City did not start as a development or expansion initiative. The Old City remained the center of social, political, religious and cultural activities for the Palestinian Arabs, Muslims and Christians. Even in the existence of a social, economic mobility process and the evolu-

tion of a strong middle class during the British Mandate – which established new neighborhoods southwest of the Old City, not much changed regarding the Old City's centrality; it remained the center, while the new neighborhoods provided limited functions on the level of services.

3. At the end of the Ottoman era and during the British Mandate, the construction of public institutions and work places was not part of the development policy towards the Arabs. The churches and Jewish institutions established their own institutional infrastructures, while the Palestinians preserved the traditional frameworks of their institutions. This did not bode well for the development process in Jerusalem. It is worth pointing out that the British Mandate did not allocate budgets for development. Instead, most of its attention was devoted to tax collection to implement a fiscal policy of great interest to the Mandate authority.
4. The villages surrounding the Old City of Jerusalem maintained their identities and their independence from the city and were not integrated with its urban transformation and development process. The social structure, affiliation, clan, local identity, class, and economic differences prohibited any merger and transformation as was happening in other cities around the world. This reality caused a predicament in the allocation of lands for development. Most of the land surrounding the Old City belonged to villagers from the nearby villages. In fact, the lands sold by the villages to the urban families and the churches were located at the peripheries of the villages, far away from their centers and cultivated lands. This explains the sale of Lifta Village lands (in Sheikh Jarrah area today) for the construction of a new neighborhood, and the sale of Malha Village lands for the construction of new neighborhoods in the southwest of the city, between the 1920s and 1940s.

These spatial transformations in the evolution of the modern Jerusalem represent a cornerstone in understanding the urban transformation process of the Palestinian side. It also helps in understanding latter transformations, such as the partitioning of the city and the forceful displacement of 60,000 Palestinians from the Palestinian neighborhoods in West Jerusalem and 41 villages – 37 of which

were destroyed – in the sector known today as West Jerusalem and the Israeli Jerusalem District. In fact, it is possible to state that the Palestinian development and urbanization process has eroded since Al-Nakba (catastrophe ;1948 War), as (with the exception of a small group that stayed in East Jerusalem) the political and economic elites and the educated middle class became refugees and fled Palestine.

The new reality of the eastern sector of Jerusalem after 1948 made its development problematic. Although it was considered the second capital (after Amman), East Jerusalem did not receive development budgets, while Amman was transformed into the primary administrative and economic center. Expansion and construction of new neighborhoods in East Jerusalem remained limited. This was due to the fading of economic and social activity. It did not exceed individual housing initiatives north of the city and outside of its municipal borders, such as in Beit Hanina, Dahiyat al Bareed and Kafr ‘Aqab.

When Israel occupied East Jerusalem in June 1967, and annexed West Bank lands to Jerusalem Municipality, the spatial transformation process in Jerusalem entered a new phase. The Israeli annexation policy followed a vivid methodology represented by annexing “the largest possible area of uninhabited lands and the least possible number of Arabs.” In spite of this policy, seven villages, with their cores and lands, were annexed to the Jerusalem Municipality (Shu’fat, Al ‘Isawiya, At Tur, Silwan, As Sawahira, Sur Bahir – including Umm Tuba, and Beit Safafa – including Sharafat). However, twelve village cores remained outside of the new municipality’s borders, while their lands were annexed to the municipality’s borders (Kafr ‘Aqab, Beit Hanina, Hizma, Anata, Al-Walaja, Abu Dis, Al ‘Eizariya, Qalandiya, Bir Nabala, Ar Ram, Al Judeira and Beit Iksa). Moreover, some of Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour and Al-Bireh lands were annexed to the municipality’s borders. One third of the new part that was annexed to East Jerusalem was confiscated in favor of Jewish settlements. This aimed at ending the physical state of the city as a frontier city by pushing the borders to remove Jerusalem from the enclave state into a metropolitan center state. This goal started to be implemented at a fast pace in the mid-1970s and grew even faster in the mid-1980s to include new settlements to the east, north-west and southwest of Jerusalem Municipality borders as annexed in 1967.

In addition to the confiscation of Palestinian lands for settlement construction, Israel declared in its planning policy on nearly 40 percent of privately owned Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem as “green areas”, on which consequently building and development was prohibited. Those lands represented the strategic reserve for the expansion and growth of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Palestinian construction in the city since 1967 was characterized by individual construction. There was also weak construction of public institutions and economic installations capable of providing job opportunities. The period from 1967 to 1996 was characterized by a slow urban development and expansion period. The number of building permits issued by Israel in East Jerusalem was largely disproportional with its residents’ growing housing needs due to the high population growth. This forced many Palestinians to build in areas outside (but parallel to) the Jerusalem Municipality borders, thereby forming the suburbs of the city. This phenomenon has continued to accelerate since the mid-1980s and has led to the evolution of new towns surrounding Jerusalem, especially Ar Ram, Bir Nabala, and Al ‘Eizariya. The motives of this suburbanization process, which was boasted by former Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kolek, forced 40-50 percent of the East Jerusalem population to settle in the new towns, creating the mutant expansion of existing villages. This development can be explained through the following reasons:

1. The Israeli restrictions on the construction and development process and the difficulty of obtaining building permits in comparison with the areas subject to the Israeli military administration laws in the West Bank, which include the areas surrounding Jerusalem.
2. The imposition of high construction taxes and municipality fees that cannot be born by individuals. In contrast, construction initiatives on the Israeli side are made by public parties or the private sector, thereby leading to lower fees and taxes.
3. Scarcity of land and difficulty of registering land ownership; most lands in Jerusalem have not been through parcelation and registration. The social system, family ownership and the inheritance system have made the registration of lands problematic. By contrast, lands were available in areas

around Jerusalem at much more reasonable prices. The process of these suburbs' evolution and growth around Jerusalem has been waning since 1996, when Israel began implementing the "center of life" policy and tightening its closure of Jerusalem.

The "center of life" law deprives Jerusalemites from their residency rights in Jerusalem, if it is proven that; they reside outside the municipality borders, do not work in Jerusalem, that their children do not receive education inside the city and do not pay public and municipality taxes. As thousands of Jerusalemites returned from the suburbs to the city, several problems were caused. This included housing shortage, deterioration of living conditions, and increased housing densities. In the meantime, unlicensed construction accelerated at a fast pace. The process of unlicensed construction began in the form of annexes to existent buildings in East Jerusalem's internal neighborhoods. However, this expanded at the end of the 1990s to include the construction of completely new buildings in the northern and southern neighborhoods. There are no accurate statistics of the number of buildings in the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem which have been established without licenses, but the number is estimated at 15,000 out of 40,600 existent buildings.

The residents' return to Jerusalem and acceptance of difficult living conditions, in contrast to the large houses in the suburbs, has accelerated since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. Likewise, so has the imposition of tighter Israeli restrictions at the entrances of Jerusalem, where residents are forced to wait for long hours at checkpoints. Conditions deteriorated further when Israel started erecting the wall in 2003. Nowadays, many of the suburbs surrounding Jerusalem are no longer inhabited by Jerusalemites. The Jerusalemite population in those suburbs does not exceed several dozens although they own most of the real estate and commercial and industrial installations in them. This process has had negative impacts on – and in fact caused deterioration of – the functions performed by those suburbs that started out as residential neighborhoods and transformed into service, commercial and transportation centers, following the tightening of restrictions on the entry of West Bank residents into Jerusalem. This is because the suburbs formed hubs connecting the north and south of the West Bank. For example, Al 'Eizariya and Abu Dis formed shuttle points for the

southern part of the West Bank, and Ar Ram, which formed a shuttle points to the northern part of the West Bank.

Israel's construction of the Wall represented the major transformation process on the spatial development of Jerusalem. The placement of all suburbs outside of the physical borders of the Wall ended their service and economic roles, and rendered Jerusalem an isolated city from its direct surrounding, as well as from its hinterlands. The process of settlement construction inside and around the city's borders, followed by their actual annexation through the construction of the Wall and inclusion of the empty (un-built) lands as reserves for those settlements' expansion, was at the expense of the Palestinian neighborhoods and villages. This was accompanied by the connection of the settlements to each other via a network of highways, tunnels and bridges, which has shortened distances and expanded Jerusalem's limits in all directions. The process has been coupled with the dismemberment of the Palestinian neighborhoods and their spatial and functional cohesion through the Israeli spatial domination, and the use of exploitation as a means for amputating and weakening the integration of the Palestinian space. The disintegration reached a degree whereby it is possible to argue that Jerusalem's urban entity is no longer existent. The fragmentation of this entity was enforced by the development of services and commercial installations at the level of every neighborhood. Such a thing was nonexistent before the construction of the Wall, when reliance was on the city center, (the Old City and the Commercial-Business District (CBD) in the east) as well as the secondary centers that evolved in the suburbs until the construction of the wall (which is still at its peak), and whose impacts are still taking place on the ground.

Table 1: Spatial Transformations in Jerusalem

The British Mandate 1917-1948	The new city evolved outside the walls. Jewish construction was predominantly concentrated to the west of the Old City. Palestinian development started in the north and shifted to the southwest. The city's administrative borders remained confined to its neighborhoods and excluded the surrounding villages, including those close to Jerusalem, which were all Palestinian. All of the Jewish presence was concentrated in neighborhoods established since the end of the nineteenth century in the west of the city and in the direction of the coastal city of Jaffa, which was considered Palestine's economic center during the British Mandate.
Divided Jerusalem 1948-1967	In 1948, 60,000 Palestinians were obliged to leave their neighborhoods in West Jerusalem as well as 14 villages around it; 37 of which were destroyed. East Jerusalem was partitioned into two sectors comprised of the Old City and a limited area north of it.
Occupation 1967	Jerusalem was occupied and lands belonging to villages surrounding it were annexed to its administrative borders (70 km²). 34% of the total area was confiscated for the sake of building Jewish settlements. 40% of the Palestinians' lands in Jerusalem were declared "green lands" on which construction and development were prohibited. Settlement construction in East Jerusalem started immediately after the city's occupation, and the number of settlements soon reached 11. Since the 1970s, settlements were constructed around Jerusalem to form a belt that expanded the city's borders and ended the frontier status which the city held before 1967. There are now 18 such settlements.
The Wall 2003	● Construction of the wall and isolation of neighborhoods within Jerusalem municipality borders from the city. ● Actual annexation of the settlements inside the municipality borders and around them. ● Transformation of the Palestinian space into a dismembered space. ● Connection of the Israeli settlement space with West Jerusalem and Israel via a network of highways.

Transformations on the Level of the Institutions and their Role

As Israel's first premier, David Ben Gurion declared applying the Israeli law on Jerusalem in August 1949. The Knesset convened in Jerusalem in December 1949, and the government's headquarters and ministries began moving to Jerusalem at the beginning of 1950. Jerusalem was enforced as Israel's capital and headquarters of its administrative institutions, in addition to its status as a spiritual and religious center. Jerusalem's importance as a capital was not determined by Israel's official declaration in 1950 nor by the Jordanian reaction, which declared the eastern sector as the second capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with its eastern and western banks. In spite of the official declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, this declaration was enforced in phases and was not instantaneous. The first and most important of which was Israel's occupation of the eastern sector in 1967 and the conversion of religious symbols like Al-Buraq (Wailing) Wall and the Jewish Quarter (including Al Magharbeh and Ash Sharaf neighborhoods) into national symbols. This began to take root in the Israeli collective memory and became more of a national consensus. Another symbol was the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital on Mount of Scopus, which were an enclave in no-man's land in the sector under Jordan's control.

Jerusalem's importance as Israel's capital and center was an ascending process; its importance increased as time elapsed. At the end of the 1970s, and when Israel passed a law in 1980 declaring Jerusalem as Israel's eternal united capital, Jerusalem's importance in the Israeli political rhetoric increased. Meanwhile, the Israeli government doubled its efforts to create an intensive settlement reality inside and around Jerusalem. The theory of Jerusalem as a metropolitan center, instead of a peripheral city, became a reality imposed on the ground. The official Israeli establishment, which sought to impose sovereignty, spatial control and demographic superiority, did not seek to annex the population as much as it sought to annex the land.

Due to the setup of Israel's priorities, the Israeli law was not fully imposed on the Palestinian population. Aside from the termination of sovereign institutions, the Palestinians were accorded semi-autonomy in fields related to their lives, such as health and education. Private schools, for example, continued to adopt the Jordanian curriculum taught in the West Bank. This was eventually

replaced with the Palestinian curriculum after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel had attempted to impose the Israeli curriculum in public schools in the beginning of the 1970s, but parents resisted by refusing to send their children to those schools. Subsequently, the Israeli authorities were forced to retract their decision. On another hand, Jerusalem preserved its health system after the occupation through the Palestinian hospitals, which remained independent from the Israeli Health Ministry. Furthermore, Jordan continued to control the Waqf (Islamic Trust) that administers the Haram Ash-Sharif as well as most properties and real estate in the Old City. This included houses, shops and some commercial buildings and offices in East Jerusalem's CBD in Sultan Suleiman and Salah Eddin streets.

Palestinian influence and independence in Jerusalem began to be enforced towards the end of the 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the process of establishing civil society organizations and service institutions accelerated. This was due to PLO support and to financing allocated at the Arab Summit in Baghdad in 1974. Since then, several universities, cultural centers, social service institutions and media centers have been established. Israeli's motive behind "allowing" such institutions to exist was the incorrect assessment that their existence would lead to forming an alternative Palestinian leadership to the PLO, which would be comprised of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Alternatively, the institutions formed an arm of the PLO, especially during the first Intifada, 1987-1992. The role of the PLO increased to the point of replacing the role of the traditional leaderships and weakening Jordan's role in important institutions, such as the Waqf Department, syndicates and unions. The institutions ended their affiliation with Jordan when it declared disengagement with the West Bank in 1988. The resulting vacuum was filled by the PLO.

The West Bank and Gaza Strip's importance increased following the outbreak of the First Intifada, when the conflict and its leadership moved from the outside to the inside. The Palestinian leadership (which was based in Lebanon until 1982 and then moved to Tunisia), did not play any role in the outbreak of the Intifada and early Intifada actions. However, soon afterwards the unified national leadership's communiqués were released in Tunis and distributed in the occupied territories. It is fair to say that during this period, Jerusalem was trans-

formed into the undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories. This was due to its position as the center of representative political and service institutions, as well as its commercial centrality and status as an important metropolitan center for the entire West Bank and to a lesser extent, the Gaza Strip.

The declaration of holding the international Madrid Peace Conference in the Middle East, the decision of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation and the acceptance of the composition of the Tunis-based PLO leadership transformed Jerusalem to the headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team. The team was headed by the late Faisal Husseini. Israel initially refused the participation of Faisal Husseini in the Madrid Conference and the subsequent Washington Talks on the pretext that he carried a Jerusalemite identification card and was subject to Israeli law. However, following the success of the late Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin in the 1992 election, Israel retracted the decision to bar the participation of Palestinian Jerusalemites in the negotiating team and Husseini was officially allowed to participate. During this period Husseini held political contacts with the Palestinian leadership in Tunis, as well as diplomatic contacts with various players, from his house. This was due to the closure of the Arab Studies Society (which he founded in 1979), for accusations of conducting Intifada activities. However, the official headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team was opened at the Orient House in October 1992 in the same building that included some Arab Studies Society's offices. These headquarters became the diplomatic and political address for the Palestinians. However, while talks were being conducted in Washington, direct secret negotiations in Oslo with official representatives of the PLO in Tunis succeeded in reaching a Declaration of Principles in September 1993, and formed an important turning point in moving the political weight into the Occupied Territories. This weakened the role played by the inside leadership prior to establishment of the PA.

In the frame of the Oslo talks, Israel agreed to include the issue of Jerusalem among the final status negotiation issues, to which solutions were to be reached before the end of the agreed upon interim period in Oslo. Israel made a commitment in the form of a letter from Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johannes Yurgen Holst. This affirmed that Palestinian economic, educational and cultural institutions in Jerusalem were important and

should be preserved. Peres denied the existence of such letter, but the Palestinian side revealed its contents.

In June 1994, just after Israel signed the Oslo B Accord (May 1994) and the PA was founded, Israel began passing laws barring the activities of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem. After the Israeli Knesset passed this law in its session on June 26 1994, Israeli authorities, instructed by Premier Yizhaq Rabin, began curtailing Palestinian activities in Jerusalem. This was in contravention with its agreement with the PLO. The Israeli security apparatuses set “criteria” in accordance with which the operations of Palestinian institutions were monitored. Such criteria included the nature of the activity, the activity’s governmental character (sovereignty), its linkage to the PA’s budget, its affiliation with the official Palestinian administrative system, usage of official titles and the usage of the PA’s emblem.

Israel enforced this law, particularly in regards issues related to sovereignty. It influenced the Palestinian police and the preventive security services, which was meant to be enforced in Jerusalem and around, while the Palestinian police handled criminal cases and social and economic disputes. Since the end of 1994, Israel pushed PA affiliated institutions out of Jerusalem. This included the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) and the Palestinian Housing Council.

Israel also undertook measures to stop European diplomats visiting the Orient House. In response to the European Union’s decision that European foreign ministers visiting the region should make official visits to the Orient House, Israeli Premier Yizhaq Rabin, decided not to bar foreign ministers and ministers from visiting the Orient House. However, he abstained from meeting the foreign ministers and officials who visited the Orient House. In light of this decision, it is possible to say that the work of the Orient House was reduced to following up the issue of Jerusalem. It worked hard to keep the issue of Jerusalem and its future on the political agenda and the agendas of diplomatic visits, which continued to the Orient House on the level of consulates in Jerusalem and representative offices to the PA.

During the period following the Oslo Accords, the Orient House worked on

following up legal issues pertaining to land and real estate confiscation, house demolition, health, cultural and athletic services. This was in addition to assisting individual cases and supporting small projects undertaken by institutions in Jerusalem.

After Binyamin Netanyahu won the 1996 election, he continued the efforts undertaken by Rabin and Peres, which were focused on curtailing the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and barring any signs of sovereignty. Netanyahu worked on enforcing the Israeli annexation and sovereignty in the occupied East Jerusalem by enforcing police presence and opening new police stations, allocating budgets for developing East Jerusalem and building settlements, especially on Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa). Moreover, Netanyahu took the decision to open the tunnel that passed parallel to the eastern wall of the Haram Ash-Sharif.

The Palestinian side distinguished between the operation of the PA and the operation within the framework of the PLO, on the basis that the understandings reached with Israel allowed the PLO to operate in Jerusalem. However, Israel did not distinguish between any forms of Palestinian operation legally or practically. This was regardless of the extent of its affiliation with the PA. Instead Israel considered any representation or any action affiliated with or related to the Palestinian leadership to be illegal. In spite of the Orient House's diminishing role since establishment of the PA, Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem remained important in the political presentation of the issue of Jerusalem. It continued to be an address to which people headed to for resolving their problems and addressing their needs. Israel's closure of the Orient House in August 2001 ended any Palestinian political or institutional representation. Israel also closed other important service institutions at the same time. The death of Hussein in May 2001, also had an effect on diminishing the role of the Orient House.

During the past four years, the Palestinian influence and role in Jerusalem has diminished. Several institutions which were closed by Israel opened alternative offices in Dhahiyat Al Bareed area, just outside of Jerusalem's municipal borders. However, the possibility of their operation inside the city remained limited due to the Israeli harassments and restriction of Palestinian operation, whether on the social, service or political levels.

Table 2: Institutional Transformations in Jerusalem

End of the Ottoman Rule of Jerusalem	● Weak public institutions and services in comparison with Western institutions, which evolved with Europe's increasing influence in Jerusalem (Christian and Jewish institutions increased as Jewish immigration to Palestine increased). ● Jerusalemite elites and clans controlled the bureaucratic administrative structure, and their influence increased due to the weakness of the central administration.
The British Mandate (1917-1948)	● Jerusalem was transformed into an administrative capital, which reflected positively on the city's development and the social and economic activity within it. The mandate sought to establish institutions preserving Jerusalem's ethnic and religious plurality and preserving balance among them.
The Divided Jerusalem (1948-1967)	● West Jerusalem became the declared capital of the state of Israel. Most legislative and executive authority institutions, including cultural institutions, were moved there at the end of the 1940s. ● East Jerusalem was officially declared the second capital of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, but official institutions remained concentrated in Amman, which began developing at a fast pace. ● East Jerusalem remained the center of traditional local institutions on the level of the West Bank, such as benevolent societies, the Waqf, the Chamber of Commerce, cooperative unions, etc.
The Israeli Occupation Era (Since 1967)	● Israeli domination and enforcement of the legal and administrative annexation. Prohibition of all sovereign institutions, while according the Palestinians semi-autonomy in living sectors like education, health, cultural and social services. Jordan continued to administer the Waqf and the Haram Ash-Sharif.
First Intifada 1987-1992	● Evolution of Palestinian civil society organizations supported by the PLO, whose influence increased in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These institutions included universities, cultural and media centers, research centers, service institutions and others. They served the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and transformed Jerusalem into an undeclared capital of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967.
The Peace Process 1992-1995	● Evolution of Palestinian political representation in Jerusalem by the Palestinian negotiating team to the Madrid Conference, whose headquarters was the Orient House. A leadership from inside the Palestinian territories managed the negotiations in Madrid and Washington under guidance and instructions from the PLO leadership in Tunisia.

Table 2 (Continued)

	● The Orient House formed a political address for the internal leadership. Diplomatic and political activities were concentrated in this semi-official headquarters. ● Direct secret talks between Israel and the PLO in Oslo weakened the importance of the Orient House. Its work was reduced to representing the issue of Jerusalem.
The Palestinian Authority 1995-2000	● Several civil society organizations moved to Ramallah and some merged with PA institutions. Ramallah's importance began to increase, and since 1996 the city transformed into an important administrative and economic center. ● Israel passed laws and regulations restricting Palestinian institutional operation in Jerusalem and barring the visits of high-ranking diplomatic figures to the Orient House. ● The operation of local Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem was confined to serving the city's residents as Israel tightened the closure of Jerusalem and prohibition of West Bank residents from entering the city for work or to receive services.
Institutions Closing down 2001	● Termination of the Palestinian political representation inside Jerusalem with the closure of the Orient House. This was in addition to several service institutions on the pretext of their affiliation with the PA. Several others relocated to Jerusalem's surrounding areas due to the legal harassments, the restriction of movement and the closures which prevented most Palestinians from entering the city.

Future Transformation: Where Is It Going?

The new reality created by Israel as a result of the construction of the Wall, imposition of the domination and annexation, and closure of Palestinian institutions shall lead to a negative transformation, which will highly impact the future of Jerusalem as well as the entire conflict. The present ongoing transformations in the Palestinian Jerusalem can be summarized in the following points:

1. After Israel managed to end Jerusalem's centrality as the Palestinian metropolitan center of the West Bank in the beginning of the 1990s, the Palestinian essence of Jerusalem as a city is disappearing. Instead it is transforming into a spatially and functionally cluster of fragmented disjointed neighborhoods.

2. The functional semi-autonomy enjoyed by Palestinian Jerusalemites on the service, political and cultural is determined in accordance with Israel's preferred demographic considerations and security considerations. This means that the agenda is dealing with people's basic needs is for survival rather than according to a political agenda.
3. Jerusalem represented the heart and soul of the West Bank. This functional and spatial contiguity will be transformed (in accordance with the Israeli plans) into a superficial 'transportation' contiguity via highways and tunnels. This is isolating Jerusalem from its natural environs and thereby affecting the prospects of establishing a viable Palestinian State on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.
4. The departure of Palestinian institutions from Jerusalem and their relocation into areas under PA laws is accelerating. Consequently, Palestinian activists on Jerusalem issues have relocated from inside of the city to outside of its borders. The ability to provide services to Palestinians inside the city itself has been limited. This is a result of the Israeli restrictions and semi-total prohibition of any relationship for Palestinian institutions with Jerusalem. It is possible to argue that the Palestinian state of affairs today is similar to the Israeli state of affairs from 1948 to 1967, when Israel "waited" for the day when it would control the eastern sector of the city. This is the reality of the PA, which has temporarily established a basis for its institutions, governance and administration in the city of Ramallah while "waiting" for its control of East Jerusalem. The worrying question is "would Ramallah become the Palestinian Tel Aviv", or would waiting continue for too long, until it becomes impossible to move to Jerusalem because of the realities created by Israel and the PA itself?

The spatial and functional reality imposed by Israel by force is expected to exacerbate the conflict and push it to new unprecedented limits. Israel seeks from this reality to render the issue of Jerusalem non-negotiable and to render negotiation over its future illegitimate. Advocates of this approach argue that former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak failed to reach a settlement over the future of Jerusalem although he offered to divide Jerusalem (including the Old City), but the Palestinians turned down his "generous offer"! The Israeli side

also seeks to link its willingness to dismantle some settlements and to give up Palestinian populated areas in exchange for the Palestinian side to forfeit Jerusalem and accept its new Israeli definition. This definition aims at keeping the Old City, its direct environs and inner neighborhoods under Israeli control. In fact, the Israeli decision maker shall seek to legitimize the Israeli concessions and withdrawal from territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through “retaining” Israeli control over Jerusalem.

Important questions to ask are, can Israel keep up its unilateral policies in Jerusalem, which have accelerated at a fast pace, since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993? Moreover, can it do so in light of the negative transformations witnessed in Jerusalem, which may render it impossible to transform Jerusalem into a capital? If so should one drop the solution of the establishment of a Palestinian state living side by side by Israel with the state of Israel?

The following hypotheses lay a basis for devising a new model for reaching a formula for resolving the conflict in Jerusalem:

- Jerusalem cannot be a city controlled by one party of the conflict. It cannot be a Jewish dominated city although Israel seeks to impose such reality by creating facts on the ground.
- The plan of the Jewish Jerusalem or the Jewish metropolis or the Greater Jerusalem remains simply domination by sheer force (in spite of Israel’s enormous spatial domination). Jerusalem cannot become a center and a capital for Israel. In spite of all the Israeli policies of control and expansion (coupled with restriction of the Palestinian expansion and development on the other hand), Jerusalem remains located at the fringe of Israel’s functional center. It remains a poor city abandoned by the middle, upper and educated classes. It remains a city to which the rest of Israel view as negative due to its location and its population’s ethnic, racial and religious composition.
- Jerusalem enjoys international importance. This necessitates international intervention in order to preserve its character in favor of a city that reflects more balance between the two parties to the conflict. Moreover, Jerusalem’s religious, symbolic and spiritual importance for the Arab and Mus-

lim worlds shall force them to intervene in favor of a policy that preserves the Arab, Christian and Muslim existence and character of the city.

- The conflict over Jerusalem was used as a symbol and indicator of the conflict, especially for considerations pertaining to “legitimizing” the conflict and its exacerbation. In fact, Jerusalem as a potential tool for resolving the conflict was not even thought of by either party to the conflict, especially the stronger party (Israel), which possesses the power to impose its agenda with no regard for the weaker party (the Palestinians). Consequently, it is possible to argue that Jerusalem possesses the capabilities that enable it to form a positive model for Palestinian-Israeli relations. Moreover, this should be able to guarantee a balance between the parties’ interests and to ensure the evolution of a viable capital city.
- During the past four years, the Palestinian side has been unable to influence the course of events in Jerusalem. However, it still remains a strong partner whose active participation and legitimacy has continued through a determination to reach a peaceful solution for sharing Jerusalem politically. This is essential for building the city’s centrality and improving its image.
- A political solution in Jerusalem represents a cornerstone for reaching a comprehensive solution to the conflict and eventually ending it. Failure of the first direct negotiations between the two parties regarding its future (Camp David Talks) enforced its status as a central element to the conflict to be negotiated if a political solution is to be reached.
- The solution in Jerusalem must include special arrangements striking a balance between the two-state solution, the political separation and the need to fulfill the ambitions and aspirations of the two peoples. It must also respect the need for cooperation and partnership in order to enforce the city’s centrality as a center and a capital. This necessities opening the door for developing the city’s international significance.

Model for Peaceful Transformation


The state of deterioration and collapse undergone by Jerusalem today necessitates the acceleration of efforts to reach a political solution. Causing peaceful

transformation must go beyond reaching a formula for geo-political solutions (a peace agreement). It must also deal with a strategy for enforcing the city's status as a center, two capitals for two states and an international city in recognition with its symbolism and importance for the Western, Arab and Muslim worlds. Occurrence of a peaceful solution of the conflict and the enforcement of Jerusalem's status from a marginalized city into a shared city and metropolitan center, is attainable through the following framework:

- The geopolitical solution in Jerusalem must be based on political separation and demarcation of clear political borders for the two states, whereby East Jerusalem and the areas annexed to it become the capital of the Palestinian state and West Jerusalem and the areas annexed to it become the recognized capital of the state of Israel. This is provided that the annexation is recognized as part of an agreement between the two sides. It must also be linked to a comprehensive solution to the issue of land exchange and the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.
- Borders between the city's two sectors and the two capitals must be open. There must be no physical barriers or walls dividing the two sectors. There must be various degrees of permeable borders which minimize supervision and control of the freedom of movement and transportation between the borders. This will become increasingly important as the city's international status deepens and in order to enforce human and economic security for both peoples. A solution in Jerusalem must be based on the principle of Jerusalem as a divided city, politically and open with no physical separation.
- Jerusalem should set up two mother municipalities for a city center area. This should be comprised of an inner ring of neighborhoods for each city. The neighborhoods should be divided into separate administrations, which should be elected by the citizens freely and democratically. They should be responsible for providing basic services and tax collection. On another hand, municipalities and local administrations in the outer ring neighborhoods should enjoy independence (as sister cities), provided that they follow their respective mother municipalities in strategic planning issues and in allocation of new areas for development and urban expansion.

- A Jerusalem region with new borders should be defined. It should comprise the cities and localities functionally linked with Jerusalem, and form part of both the Palestinian and Israeli metropolitans. This region should be subject to the administrations of the two states in accordance with the demarcation of the political borders. Meanwhile, a joint Palestinian-Israeli body should be formed to deal with the administrative and technical issues. It should also follow up strategic planning in the region and monitor the effects of each party's planning policy on the other.
- The Old City should not be dealt with as a holy basin only (in accordance with the Israeli proposition), but as a lively city representing a point of attraction.
- No legal or political terms, such as 'sovereignty' and 'control', should be applied to the future of the holy sites. Each religion should be responsible for the holy sites under its administration. The division of the holy sites and the multiple use by more than one religion, or the enforcement of a situation in contravention to the reality of the past hundreds of years, would only exacerbate the conflict.
- Representatives of the three monotheistic faiths, including their multiple denominations, must set up an unofficial body. This should encourage dialogue and raise awareness and understanding between the different viewpoints. Dialogue and acceptance of the other is vital. Otherwise, a fear of hidden agendas, absence of recognition and the absence of a platform of understanding among the religions and denominations could cause failure of any joint executive or administrative body for the Old City or the religious sites.
- The Jerusalemite identity must form a mutual meeting point for the Israelis and Palestinians. It must be an identity of linkage to the city which is constructed in a manner that does not deny the right of the other, but instead recognizes his or her national rights. This is especially important in regards to the right of moral and material participation and to the right to benefit from the city's international potential as a world center.

Moving towards peace in Jerusalem requires transforming these general principles into mechanisms capable of causing transformation of the city from one dominated by a single party into a joint city shared by both parties. Frameworks of cooperation must be established. Moreover, new functions must be created in order to open the way for the city's transformation into an international city, like other great cities of the world. Jerusalem should be able to attract visitors, investors, and seekers of knowledge. This will put an important city on the map, which until this day, remains marginalized and victimized. There is no hope for ending the conflict without reaching a solution to the future of Jerusalem.

An aerial, sepia-toned photograph of the Berlin skyline. The Fernsehturm (TV Tower) is a prominent feature in the center-left. The city is densely packed with various buildings, including modern high-rises and older, more traditional structures. The sky is filled with soft, white clouds. The overall tone is historical and atmospheric.

PART TWO

The Management of Transition in Berlin

Team Berlin: Perspectives from Within

Berlin between Integration, Cooperation and Division

Edited and compiled by Team Berlin

Stephan Stetter and
Lena Schulz zur Wiesch

Introduction

After more than 40 years of division, Berlin became again a united city in 1990. However, the formal unification of East and West Berlin did not lead overnight to the disappearance of those forms of division and separation, which had developed after the end of the Second World War in 1945. Seen from this perspective, the unification of the city in 1990 was a tremendous change but did not automatically mark the end of those divisions which had emerged during the previous decades. This chapter builds upon this insight and argues that “1990” has in fact been the starting point of the on-going management of transition which still characterises Berlin today.

This chapter traces both the roots and the development of the management of transition in Berlin. It is based on individual contributions by all members of Team Berlin to a set of questions by members of Team Jerusalem on the management of transition in Berlin. Initially, these questions had been answered by Team Berlin on an individual basis. However, in our further discussions within Team Berlin and between the Jerusalem and Berlin teams, we decided to integrate these individual answers into one text. Of course, such a proceeding has advantages but also disadvantages when compared to the individual answers. Thus, by definition, this text lacks the coherence which a text produced by one author would certainly have. Moreover, in the process of integrating the often quite diverse answers by Kristina Volke, Jutta Borgstädt-Schmitz, Volker Hobrack, Holger Kuhle, Cornelia Poczka, Lena Schulz zur Wiesch and Andreas Wilke in

one text, we decided to leave a certain “inhomogeneity” in place, thereby reflecting the diversity of opinions which exist in Team Berlin on the various issues dealt within the text. This might, at times, require from the reader to “read between the lines” in order not to be distorted by the multiple perspectives in this article. Apart from these words of caution, however, we feel that an integrated text also offers manifold advantages. Hence, the text is now much more easily accessible to readers, in particular those not too familiar with the complex Berlin-situation. Moreover, by trying to integrate the sometimes consensual, sometimes diverse answers of Team Berlin members into one text, we were forced to re-assess and re-question our own opinions on the management of transition in Berlin. Overall, after careful consideration of the pros and cons, we therefore decided that an integrated text responds best to the specific purpose of the Jerusalem-Berlin Forum and, in particular, the requirements of the present book.

The chapter is structured around the general themes of integration and division and applies this analytical framework to the periods of division and unification. Thus, section two takes a closer look at how the dynamics of integration and separation shaped the period of the formal division of Berlin between 1945 and 1990. This period witnessed an increasing separation between West and East Berlin not only on the political but also on the economic, social and cultural levels. While there are some noteworthy areas, in which functional cooperation between both parts of the city were upheld, most of these islands of limited functional cooperation were often drowning in a sea of general division – with the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 being the most symbolic and decisive watermark. As was the case for Europe and Germany as a whole, Berlin was taken by surprise in 1989 and 1990 when the formal unification of the city materialised. And indeed, unification led to a complete overhaul of the seemingly entrenched separation of East and West and it remains a remarkable achievement that on most levels Berlin has today become an integrated and unified city. However, this general trend of functional integration should not lead to the conclusion that the former division of the city has entirely faded away into history. Thus, a closer look at the political, economic, social and cultural levels reveals that there still exist manifold pockets of division in the city. While not all problems of the city of Berlin can be related to this East-West divide there is no doubt that a decade and a half after unification the management of transition is still under way. This relationship between general functional integration and limited

division as part of the management of transition will be discussed in the third section.

We have highlighted in this chapter, through bold letters, specific key words, which are meant to offer the reader the possibility of quick orientation on the main issues dealt with here.

General Separation and Limited Functional Cooperation

The Division of Berlin (1945 to 1989)

The division of Germany and Berlin was a consequence of the Second World War. The victorious allied powers, led by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, took control of all public affairs in Germany after its unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. The allies were united in their efforts to render Germany unable to ever again inflict the European continent with war and genocide. Consequently, the former German state came under an allied occupation regime, while the Eastern territories in Silesia and Eastern Prussia were detached from Germany and handed over to Poland and the Soviet Union – with more than 12 million German refugees fleeing to the West. Soon it became clear that the three Western powers (France soon joined the United States and Great Britain) and the Soviet Union were only held together by their fight against Nazi Germany. But they disagreed about the country's future orientation. The **ideological gap** between Western liberal democracies and the communist Soviet Union proved to be too wide to be bridged and ultimately provided the context for the **division of Germany and Berlin**.

The once prospering city was heavily hit by the Second World War. In 1945, more than 70 percent of the city's building structure was heavily damaged or had been completely destroyed – about 600,000 flats were destroyed. The pre-war population of 4.3 million (1939) – amongst them 170,000 Jews – shrunk to only 2.8 million in 1945 – of Berlin's Jewish population only a few hundred have remained in the city after the horrors of the Holocaust. As was the case with Germany as a whole, the city of Berlin was divided up by the victorious allied powers. Berlin was under joint allied control and split into four occupation sectors, each of it governed by a military governor representing the allied powers.

The United States took control of the southern parts of Berlin, whereas Great Britain became responsible for the west. France governed the northern part and the Soviet Union controlled the east of the city. They were all formally subordinated to the Allied Command, which was responsible for all public affairs in the whole of Germany. The seat of the Allied Command was located in Berlin.

Yet, from the very beginning, the Allies had quite differing visions for the future of Germany. There was hardly any consensus between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union on the key political and economic parameters. It was a disagreement over the monetary reform in Western Germany which then provided the pretext for the demise of the Soviet Union from the Allied Control Council in 1948. In the wake of this decision, the Soviet Union banned in June 1948 all access to the Western sectors of Berlin from the surrounding Soviet-controlled areas. The aim of this “blockage” was to isolate the Western part of the city and thereby to gain control of the entire city. In this period, in which Berlin became drawn into the emerging Cold War, the ground for the increasing popularity of the Western Allies amongst the West Berlin population was laid. Thus, for more than one-year the Western Allies established an airlift, which provided West Berlin with supplies of coal, food and industrial goods and, as a result, guaranteed that this part of the city did not fall into the hands of the Soviet Union.

It soon became clear that East and West Berlin would follow opposite directions. For example, in November 1948 an independent city administration was set up by the Soviet Union in the Eastern parts of Berlin – which in the East replaced the Berlin city government which was duly elected by all Berliners in 1946. Consequently, the division of Berlin and Germany into an Eastern and a Western part was sealed and in 1949 two different states were founded, namely the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the West and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the East. In violation of the allied status, which was initially applying to the whole city, East Berlin then became the capital city of the GDR. The political status of West Berlin within the FRG was weaker in comparison. The city of Bonn was declared the new capital and only few federal authorities remained in the city.

However, the political future of West Berlin as part of the FRG and the West-

ern world was assured. Yet, the **status of West Berlin** remained shaky for other reasons. Thus, due to its isolated location, West Berlin suffered from a lack of direct investment and became increasingly dependent on transfer payments and tax-benefits from the federal level. The once prosperous industry suffered both from the effects of the dismantlement policy by the Soviet Union prior to the entry of the Western allies into the city and from the general isolation of West Berlin from other Western markets. Despite the end of formal cooperation between the Western and Eastern allies, the formal division of Berlin into four occupation sectors was maintained and applied to the city until unification in 1990.

Berlin Before and After the Wall

Notwithstanding the increasing differences between political and economic developments in East and West Berlin, this bi-polar division of the city after 1945 did for some time co-exist with **nearly free passage** within the entire city for all Berliners – which markedly distinguished the relationship between East and West Berlin from the sharp physical division between East and West Germany at large. Thus, prior to the building of the Wall in 1961, some 51,000 Berliners commuted daily between the two parts of the city. Nikita Chruschtshev called the Western Allies to withdraw their troops from Berlin and to agree to make West Berlin an independent political unit. The aim was to detach West Berlin from its bonds with Western Germany. The eastern propaganda pronounced the alleged necessity that the occupation through the Allies had to be lifted once and for all. This allegation had no resonance among the people because the Allied troops in West Berlin for a long time enacted a protective more than a menacing role. On early 13 August 1961, the GDR leadership closed all accesses by train or streets to West Berlin. Connecting streets between the two parts of the city were demolished. A provisional barrier was built, which over the weeks and years became an **impermeable separation**. West Berlin was surrounded by fences and walls with a length of 160 km. The wall between East and West Berlin alone was 46 km long. West Berlin was connected to the Federal Republic overland by so-called “corridors” (three train tracks, 3 highways).

From 1961 until 1972, the border provisions were very strict. Visits were

possible for the first time during new-years eve 1963 and again in March 1966. However, in contrast to the situation prior to 1961, East Berliners were banned from leaving the GDR unless they had reached pensioner age. This restrictive policy forced many East Germans trying to escape to the West without the permission of the authorities, which was a dangerous exercise since the GDR authorities left no doubt that any unauthorised passage to the West would be prevented by force. Indeed, many East Germans tried to escape to the West by surpassing the Wall. While some were successful, more than 1,000 people were killed by East German border police in their attempt to cross the wall from East to West.

Developments in the city of Berlin from 1945 until 1990 must be understood in the double context of both Germany's prior defeat in the Second World War and the Cold War which shaped relations between East and West – on the city, national and international levels. However, Berlin was more than just one amongst many spots in this double context. Not only was Berlin the capital city of Nazi Germany but it also turned into a main bone of contention and, indeed, the main **symbol of the Cold War**. For Berliners, however, the division of the city was more than a historical or symbolic matter but was felt on many levels in day-to-day affairs. The division of the city required from East and West Berliners to face the many practical problems arising from the division of a once integrated city.

Administration and Politics

During the years of division, two completely **autonomous administrative bodies** developed in the East and the West of Berlin. Each “city-half” conducted its own politics of reconstruction and housing, planned its own urban centres and restructured the economy according to its own policy outlooks. The period from 1945 to 1990 thus witnessed the predominance of a clear division between both parts of Berlin. East and West Berlin were incorporated into the political, legal, economic and financial frameworks of the respective German state. And both parts of the city established their own city government, these being the Magistrate in the East and the Senate in the West. Due to the historical, geopolitical and symbolic significance of Berlin, both German governments were

keen to emphasise their claims on the city. As a result, both East and West Berlin attracted a lot of investment and subsidies from their governments.

The Situation in West Berlin

Due to its isolated physical location, the status of West Berlin remained shaky. After 1945, West Berlin lost many of its previous political and economic functions within Germany, but due to its symbolic importance as a bastion against communism, it was promoted by the German government and the Western Allies as a “showcase of the free world”. The federal government in Bonn had to compensate for a 75 percent decrease in industrial activities compared to the pre-war situation as well as for the loss of the function as the former capital of the German Reich. As an island within the GDR, West Berlin had also lost its hinterland, the domestic market shrunk and, consequently, the city ceased to be self-sustainable. The entire labour-market, housing market and economy became dependent on West German subsidies, tax relieves, supplementary allowances on wages etc. Each employee in West Berlin received a tax-free supplement of 8 percent on his wage, thereby also attracting many West Germans to move to West Berlin. Enterprises in West Berlin benefited of an income-tax reduction of 30 percent. Investors got allowances of 25 percent off tax; R&D activities even received a 40 percent reduction. Thereby it was possible to establish or keep alive rather unproductive industries and to maintain comparatively high employment rates. The loss of cultural, political, administrative and social institutions – many of which were located in East Berlin – had to be compensated by the building-up of new structures, such as universities, opera houses and administrative buildings. Notwithstanding this considerable degree of subsidies and investments in infrastructure, the gross domestic product of West Berlin did not allow the city to live from its own budget. During the entire period of division, the West Berlin budget was therefore subsidised by 50 percent through the federal government. These federal subsidies were significantly cut after unification.

This situation markedly differed from the developments in East Berlin. From the outset, the situation in the East was different, for the excessive dismantling-policies of the Soviet Union provided for a less promising starting base when

compared with the West. The introduction of a socialist planned economy further exacerbated economic and social problems in the East. Political and social discontent in the GDR increased during the 1950s and, prior to the building of the Wall in 1961, some 1.2 million Easterners moved to West Berlin and West Germany (mainly via West Berlin).

The Situation in East Berlin

In the GDR – thus also in East Berlin – private property was abolished and huge housing programs were adopted. New representative modern buildings were built in the centre of East Berlin at the expense of the existing or remaining building structures (e.g. Fischerinsel, royal city-castle). Due to the central role of the socialist state, a housing market practically did not exist. The overall low level of rents, the central administration of the housing distribution as well as the small income differences were responsible for the literal absence of socio-economic spatial segregation in the East.

The sector of planning also was a highly politicised issue in the East as much as in the West. The function of East Berlin as the capital of the GDR and its closeness to and visibility from West Berlin led to intensive urban planning activities, thereby promoting the figurehead function of East Berlin. Some of the key characteristics of the socialist city were, for example, clear axes of development, central squares and monumental enclosures. Skyscrapers and the TV-tower at the centre, close to Alexanderplatz, marked this area as the needlepoint of the city. In contrast to West Berlin, the Eastern centre was planned as a cultural and social area rather than a commercial and business centre, as was the case with the Kurfürstendamm-area in the West. And relations between East and West were characterised by intense competition, as becomes visible when looking at major construction activities since the 1950s. Thus, whenever one side was constructing an outstanding building, the other side followed suit and responded in very short time by constructing a similarly visible project, e.g. Stalinallee in the East and the Hansaviertel in the West; the Springer-building in the West, right next to the Wall, and the adjacent Leipziger Straße in the East; the skyscraper Forum Hotel at Alexanderplatz in the East and the Telefunken-tower (later the Technical University) at Ernst-Reuter-Platz in the West, to mention just a few.

In comparison to other cities in the GDR, East Berlin was thus in a privileged position from the outset, for it received the bulk of public investments from the central government. East Berlin hosted all the important social and political institutions of the GDR, such as ministries and other administrative bodies as well as foreign embassies. Half of the academic personnel of Eastern Germany were employed in East Berlin and most of the grand opera houses and theatres of the GDR could also be found in East Berlin. At a lower level than in pre-war Berlin, East Berlin was also successful in keeping its reputation as a good location for electronic and chemical industries.

Despite the diametrically opposed political, economic and social ideologies which guided urban development in both city parts, there has been an astonishing similarity between “real-socialism” in the East and the “subsidised economy” in the West, at least in terms of the structural underpinning of these policies. In a sense, both systems can well be described as **“quasi state-socialist” planning**. In both parts of the city, the public influence on the spatial development was massive and, consequently, urban development and house-building were de-commercialised. The old building structure was equally discredited, even leading to the destruction of much of the well preserved housing substance. Finally, in both parts of the city, large peripheral housing estates were built; these were predominately public housing cooperations. As a result of this de-commodification of housing, the socio-spatial segregation of the population could be reduced quite successfully in both parts of Berlin and also enable a relatively low rate of unemployment and little social polarisation in both East and West Berlin.

Economics and Social Affairs in East and West Berlin

During the period of division, both parts of Berlin underwent a different economic development, but there are also some common denominators which related to both East and West Berlin, in particular the high level of subsidies for economic activities. In the West, important companies such as Siemens and AEG relocated their headquarters after the war to West Germany and only minor affiliations of these companies remained in West Berlin – where they could profit from federal subsidies.

In the Eastern part, the companies which had survived both the war and the

Soviet dismantling policies, operated quite successfully within the communist market. But in comparison to Western companies, they lagged behind technological development, were often highly polluting for the environment, and – as seen after unification – not competitive in Western markets. As far as the private service sector was concerned, this branch was completely underdeveloped both in East and West Berlin, and minor in comparison to an oversized public sector.

In the early 1960s, West Berlin's growing manufacturing industry was in need of low skilled and unskilled workers for their plants in order to meet a growing demand. Most of these workers were employed from Turkey. In the beginning, foreign workers only had the status of guest workers, but were soon allowed to permanently settle with their families in West Berlin. Immigrants mainly lived in the old workers' districts in Kreuzberg, Wedding and Neukölln. West Berlin soon attracted a huge amount of foreigners from various social and ethnic backgrounds. The two Western universities, the Technical University and the Free University, attracted many international students. Moreover, many political refugees from countries such as Iran and Chile permanently settled in West Berlin. But it was also in the Eastern parts of the city that refugees from Chile, Angola or other countries immigrated. The same is true for the Vietnamese "contract workers" in East Berlin; however, the integration of these immigrants was not intended. They were meant to leave the GDR after some years.

Housing in West and East Berlin resembled each other to a high degree. In the East, private property had been abolished, while in the West the housing market was strongly regulated and subsidised. Property remained an exception also in the West. In general, housing was cheap in East and West alike.

Despite these **structural similarities**, life in the city was, of course, characterised by the increasing functional division, which affected most areas of life. It is important to note that Berlin's division dates back further than 1961, when the Wall was erected. While the city was physically divided in 1961, the grounds for self-sufficiency of West Berlin were already prepared before that date, thus reflecting the acceptance of authorities on both sides that unification was not on the political agenda. As already mentioned, an important date was the "blockade" in 1948-49 and the resulting airlift, which made this **permanency of divi-**

sion visible to all Berliners. It was already during this period, that the West started to build up its own supply-system for many services. The monetary reforms that were implemented in 1948 (first in the western occupied zones and then, as a response, in the eastern occupied zone), as well as the establishment of two German states in 1949, provided early signals of far-reaching political and economic division between East and West. Thus, it was already since the blockade of the city in 1948, that Berlin was in effect a politically and administratively divided city. In the 1950s, the separation of the city was almost complete. Yet, with some **islands of functional cooperation** remaining in the city of Berlin, West Berlin continued to work as a bridge between East and West. As mentioned before, prior to 1961 it was still possible for citizens of the GDR and the FRG to cross into the other side of Berlin (when leaving the Western sectors this was marked only by a sign: “you are leaving the American/French/British sector”). However, as the living conditions in the East worsened during the 1950s, more and more people fled to the West, thus making use of Berlin’s attractive bridge function. Before the construction of the Wall, more than 2.4 million people, most of them young, had fled from Eastern Germany through East Berlin to the West. The building of the Wall eventually brought this movement to a permanent halt.

Service Provision and Infrastructure

In several functional areas it can be shown how the division of Berlin progressed even prior to the erection of the Wall. As far as water and sewage were concerned, it was as early as 1950 when the water company in Berlin was divided. This was to a large extent a political decision, for West Berlin aimed at an autonomous supply of fresh water and new wells were dug in West Berlin. The division of the fresh water supply precipitated a crisis in the supply for East Berlin and it was not until the end of the 1950s that this crisis in the East was somewhat resolved, when six new water supply companies were established.

In contrast to the fresh water supply, the waste water system could, however, for technical reasons not be divided. The sewage treatment plants were located mainly in the outskirts of Berlin, i.e. in the GDR. In order to prevent Easterners from fleeing through the waste water gullies to West Berlin, large iron bars were

installed underground by the Eastern authorities and these were only removed after the fall of the Wall. After 1990, the Eastern and Western water companies were merged and partly privatised.

Also, the electricity companies were divided during the blockade of Berlin in 1948, when West Berlin was cut-off from the power supply from the surrounding areas. It was then the Soviet commander's office, which ordered the division of Berlin's electricity company – the BEWAG – whose headquarters were then moved from East Berlin to West Berlin. As the soviet troops had carried out massive dismantlement policies in West Berlin after they conquered the city in 1945, many power stations could not function after the war and could not provide West Berlin with energy during the Blockade. Thus, as part of their airlift to West Berlin, the western allies carried entire engines and turbines to West Berlin which were used to reconstruct these power stations, for example, the power plant “Reuter West”, which reopened in 1949. In 1952 the joint operation of the energy supply between East and West was formally ended. Since then, West Berlin was an energy-island and relied on its own production of energy. After 1990 the formerly nationalised East Berlin energy company was taken over by the Western BEWAG. Since then, the supply of energy is again organised for the entire city.

As a consequence of West Berlin's isolated geographical status and the non-existence of a hinterland in which to dispose the city's waste, West Berlin faced quite noteworthy problems. This problem was then exacerbated by the increasing amount of waste, which was produced in the West since the 1970s – caused by the rise of the general wealth and the waste intensive consumer goods that appeared on the market. Therefore, new incinerating plants were built to tackle this problem. But, because its capacities were still not able to cope with the waste, the “exportation” of waste to East Berlin was foreseen. Thus, in 1972 West Berlin agreed with the Eastern authorities that waste from the West could be brought to a waste deposit in the GDR. In 1974 a contract was signed between both sides, which foresaw an off-site disposal of the Western waste in the East. This service was paid with Western currency and was thus since seen as advantageous also by the GDR.

Transport Systems

Already in the 1950s, the East Berlin buses and tram-lines stopped at the borders to the western sectors and vice versa. The transport companies were also divided between the two halves of the city in the 1950s. With the construction of the Wall, the S-Bahn (Urban railway) and U-Bahn (Underground) ceased to connect East and West. Those S- and U-Bahn lines that ran only in East or West continued their service as before. Those lines which started and ended in West Berlin could only be used by Westerners. They continued to run but did not stop in East Berlin (with the exception of Friedrichstraße, where Westerners with a visa could leave to visit East Berlin). More than ten “ghost train stations” existed – they were walled and inaccessible from the outside and completely unlit.

Berlin’s public transport system was most remarkably affected by the division. The decision was made by the allies in 1948 to split the transport companies between East and West. The East controlled the S-Bahn (light-railway), the West the U-Bahn (subway). The extension of the S-Bahn to the newly built housing estates in the Eastern outskirts of the city was then pushed forward by the East. The West focussed on the extension of the U-Bahn. The Eastern run S-Bahn was not considered a reliable means of transport for Westerners. The West Berliners experienced this for the first time during the blockade when the S-Bahn ceased operating in the West. Since the S-Bahn belonged to the Eastern German Reichsbahn, the public boycott of the use of the S-Bahn became popular in the West, in particular after 1961. The motive was that many Westerners did not want to support the East financially and, indirectly, the construction of the Wall. Therefore, the Western transport company started to run buses which operated in parallel to the traditional S-Bahn routes in the West. Most S-Bahn coaches consequently ran nearly empty during this period. An interesting insight into the **paradoxes of a divided city** is that the employees of the Eastern S-Bahn on the Western side were all West Berliners, most of them were members of the West Berlin section of the communist party. However, they were paid badly and could only get medical care in the East. It was finally in 1984, that the Western transport company took over the administration of the S-Bahn in the West and that they started to repair and modernise the S-Bahn infrastructure in the West.

Airports

The blockade of West Berlin made it necessary to supply West Berlin with coal, oil, food and other goods by an airlift. This made the opening or repair of several airports necessary. In the French sector, the Tegel-airport was opened; in the British and American sectors, Gatow and Tempelhof airport were expanded.

During the whole time of the quartering of Berlin until 1990, the sovereignty over the airspace was in the hands of the Allied Control Council. From 1945 until 1990, German air carriers were not allowed to fly over or land in Berlin. This sovereignty was exclusively reserved for air carriers from the four Allied powers.

It was already prior to the end of the Second World War that the allies agreed in principle on the division of Germany and Berlin into three and later four (including France) occupation zones. Already in 1944, the allies agreed on the modalities of entry of Western allies into the later Soviet controlled East of Germany. They agreed on the establishment of **three air corridors** as well as an allied air space security authority. No comparable agreements were made for street, railroad or sea-traffic – which became visible during the Blockade of 1948 and 1949, when airspace was the only regulated and secured entry into West Berlin. In this period the Western allies conducted more than 250,000 single airlift flights to West Berlin – every minute an aircraft landed in the cut-off part of the city. The GDR was gradually extending the Schönefeld Airport in the South-East of Berlin into a civil aviation airport.

Only after unification was air control handed over to German authorities. This persistence of pre-war allied rights over air control in Berlin had different reasons. Thus, it was a powerful symbol of the ongoing significance of the occupation status. It also allowed for the securing of independent access to West Berlin without the interference of the GDR. Most important, however, were military considerations. The strong military presence of the three Western allied powers was a highly significant outpost of the West – including espionage and air control – deep inside an Eastern controlled environment.

Culture

The bulk of cultural attractions were located in the Eastern parts of Berlin, such as the main museums, the state opera and the Humboldt University. Thus, after the division of the city, similar institutions had to be newly established in the West. Consequently, in the 1960s and 1970s, West Berlin saw huge public investments in the construction of cultural institutions such as the new opera house (Deutsche Oper), several theatres and the cultural forum (60s/70s) – these included praised architectural constructions, such as the Berlin Philharmonic Hall close to Potsdamer Platz, the Chamber Music Hall and the National Library, which were all designed by Hans Sharoun, as well as the New National Gallery, designed by architect Mies van de Rohe.

Apart from this technical and physical separation of East and West on many functional levels one also has to emphasise the effects which division had on the human level, i.e. by separating families and, more generally, by focussing on the psychological aspects stemming from the division of Berlin. Here, important differences come to the fore. Whereas in West Germany as a whole, the GDR and Berlin were considered far away and public interest and knowledge on the East was limited, this was different for West Berliners themselves who felt the impact of division in day-to-day affairs. This explains also the popularity and political importance of the allied presence in West Berlin without which West Berlin would presumably not have been able to sustain itself for more than four decades.

As this short discussion on the years of division in Berlin between 1945 and 1990 has shown, these years were characterised by an increasing separation between both parts of the city with only a few islands of functional cooperation remaining. What is interesting to note is that – notwithstanding the huge political, economic and social differences between the West and the East of Berlin – some structural similarities can be observed for the period of division. Thus, both cities functioned as **showcases to the other side** in the Cold War. This is reflected in the huge public investments and subsidies which were directed and, for example, in the architectural “competition” between East and West. Seen from this perspective, the Wall was not really able to divide the city but made the absurd twin-status more visible.

Overcoming Division

The Management of Transition and the New Order Since 1989

Fall of the Wall

The formal division of Berlin eroded quickly after the breakdown of the Communist regime in the GDR in 1989, when the Wall came down on 9 November. Unification of the city was an almost uncontested issue amongst Berliners, in East and West alike. Since 1989, a process of overall integration in the city of Berlin can be observed, primarily through an **integration of the East into the West**. Thus, most institutions of East Berlin ceased to exist in 1990 and were integrated into the traditional West Berlin institutional framework. However, the long period of division also left some areas of ongoing division intact, while the often contradictory historical experiences of East and West Berliners can still be observed in many political, economic and cultural borders which continue to divide the city, often in an invisible way. These islands of division notwithstanding, it should be emphasised that the East-West divide is today only one amongst many distinctions which characterise Berlin in the early 21st century. Often, the East-West divide is not even the overarching cleavage in the city. In a sense, Berlin has to get to terms with normality. It has become a **“normal” Western metropolis** which shares many of the opportunities and problems which are normal to big, Western capital cities.

The Political and Administrative Set-Up of Unified Berlin

Formally, Berlin is today a politically integrated city. Berlin is both a state within the German federation and a municipality. As a “Land” (state) of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin has its own constitution and its own parliament (“Abgeordnetenhaus” or Chamber of Deputies), as well as its own school and university system, police force and judiciary. As a municipality, Berlin is divided into twelve boroughs (“Bezirke”) and fulfils all the normal functions of a modern city. The status of Berlin as federal capital does not involve any special rights or obligations.

The Land Government and Land Parliament

Berlin's head of government (prime minister) is the Governing Mayor ("Regierender Bürgermeister"). The Governing Mayor represents Berlin externally – he is, for example, representing Berlin in the Bundesrat, the powerful first chamber of Land governments at the federal level – and determines the general guidelines of government policy. In his capacity as head of government, the Governing Mayor is closely bound by other state bodies. For instance, the guidelines of his policy require the approval of the Senate – the Berlin state government, which consists of the Governing Mayor himself and up to eight senators (ministers). They must also be approved by the Chamber of Deputies, which means that in Berlin the legislature has a direct influence on the work of the executive. This influence can also be seen in the fact that the Chamber of Deputies elects the Governing Mayor and, on his/her recommendation, the Senators. The Chamber of Deputies can withdraw its confidence from any of these Senators individually. Moreover, it actually decides on the number of Senators and even defines their areas of responsibility. Of course, the Chamber of Deputies also wields normal legislative power.

Within the constraints of the general guidelines of government policy, the Senators are autonomous in terms of the individual fields of responsibility assigned to them (Senate Administration). The Governing Mayor has the right to demand information on all aspects of official business to ensure that the government policy guidelines are being followed. If divergences of opinion arise, or upon application by the Governing Mayor, the Senate takes its decisions as a collegial body; in the event of an equality of votes, the Governing Mayor holds the decisive vote.

A number of authorities ("Landesoberbehörden" or higher state authorities), whose competences cover the entire territory of the city, are subordinate to the various Senate Administrations. These include, for instance, the police and the State Residents' Registration Office ("Landeseinwohneramt"), which also functions as the aliens' authority and is responsible for all issues regarding the legal status of non-German residents. Moreover, important services of public interest are provided on behalf of the state by independent administrative bodies or corporations.

Regional Cooperation

There is some official co-operation between the two federal states; Berlin and the state of Brandenburg, which surrounds Berlin. To avoid problems due to overlapping competencies and duplication of work, the two states have shaped their relationship in a series of bilateral treaties. An actual merger of the two states failed in May 1996, when in a referendum the population of Brandenburg rejected the merger, despite a positive vote in Berlin. The next referendum is planned for 2006 with the actual merger foreseen in 2009.

After the failure of the merger of Berlin and Brandenburg, the governments of both states agreed on major planning proposals in the Berlin-Brandenburg Planning Conference (PLAKO), which is convened and chaired by the Governing Mayor of Berlin and the Prime Minister of Brandenburg. The Regional Planning Council (RPR) is a forum for Berlin and Brandenburg's ministers and the regional chairs of Brandenburg's regional planning groups to discuss specific planning issues important for the whole metropolitan area.

The Boroughs

As mentioned above, Berlin is divided into twelve boroughs ("Bezirke"). After an administrative reform, which entered into force in 2002, one of these boroughs now comprises both former Eastern and Western parts of the city. The boroughs are non-independent administrative entities without a separate legal personality. The boroughs do *not* possess the legally enforceable right of municipal self-government which is normally guaranteed to municipalities under the terms of the Basic Law (the German constitution) – a right which is also enforceable vis-à-vis state governments – and gives them a comprehensive right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility. Even though the boroughs act on the principle of self-government when fulfilling their functions, they remain organizationally bound within the state and are administrative organs of the state of Berlin.

The boroughs' administrative structure is constituted on the model of the Magistrat's constitution. The system is dualistic in structure. Alongside an assembly of 55 elected borough representatives (the "Bezirksverord

netenversammlung” [BVV] or borough assembly of deputies), a collegial body composed of the borough mayor and several councillors runs the administration (a “Bezirksamt”, or borough authority, “Magistrat”). The borough authority is the administrative authority for the borough. It is a so-called “proportional-representation authority”. This means that the parliamentary parties are represented in the borough authority on the basis of their relative strength, i.e. following the system of proportional representation. The BVV elects the members of the borough authority and can remove them from office with a two-thirds majority. It furthermore monitors the administration of the borough.

The distribution of functions laid down in the state constitution usually provides for the execution of local administrative functions by the boroughs. In contrast, the Senate – through the different Senate Administrations (also referred to as “main administration”) – exercises the functions which affect the city as a whole. These include in particular managerial functions (planning; issues of fundamental importance; control; supervision), the administration of the police, judicial and tax systems as well as a few other functions which, due to their unique character, need to be exercised directly by the government. Individual functions can be delegated to the level of one borough. The distribution of functions is laid out in detail in the General Competence Act (“Allgemeines Zuständigkeitsgesetz” [AZG]) and, as far as public order functions are concerned, in the General Security and Order Act (Allgemeines Sicherheits- und Ordnungsgesetz” [ASOG]), each having their own catalogue of competences. Recently, the jurisdiction for the passport and citizens’ registration system was transferred to the boroughs. Functions newly created under federal law – unless otherwise provided for by subsequent legislation – normally come under the responsibility of the boroughs if they are exercised by municipal authorities in the rest of Germany.

Whenever the boroughs act in their own jurisdiction, they are bound by a number of regulations, primarily because they have almost no law-making power (an exception is building law). In legal terms, their actions are controlled by federal and state laws or by statutory instruments issued on the basis of such bi-laws (e.g. the Noise Protection Ordinance or the Market Ordinance). From an administrative point of view, they are also limited by principles and general administrative regulations imposed by the Senate, in particular implementation

regulations – in other words rules on how a law is to be implemented. The Senate is expected to limit its regulatory activity to essential matters and to coordinate its work with the boroughs

Role of the Federation

The Federal Government cannot directly interfere with the political or planning decisions of the city, however, it gives some funds to the city due to its status as the German capital city; for instance the Government contributed 64 percent of the overall costs for the development of the governmental and parliamentary facilities in the Spreebogen area. Moreover, the Federal Government and the State of Berlin concluded a treaty which stipulates that the city receives some further 500 million euros for the rebuilding of the capital city's infrastructure. Most of the funds were invested in the restructuring and modernisation of the Berlin railway and public transport network. The Government also subsidises Berlin's universities, the economic sector and cultural facilities such as the Jewish Museum, the Topography of Terror, the national opera houses etc. Since the city has a higher expenditure in the security sector than other German cities, it receives some further 90 million euros from the Government.

Prevalence of Political Differences

Notwithstanding these examples of far-reaching **political and administrative integration**, a separation between East and West can still be detected on the political level, e.g. with regard to the structure of the party system and voting patterns in East and West. Thus, in former East Berlin the post-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) – successor party to the former Communist State Party in the GDR – still receives a considerable share of the vote (around 25 percent in the East), while Westerners by and large oscillate between the two traditional West German *Volksparteien*, the conservative CDU and the Social-Democratic Party (SPD) and, increasingly, the Green Party. In the last elections in the Land of Berlin in the year 2000, the PDS became the second strongest party, after the social democrats. Following these elections, both parties decided to form a coalition and since then form the current government of Berlin. The reasons for this success of the PDS are quite interesting from an East-West per-

spective. Thus, the PDS is the only party in Germany that has a majority of East German members and politicians. Many people thus regard the PDS as the most credible representative of “East German interests”. This is even more so the case in Berlin, which has traditionally been the “red” city of Germany. In contrast to the situation in West Berlin and Western Germany, only few East Berliners and East Germans regard the social democrats as representing such a leftist or Eastern agenda.

While not neglecting these differences between East and West much equalisation has materialised in the course of the last 14 years. However, the symbolic dimension of reunification remains somewhat underestimated. Many decisions rather reflected post-revolutionary symbolism than a real effort to take both Western and Eastern experiences seriously. As will be further outlined below, dozens of streets in the East were renamed, some important monuments demolished. The case of the Palace of the Republic – the former parliament of the GDR – is currently virulent among Berliners – and dividing lines largely overlap the East and West division, with many West Berliners supporting the demolition of this building – a step which is opposed by many East Berliners, even those who do not associate any socialist nostalgia with the Palace.

Economic and Social Affairs

Since unification, Berlin has undergone a **radical transformation of its economic structures**. There has been a huge decline in the industrial sector in both parts of the city, and Berlin lost half of its industrial workers. About 100 medium and large-scale companies moved out of the city to establish their businesses in the hinterland, since production costs are lower there than in the city itself. The breakdown of the Eastern industrial sector was mainly due to the bad standards of these plants in Western comparison, and the fact that the traditional sales’ markets in Eastern Europe had broken away with the demise of the Comecon market.

The private service sector was traditionally underdeveloped in both parts of the city. More than half of the people working in the service sector are still employed in offices of public administrations or facilities.

Today, Berlin has some 162,500 jobs in the industrial sector, but this figure

will continue to decrease. To compensate the loss in jobs, the city has created seven million square metres of office space and 1.2 million square metres sales' space for the retail sector. To extend its activities on the private market, Berlin has focused on the media and film industry, on new technologies, research and development, tourism, and on the trade mainly with central and Eastern Europe. Berlin has meanwhile become one of the world's leading conference centres. The trade fair exhibition centre surrounding the Radio Mast (Funkturn) has expanded its exhibition area to 160,000 square metres.

Unification and Globalisation

The **costs of unification** were, however, high and arguably followed a problematic strategy. Thus, a lot of funds have been spent on the restructuring and the Senate did not take into consideration that the increasing debts would have to be repaid one day. The result is now that Berlin has an annual budget of 21 billion euros but annual revenue of only 17.5 billion euros. Eleven percent of the overall budget has to be spent on interest rates to pay back the debts which are amounting to currently 60 billion euros. This budgetary situation is very problematic since the necessary cuts are now considerably affecting the living conditions of Berlin's population.

Notwithstanding the differences between East and West in economic terms, both parts of the city have to face a similar challenge arising from decreasing state subsidies and increasing openness to the world market.

After 1989, Berlin lost its special status as a showcase in the frontline of the Cold War and since then has had to face the "normal" problems of Western capital cities in the age of globalisation. This global map changed towards a growing economic functional integration of most parts of the world in a world wide economic net. As a consequence, Berlin's opportunities and limits of development are increasingly determined by the rules and conditions dominating the global economic map. When seen from this perspective, cities such as Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich or Stuttgart are at an advantage to Berlin, since they have been exposed longer to the effects of globalisation than Berlin has.

The **globalisation** – defined as growing interdependence of local, regional, national and global conditions – is framing the national and regional policy trying to steer the unification and development of Berlin. It is a tightrope walk among the satisfaction of local needs and the adaptation to globalisation. Adaptation to global conditions and the issue of international competitiveness are dominating regional politics more and more, with one of the most visible effects being the reduction of welfare policies. Thus, the process of unification of Berlin (and Germany), which remains in national control, has from the outset been limited by globalisation – and not only on the economic level. For example, although the government and other public institutions were transferred from Bonn to Berlin, the main German private companies kept their headquarters in West German cities. Berlin could not attract this established system of economic functions but tried to find economic niches with rather new contributions (culture as well as new technologies, such as biotechnology). But those new contributions do not compensate for the loss of employment in Berlin which was a result of de-industrialisation and other effects of adaptation to globalised economic function-sharing after unification. The above mentioned tightrope walk of national and regional policy becomes more and more unable to include in society those people who lost their jobs and were deprived of their social status. By German standards Berlin – West and East alike – is the **capital of poverty**. The city has a higher ratio of people living in poverty (12.8 percent, approximately 435,000 residents) than the country as a whole (around 10 percent). When compared to Germany as whole, over double the percentage of Berlin's residents receive public assistance (7.3 percent). The Berlin median income (1,090 euros) is 150 euros below the German average.

‘Economic equality instantly’, was what most East Germans expected. They believed West Germany to be so rich that it would be possible to offer the same standard of living to everybody right away. So an enormous amount of money was poured into East Germany to meet peoples’ expectations. Not mentioning the money Germany paid to the Soviet Union to make sure that the 500,000 Russian soldiers would leave the country.

Employment and Economic Performance: Old and New

The unification of Germany and the relocation of the capital function from Bonn to Berlin have had mixed results for employment and economic development. Contrary to the optimistic prognoses for economic growth in Berlin following unification, actual performances have been below average when compared with national figures. Between 1991 and 1998, the German GDP grew by 11.7 percent while the GDP of Berlin grew by only 6.4 percent. With approximately 20,000 Euros for the year 2000, the Berlin's GDP per capita is situated in position eight out of the sixteen German Länder. The total GDP represented only 3.7 percent (72.7 million euros) of the national figure in 2001. More than 250,000 jobs have been lost since 1990. Today, Industrial jobs represent today only 12.7 percent of the overall employment figure (compared with the national average of 24.8 percent).

Most of the East Berlin manufacturing facilities were not able to survive after unification, especially not the currency union with the West. Because of the competitive weaknesses of the East Berlin industries stemming from outmoded technology and low productivity, the East Berlin industrial sector had to be completely rebuilt. These structural deficiencies led to an almost complete collapse of industrial production, which was aggravated by the loss of the Eastern European markets without corresponding openings in Western German markets. In West Berlin, industry initially benefited from unification. However, since 1992, West Berlin's industry has also mostly experienced recession. The high percentage of supply and processing industries, the low percentage of skilled labour and the lack of interaction with the hinterland prevented efficient adaptation to the new context. Besides, the West Berlin manufacturing industry was controlled mainly by firms based elsewhere in West Germany, with production geared to supply other factories or mass-produce standardised goods with little added value. Raw materials and semi-finished goods were transported at cost from West Germany to Berlin where facilities easily benefited from direct subsidies and fiscal incentives – however, this special status came to an end after 1990.

Fourteen years after unification, the structure of the Berlin economy has thus deeply changed. Industry declined, while the service sector has considerably expanded. In 1991, 72 percent of all employed persons were working in the

service sector and by 1999 the proportion was around 80 percent. But efforts to sustain the service sector are still not sufficient to offset the negative consequences of the sharp drop in manufacturing activities.

The “cultural economy” is nonetheless a strong and growing Berlin asset (Opera and Theatre, film and TV production, press and publishing), enhanced by clusters of smaller firms (graphic arts, new media conception, art galleries) working as partners to the main public and private actors in the sector. Berlin is Germany’s main tourist destination and in 2003 counted 11.3 million overnight stays. After London, Paris and Rome, Berlin thus ranks fourth in a European comparison.

In the field of R&D-intensive industries, Berlin clearly lags behind other German cities such as Munich, Hamburg and Frankfurt. The capital city can only boast a fair position in instrumentation technology and telecommunications but it is last in data processing and equipment, aviation, automobile industry, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. The capital city function led to the expectation that influential national and international companies would relocate their headquarters or European operations in Berlin. Many of these have been lost to other major German cities during the period of division of the country. Even though a certain number have (re-)settled in Berlin (former DEBIS, software branch of Daimler-Chrysler, Sony Europe, Coca-Cola Germany), the large companies located in Berlin are, to a great extent, controlled from head offices in other places, where decisions on investment, job cuts and dissolution or sale are made. Of the 265 companies based in Berlin, 147 are controlled externally. This position, whereby the decision-making power of major companies is located elsewhere, does not put Berlin at par with other European capital cities such as Paris or London.

There is a bi-polar trend towards a concentration of business-related services in the Berlin City centre, spread over two areas, these being Mitte (Centre and East) and to some extent Prenzlauer Berg, which are both part of former East Berlin, on one hand, and to the West (Charlottenburg, Wilmersdorf but also Zehlendorf), on the other. Business consulting, market research and advertising are located in both of these larger business districts but a higher concentration is visible in the West.

Cultural economy activities exist in both parts of the city. Film production is, however, primarily located in the Western part of the city (Wilmersdorf, Schöneberg) and in one Eastern area (Prenzlauer Berg). The Eastern part of the city centre (Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, but also Friedrichshain) has in comparison a greater density and heterogeneity of cultural productions, with a relatively strong informal cultural sector. Overall, East Berlin has a higher proportion of people working in the culture and the media sectors, the property sector, guard and security services, whereas in West Berlin there are a higher proportion of employees in advertising and exhibition-related activities.

As mentioned before, Berlin has emerged as a significant centre of tourism. 90 percent of guest arrivals and overnight stays since unification stem from EU citizens. The capital city's well-established reputation as an international conference and trade fair centre, offering adequate facilities, contributes significantly to these figures. This boom translated into significant build-up of hotel capacity, particularly in East Berlin, resulting in intense price pressure because of increased competition. In spite of this, turnover increased again in 1999, after a slump since 1995, with employment reaching 95.9 percent of that year's rate. The restaurant industry did not recover as well. Turnover in 1999 was at 79.6 percent of the 1995 level and employment at 77 percent of that year's figure.

Berlin has also to some extent been successful in turning into a centre of research. The city is becoming more and more a "city of transit" for youngsters and students from East and West Germany and Europe at large, but also from other continents. The paradox lies in the fact that Berlin is not able to retain a significant proportion of these young innovative people for lack of career perspectives due to the sluggish economic development since unification.

Urban Planning and Housing

Spatial planning on the federal level formulates general objectives for plans and legislation affecting the use of land. On the basis of a federal frame law, the Länder develops a Land Use Plan of their own, which is a generalised development plan for the whole area of an authority – in this case of Berlin. An intensive public participation with two phases is compulsory and these phases are legally

binding for all local authorities and public bodies. Sectoral development plans (STEP) deal with some key aspects of the spatial development of the city (housing, industry, transport etc.) These plans define planning objectives, measures and the priorities of their implementation; they form the framework for subsequent levels of planning. Local development plans (B-Plan) contain legally binding statements on permitted land uses and building densities; they separate future building land from areas for public use and determine which parts of the area could be used for construction. These plans are prepared for relatively small areas, e.g. a block of buildings or a project area (e.g. Potsdamer Platz). The responsibility lies within the borough administration. In exceptional cases, if the area is of overall importance for the city, it is worked out and defined by the Senate Department of Urban Development. The legal basis is the federal planning legislation together with a local implementation act. The public is involved by means of early public participation procedures and public display of the draft plan in the borough town halls or the Senate administration. The draft plans are published in all the major newspapers of Berlin.

After unification, there was an assumed lack in housing and the first draft of the Land Use Plan made provisions for 400,000 new housing units. Some 150,000 units have in the meanwhile been built. Against some expert studies from the early 1990s who had estimated an increase in population of up to one million until 2010, Berlin's population did not grow. Thus, the city now has an offer of flats exceeding the demand. Of a stock of 1.8 million flats, 160,000 are vacant, mainly in the large housing estates in the north eastern part and in the old districts where the housing standard is still very low (no central heating, no bathrooms inside the apartments etc.). Within the next few years, about 5,000 of the pre-fabricated housing units will be demolished. Berlin is a city of tenants. Only 11 percent are owners of the flat or house they live in. A **process of segregation** started in the last years. The capital functions attract wealthier people, who prefer the better housing areas, with rising prices in these areas being the result. The segment of the housing market with badly equipped but cheap flats is constantly shrinking, which exacerbates the situation for the poor.

In the early 1990s five areas which needed urban regeneration were defined as urban development areas. Due to the difficult economic situation of the city,

their development is not satisfactory. Thus, the Berlin Senate has recently decided to relieve the status earlier than originally planned and to cut the funds for the areas. The same will happen to the areas of “careful urban regeneration” since most of them are almost completed. However, the far reaching protection schemes for tenants are threatened with the cancellation of the program in the areas. Berlin has local law protecting historical buildings; there is a list comprising 8,000 buildings, parks, streets, bridges etc., which belong to different protection categories.

There was the attempt, in the 1990s, to rebuild the whole infrastructure in quite a short period of time and to repair the destroyed urban fabric. However, the balance sheet is mixed. Many have thought for too long that there will be an economic boom due to Berlin’s geopolitical situation and its new status as the capital city. This was a mistake since decision-makers have not concentrated on finding new economic sectors for Berlin in the first few years after unification but have thought to some extent that prosperity would come by itself.

Transport

Berlin has important competencies and instruments for shaping traffic development. Federal law, however, sets a general framework, for example, in the case of road traffic law. As mentioned above, Berlin’s railroad network consists of trams, underground lines (U-Bahn), suburban railways (S-Bahn), and regional railways with a total length of 732 km. With reunification of Berlin, the “ghost train stations” of the U-Bahn in the East of Berlin could be reopened and easily be reused. Also the interrupted S- and U-Bahn connections could be merged again. The road network encompasses 5,317 km. The modal split for the entire city is as follows: 22 percent of the routes are on foot, ten percent by bicycle, 28 percent by public transport, and 40 percent by car. The degree of motorization in Berlin is at about 330 private cars per 1,000 inhabitants, which is considerably lower than in all other German cities. Nearly 50 percent of all households in Berlin do not own a car. Approximately 73 percent of all households possess at least one bicycle. In 2002, about 14,000 million km were travelled by car. About 300,000 people suffer from traffic noise of more than 65 dB (A) at night.

The new central station (Hauptbahnhof / Lehrter Bahnhof), close to the

Reichstag, will be opened in 2006. It is the first railway junction of the city. Berlin currently has three airports of which the inner-city airport Tempelhof will probably be closed down in the coming years. Tegel will become the governmental airport, and Schönefeld in an area south of Berlin will become the new international airport by 2011.

Cultural Affairs

An important challenge in the reunified Germany is to **find a common understanding of the past**. Meanings attached to monuments, buildings and other objects imply a statement about the past. Because they are symbols and repositories of the past, which can be interpreted differently, the dealing with symbolic objects and places has turned out to be a contentious issue. Therefore, some of the leftovers from other regimes, not least the era of National-Socialism, were fiercely disputed. Despite the absolute majority of Eastern Germans backing the unification, many did not agree with dismantling the socialist symbols and dealing with other relics from the past. Some perceived the preservation, and others the dismantling of a monument or building, as a provocation.

The Symbolic Landscape

It is remarkable that as opposed to the processes in other formerly socialist countries, in East Berlin all of the decisions were administratively led and executed; there is no prominent case of spontaneous citizen-action against monuments or symbolically charged objects. Presumably, the possibilities to tear down or pick pieces from the Wall diverted many of the aggressions towards the other leftovers of the system. What could be observed later on was an opposite trend, when people actually defended monuments and buildings against demolition, thereby provoking severe conflicts with authorities.

Symbolic unification on a very general level, such as represented for the case of dealing with “symbols” of the past, has succeeded in that it has become increasingly difficult to categorise the symbolic landscape and the interpretation of symbols in the population on the basis of an East-West divide. It reached wide consensus among the population of the city over time. The determinants are

different from case to case, but leadership and time can be decisive factors for the fate of a symbol. The earlier a decision is taken, the more radical it can be. The “window of opportunity” after a revolution gets smaller over time and with an increasing number of actors involved. In the case of Berlin, there has been a tendency to overlook minority opinions and to use the chance of historical moments where rules are unclear or are not established yet. Those top-down decisions are more likely to produce the intended effect (e.g. the Neue Wache where former Chancellor Helmut Kohl objected any opposition to his own plans) but can be counterproductive if they turn into high-handedness (e.g. the Lenin-monument whose demolition was ordered before a commission of experts was established). The determinants of the content of a symbolically charged object cannot be anticipated in their totality nor can they be generalised (see further below on the Palace of the Republic, which is still there even though demolition has been foreseen for years).

Monuments

The Lenin-monument is a prominent example of the absence of citizen action and a politically steered dismantlement. The conflicts about leaving or demolishing it did not take place between Easterners and Westerners but rather between politicians and the citizens – from both parts of the city. However, during the months of discussion, the monument developed from an honouring memorial to being a sounding board for frustrations in the East about the symbolic unification. Eventually, after its demolition in 1992, Lenin and the monument have disappeared from the public discourse and from conflicts between East and West. Yet, the demolition was not a product of a farsighted and balanced decision-making process. Rather, it was a ritual of revolution initiated by conservative politicians of the CDU and carried out during a short period, in which a window of opportunity was open, and in which much of the GDR’s symbolic environment was modified and adapted to the symbolic system of the new regime. Recently even the question of putting the Berlin Wall on the list of the UNESCO world-cultural-heritage has been discussed in order to protect the few remaining parts of the wall, which still exist. The city has become aware of the uniqueness of its history and today uses it as a location factor. However, the

most impressive monument – Lenin – has been cut into 129 pieces and buried in a forest. Its reconstruction is impossible.

The Neue Wache also changed meaning: from being the memorial to the “victims of fascism and militarism” it turned into the central memorial to the “victims of war and dictatorship”. The GDR had put the cornerstone to the reconciliation “above the graves”. The problematic aspect of the memorial by not naming perpetrators (but calling everybody a victim) is continuing. The decision-making process that was pushed forward by former chancellor Helmut Kohl, eventually produced a unified symbol between East and West. The new Holocaust memorial, which opened in May 2005, is a powerful reminder that united Germany is not forgetting its past and is also openly confronting the dark moments of its history.

Revival of the GDR?

Because of the extensive clearance of the traces of the GDR (concerning the way society was structured, products in the stores, and the symbolic landscape), East Berlin lately experienced a booming revival of the GDR, in a sense symbols of the GDR are a fashionable product. GDR-style furniture, dishes, cloths have become a cult and so has buying food from former GDR-firms, the GDR has turned into a brand. A whole market for original or faked Eastern-products has been established and “GDR retro-shows” ran in several TV-channels. The Trabi is not a shabby car anymore; it is today being rented out for “safari tours” through Berlin. It is difficult to assess whether this trend reflects nostalgia for the East or is just a short-lived fashion which does not imply a political statement of support for the GDR. However, overly affirmative assessments of the realities in the GDR exist that have a tendency to neglect the anti-democratic and dictatorial nature of the regime and give very scattered euphemistic impressions of the past by overemphasising the positive, warm aspects of the GDR-society, which some quite appropriately called a “welfare-dictatorship”.

Many of the political decisions on the socialist relics during the early post-revolutionary phase cannot be reversed. Yet today, with opinions having become more pluralistic, there is the chance to take more farsighted and less radical

decisions. This is facilitated as most socialist monuments ceased to have an ideological charge and today only stand as witnesses of the GDR-symbolism, as, for example, the huge Thälmann-monument in Prenzlauer Berg.

Leaving these monuments intact would be a concession to pluralism and a sign of trust that the society can deal with and learn from **contradictions in the symbolic landscape**. In the observed cases, decision-makers largely underestimated – or feared – the potential value of outdated symbols. Hitherto, the dealing with the symbols was not very courageous and preferred to erase traces than deliberately leaving them.

Attempting to homogenise the symbolic landscape carries three major risks: Firstly, trying to produce simplistic messages. By means of an oversimplification of historical facts, the question of individual responsibility and guilt is being avoided. Future generations need to be taught that history is a product of individual's behaviour and not of natural law.

Secondly, the removal of the uncomfortable legacies of the past threatens to leave vacuums which are replaced by nostalgia or provoke counter-reactions against the present system. Many pillars of the former life and environment were taken away from the GDR-society and were replaced by new ones. Therefore the old structures, institutions or buildings had no chance to openly compete against the newly adopted ones. This is precisely what happened in East Berlin, where few things are left to be compared and compete with the quality of the new.

Finally, the creation of a symbolic landscape by removing uncomfortable reminders tends to result in a loss of awareness about the ruptures in history. But precisely those ruptures have to be faced in order to learn from history.

Common Places

Against the background of many eradicated symbols of the GDR, the case of the Palace of the Republic can be seen as a chance. It has been a contested symbol ever since: For critics of the GDR-regime it was a showcase of simulated unity between party and the people, for most average citizens it was accepted as a people's palace – a “socialist urban entertainment centre”. The Pal-

ace of the Republic is located at Schloßplatz, which was the historical centre of Berlin. Here, the East German government decided to build the Palace after blowing up the (war damaged) city castle in 1951. The debate about the future of this place has been ongoing since unification. One of the first proposals was to re-erect the old castle – a vision that caused a serious conflict between East and West, as most East Berliners had a quite positive relation to the Palace of the Republic. For some, the re-erection of the castle became associated with the Western attempt to wipe out forty years of East German history, experience and memory. An international competition for the future of the Schloßplatz proposed in 1993 the creation of a “democratic forum” in the centre of the city, a meeting point for all Berliners and visitors and a place of cultural activity.

The two most successful proposals in this competition had differing visions for the future of the Palace. One proposed to build a cultural centre, the other to transform the area into a huge park including cultural and leisure facilities. The Schloßplatz-commission (a board that comprised politicians from the Federal and the Land level as well as scientists) favoured the first proposal. They argued that a park would be inappropriate to the Schloßplatz’s high symbolic value. In the end, this commission proposed to build a new Schlossplatz including the following elements:

- International museums collections coming from the foundation Preußischer Kulturbesitz, the scientific collections of Humboldt-university and other museums from Berlin (including those in Dahlem).
- A newly established scientific collection of Humboldt-University as a place of research and science.
- A central public library, constructed in cooperation with existing libraries in Berlin and their facilities to create a media centre.
- A forum of cultural and leisure activities for public and private users.

Most experts but also common Berliners (represented by the borough-initiative Spreeinsel) supported the commission’s proposal. However, the majority of the Bundestag was not willing to drop the idea to reconstruct the old castle, at least to rebuild the castle’s facade. The federal parliament insisted that any proposal would have to include the reconstruction of the castle’s facade – thereby not excluding the option that support by private money could accelerate pro-

ceedings. Yet nothing happened until today. Since the City of Berlin is highly indebted, there is simply not enough money to start an architectural competition for the Schloßplatz.

Yet, the city's government upholds the vision of a public space in the Schloßplatz-area, thereby fostering the idea of commonality. Recently, this public image of the area was advanced, when the Palace of the Republic was subject to "*Zwischennutzung*" (interim use of the palace), a concept that was developed by young architects and town planners from East and West Berlin. Their idea was to use the interior of the Palace of Republic for cultural events. In that way, Berlin would have a new and unique place that connects past with present and is open to all. Notwithstanding the tremendous success the *Zwischennutzung* had amongst Berliners, the concept still evokes distrust to many politicians who refused to finance the concept for more than a short period of time.

Apart from the issue of the reconstruction of the city-castle, the conflict about the dealing with the palace also had an East-West dimension, which today is however reduced. While most of the early initiatives to preserve the palace were established and composed of Easterners and often reflected nostalgia of the GDR, the interim use was a product of mostly young Westerners and Easterners alike. The *Zwischennutzung* of the palace could have the positive side-effect to make up for some of the radical decisions against leftovers from socialism.

There are also **new symbolic places of post-unification** unity between East and West. For example, the newly erected Potsdamer Platz, the historic core of the city (Unter den Linden between Brandenburg Gate until Berliner Dom), and the part of Friedrichstraße which belongs to the former East, can really be called common places. Other common places include public parks, such as Friedrichshain, Tiergarten, Volkspark Friedrichshain. Other common places are theatres and museums – not necessarily newly built ones. The Volksbühne, an East German theatre house – with the thought-provoking word OST (EAST) on top of the roof – has become the central stage for modern theatre, thereby attracting people from all parts of Berlin and Germany. Finally, there are the three universities in Berlin, in which East and West Germans and a high number of foreigners study jointly. Seen from that perspective, there are indeed many places

in Berlin which are today common to East and West. They provide activities for both sides alike and are used by both.

Some areas within the Eastern district of Prenzlauer Berg are also “common”. Here, the housing stock is attractive to students, young urban professionals and young families from East and West, residents from Germany and other countries alike. In much of the rest of Berlin (and especially among the older parts of the population) the “wall in the feet” formula still applies – a reluctance to physically integrate the other part of the city into one’s activity-spaces.

Notwithstanding this existence of shared spaces, today, Berlin still has many places that are considered to be West (Kurfürstendamm, Schöneberg) or East (Alexanderplatz, high-rise-district of Marzahn) or, as a matter of fact, Turkish (parts of Kreuzberg). Thus, 15 years after unification, there are only a few places that “belong” to all. As has been mentioned above, one of them is said to be Potsdamer Platz, the re-erected city centre that was, prior to the Second World War, the urban junction of the whole city. Today, this area is mainly a place of banks and shopping malls. Hence, from a social perspective, the common ground – defined as a place of equal access to everybody – is very small. It is hence hardly surprising that the future of Potsdamer Platz was a matter of hot public dispute right after unification. The land sale to private companies was one of the most critical points in this debate, for its emphasis on fostering consumption was regarded by many as socially exclusionary. Responding to this critique, architects and owners made the building process accessible to all. By installing a small exhibition hall, the so called “Red Info Box”, which was at the same time an observation platform of the entire construction ground, Berliners and tourists could visit the construction site. Today, Potsdamer Platz has become a huge modern shopping area that is visited by all groups of Berliners and tourists, and in this sense has become “common” – while at the same time remaining an “external area” because it is a place with little connection to everyday life of citizens. Hence, as is the case in Friedrichstraße and Unter den Linden, Potsdamer Platz is at the same time “common” to Berliners but rather unrepresentative for Berlin. First, these areas are more often visited by tourists rather than by Berliners, secondly, all these areas remain somewhat detached from the manifold social problems, which affect the city of Berlin today.

Renaming of Streets After 1990

As was the case for monuments, immediately after unification, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate began to deal with the issue of how to deal with other left-overs of the GDR regime. The renaming of streets has in this period been a prominent issue and has led to conflicts between political parties, within the public and the media. Since this period coincided with the move of the German government from Bonn to Berlin, this issue soon developed a national dimension.

Following the laws in Berlin on the naming of streets, this is exclusively an issue of borough responsibility. But this general provision has been replaced after 1990 in order to ensure a more centralised approach to dealing with contested street names. According to the policy guidelines of the Senate, “all those street names from the years 1945 to 1989, which have named with reference to active opponents of democracy and ideological-political founding fathers and supporters of Stalinist policies in the GDR-regime and other communist regimes” should be removed. It was the goal of this Berlin-wide regulation, to ensure the consistent application of rules on renaming of streets in all Eastern boroughs. At the same time, the Senate had the competencies to intervene, if boroughs would not act in time.

Renaming of streets was a thin line. On the one hand, it could easily be interpreted as a manifestation of political interests and power, on the other hand, its objective was to ensure integration rather than division of the city. Street names are often of great symbolical significance, particularly when they refer to historical events and persons. The debate over the renaming of streets has had a double effect. First, it triggered considerable political conflict and polarisation; secondly, it forced those involved to seriously engage in political interaction on new symbolic orientations in united Berlin.

The history of street names in Berlin dates back to the Prussian period in the early 19th century, when street names were for the first time introduced. These traditional street names endured for a long time and have not been subject to alteration after regime changes, such as the establishment of the German Reich in 1871 or the democratic revolution in 1918. In the Weimar Republic it was

only the former Königsplatz (King's Square) in front of the Reichstag which was renamed into Platz der Republik.

It was under National Socialism since 1933 that many streets in Berlin were renamed. Thus, the names of Jewish and leftist politicians, scientists and artists were removed and streets were often renamed with the names of what the Nazi's considered "German heroes".

After the liberation of Berlin in 1945, the allies decreed the renaming of those street names which were associated with the Nazi regime. This was an uncontested issue also for the bulk of the Berlin population and was supported by the city's administration. Also many streets which had a reference to the monarchic or militaristic past of Germany and Prussia were renamed. Thus, in 1947, already 40 streets had been renamed.

The Cold War, however, soon left a mark on the issue of street names in Berlin, with quite divergent developments in the East and West of the city. Thus, prior to 1989, streets in the East were often named with reference to anti-fascist or communist figure-heads, usually without consultation of those people living in those streets. Examples are the renaming of Weißenseer Weg (reference to a borough) into Ho-chi-Minh-Straße or Rüdersdorfer Straße (reference to an area) into Babeufstraße (reference to a French socialist revolutionist of the 18th century).

A somewhat different development can be observed in the West. Also in the West there was the general policy to rename streets with reference to anti-fascists but the number of such streets was smaller than in the East. In the West, however, there was greater recourse to names which related to the 19th and 20th century democratic and liberal tradition of Germany.

It was then unification which triggered a new wave in the history of renaming streets in Berlin. In the immediate aftermath of unification, several street signs, memorials and monuments in the East, which had a reference to the communist past and the GDR-regime were demolished or besmeared by spontaneous action. With the immediate reaction of authorities to establish a commission dealing with the contested issue of renaming and the call for wide public partici-

pation in this process, this discontent was successfully channelled into a more peaceful alley.

Political discussions on the renaming of streets were conducted both in the Berlin Chamber of Deputies as well as the borough parliaments and borough administrations. As mentioned before, the Berlin Senate issued a special piece of legislation which ensured that in contrast to usual practice, the renaming of streets in the context of unification was subject to the overall Senate authority and was not exclusively delegated to the borough level.

The positions of the different parliamentary parties on the renaming of streets were quite diverse. The PDS, successor party to the former ruling party of the GDR, argued against the centralisation of decision-making and argued that competences should reside with the borough level. Moreover, the PDS argued that the renaming of streets is problematic in that it could hurt the feelings of many East Berliners. The PDS favoured wide public participation and also demanded that many West Berlin streets – which had reference to militaristic or nationalistic figures – should equally be renamed. In stark contrast to the PDS, the conservative CDU argued clearly that all streets with reference to the GDR regime should immediately be renamed and that the Senate should have overall responsibility for this process. The liberal FDP made many proposals for renaming and suggested in particular names from democratic figure-heads during the Weimar Republic. The FDP also was supportive of the centralisation in the decision-making in the Berlin Senate. The social-democratic SPD, and the alternative party Alliance90/The Greens, tended to favour overall borough responsibility for renaming of streets. Only in exceptional cases should the Senate decide and this only after an independent commission of wise men and women had made a proposal on contested cases. While the Greens supported both an additional referendum of inhabitants of affected streets in the East as well as a renaming of streets also in the West, this was not supported by the SPD. The positions of these parties were mainly consistent both at the level of the Land parliament and the various borough parliaments.

From the perspective of the Senate, the renaming of streets had an additional dimension which resulted from the centrality of Berlin as German capital. Thus,

many street names in the new governmental centre, Mitte, located in former East Berlin, were referring to communist leaders. However, it was problematic to leave this to the borough council of Mitte, which was dominated by the PDS party. The Senate consequently argued that the renaming of streets in Mitte was not just an issue of concern to inhabitants of this area but to all Berliners and, indeed, to the entire German population.

The borough assembly of Mitte set up an independent commission, which included members of the assembly, historians, representatives of civil society institutions and others. This commission formulated some key principles for renaming, these being a preference for renaming instead of a new name, no renaming if the street has been named after an anti-fascist or victim of National Socialism, and specific regulations for those streets which had been separated by the Wall.

All these proposals by the commission were decided by the borough with the absolute majority of votes. While most renaming was made consensually, some triggered unexpected resistance, such as the Otto-Grotewohl-Straße, the Wilhelm-Pieck-Straße as well as Clara-Zetkin-Straße. A coalition of PDS and Greens opposed renaming, however, for different reasons. Some opposed the renaming due to the problematic historical legacy of the old street name (Wilhelmstraße) while others referred to the alleged positive historical role of socialist leaders such as (Wilhelm-Pieck und Clara Zetkin). As far as the Otto-Grotewohl-Straße was concerned, this led to the curiosity that the majority of the assembly decided to rename this street into Toleranzstraße (Tolerance Street). A court ruling against this street name led to a considerable delay in the implementation of this decision. The assembly again dealt with the issue and since no agreement could be reached, the Berlin Senate ultimately took responsibility and decreed the renaming into Wilhelmstraße on 1 August 1993.

In order to apply an equal regime to all renaming processes, the Senator for Transport installed in 1993 an independent commission for renaming of streets in all Berlin. A list of 17 contested streets was drawn up, which had names of people who were very actively involved in the destruction of the Weimar Republic or the establishment of a communist regime after 1945. The work of the

commission was accompanied by public exhibitions on this issue in the local town halls. However, the commission soon ceased to work since it was highly critical that this list has been presented by the Senate and not drawn up by the commission itself. The commission also criticised that inhabitants of streets were not formally involved by the administration. However, in the end, some streets were renamed according to the initial proposals by the commission.

Memorial Boards After 1990

Many memorial boards, which have been installed in front of some houses in Berlin, refer to a building which no longer is the original building. Many houses haven been destroyed in the Second World War but the small bronze memorials commemorate a person who had lived, or an event which had happened, at this specific site.

The issue of historical memorial boards first gained prominence after the end of the war. The allies decreed that all memorial boards or monuments with a relation to the Nazi regime must be demolished. After unification in 1990 many memorial boards from the GDR period have been removed in spontaneous action and presumably are in private possession today – some people might have removed them for reasons others than nostalgia, because they used the opportunity to signal their opposition to the vanished GDR regime. For those GDR memorial boards which were not removed in 1989 and 1990, a special commission has been established in 1992 which had the task to propose comments about these memorial boards which allow the visitor to put them into historical perspective. There has even been a group which has installed copies of those memorial boards that had been stolen in 1989 or 1990.

On the initiative of public authorities some memorial boards were re-written in an attempt to commemorate in less ideological language than was the case for memorial boards from the GDR period. In West Berlin, prior to unification, there was a larger wave in the instalment of memorial boards from private initiatives as well as in the public project “Berlin memorial boards” at the 750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987. Memorial boards, manufactured by the Royal Prussian Porcelain Manufacture, were meant to make the historical heritage in the West

more visible. Proposals for memorial boards were made by the Historical Commission of Berlin, which issues specific criteria and guidelines. Proposals should in particular be made for persons and places which had a particular important role for the history of Brandenburg and Prussia and for German history in general. This programme has been extended to the East of Berlin after unification.

In addition to these kinds of memorial boards, also many memorial boards which commemorated resistance to the Nazi regime were established. In the borough of Kreuzberg a specific programme on this issue was established, with similar projects also running in Spandau and Schöneberg.

The Memorial Board of the Mitte Borough Assembly was framed alongside the pattern of the cross-party commission for the renaming of streets. The objective of this commission was to replace the memorial boards from the GDR-period in the borough of Mitte, which were often highly ideological in language. The first memorial board which was established was telling the history of Otto Weidt, living in Rosenthaler Straße 39, who saved the lives of Berlin Jews in his small factory for blind people – and whose history was not honoured during the GDR period. The second memorial board was dedicated to the protestors and victims of the popular uprising in the GDR of 17 June 1953, and is located at the Federal Ministry of Finance at Leipziger Straße/ Wilhelmstraße.

Until 2004, a total of 88 memorial boards have been established. They refer to famous – and less famous – people such as Ernst Gotzkowski, Rahel Levin Varnhagen or Alfred Brehm but also to less-known figures such as Lina Morgenstern, who opened the first public “soup-kitchen” in Berlin for the poor or Henriette Tiburtius, the first woman dentist in Berlin. Noteworthy are those 12 memorial boards which commemorate the location of barricades in Berlin during the democratic uprisings in 1848.

All memorial boards are financed through private initiatives, there is no public funding available. The Memorial Board Commission includes members of the borough assembly, historians and members of institutions, such museums, local history initiatives, the Association of Victims of National Socialism, community groups, Jewish organisations, trade unions, historical commissions of the SPD and the PDS and others. The commission accepts proposals from everybody and

its main task is to issue an opinion on such proposals, to provide for a historical annex and concrete texts for the memorial boards and to secure the financing.

The Long Shadow of History: Restitution

History has left its mark on Berlin on other dimensions, for example the issue of restitution of property. In order to deal with the complex restitution issues, which had to be dealt with after unification, several laws have been created, the most important being the Law for the Regulation of Open Property Questions (VermG). In Western Germany there has been, since the 1960s, a similar law on the restitution of unlawful expropriations during the Nazi-period. For the Nazi years, such expropriations have in particular affected those people and institutions which were defined as enemies of the regime, in particular Jewish Germans.

The aforementioned body of law dating from the post-unification period, which covers the area of the former GDR, has a wider temporal scope, for it additionally covers those expropriations which occurred in the lifetime of the GDR. This renders not only the mere numbers greater but also the legal matters more complex. Thus, several pieces of land have changed ownership on several occasions due to expropriations. It might be the case that the current owner has bought the piece of land legally, without knowing of the actually unlawful expropriations some decades ago. An incredible amount of single cases had to be studied in order to ensure that the laws apply to the myriads of possible restitution claims.

But it is not only the legal perspective that matters, because the restitution of property clearly has a political notion as well. For example, unification required the consent of the four allied powers and it remains subject to speculation, whether the Soviet Union insisted for its agreement to unification that expropriations, which occurred during Soviet military rule from 1945 to 1949, remain lawful. More important, however, are those mass expropriations during the land reform in the GDR. It has to be noted that the northern and north-eastern parts of the GDR were traditionally characterised by large, quasi-feudal ownership of land in the hands of few, mostly aristocratic persons. Through the land reform, these owners had been deprived of their land and it was accepted after unification that

this process could not be reversed. Whether this was related to a veto of the Soviet Union or carried the (silent) support of the West German authorities, remains subject to speculation.

What matters on the ground are the new legal stipulations. Today, basically everybody who has been subject to expropriations by force between 1933 and 1989 in the East can claim restitution of property. This applies to both legal and natural persons, as well as the previous owner and his or her descendants, independent of place of living or nationality.

In those cases in which a piece of land has on several occasions been subject to expropriation, the right to restitution applies to the first case of expropriation. All subsequent cases will be dealt with under a compensation regime, which also applies to those cases in which restitution is no longer possible. This is, for example, the case if a piece of land does no longer exist since the space today belongs to a street or a school.

A precondition for any decision is the existence of documents which prove the lawfulness of the claim. The proof of previous ownership is required for the entire period for which restitution is claimed. Analysis of such documents, e.g. of tax declarations, show whether expropriation was unlawful – i.e. the result of discriminatory and forceful policies – or whether it merely happened due to economic grievances of the previous owner.

This huge process of restitution of property required even the establishment of a specific agency dealing with restitution claims, namely the Office for the Regulation of Open Property Claims, which operated for more than ten years. Many claims were only settled by the courts. In retrospect the new body of law must, however, be assessed rather positively for it provided for a significant reduction of social tensions in the light of such a complex and politically and emotionally sensitive issue.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored in greater detail the management of transition in Berlin. The key issue which was dealt with throughout this chapter was the process of increasing division between 1945 and 1961, until the physical disruption

of connections between East and West Berlin, and the process of restoring the integrity of the city after 1989. What comes to the fore is the observation that, in both periods, elements of integration, cooperation and division can be observed, however, with important differences. The period of division was characterised by the increasing dominance of separation at most levels of life and this chapter has traced separation between East and West, which must be understood in the context of the Cold War, on various levels, such as the political, economic, social and cultural spheres. In this period only a few islands of cooperation were left intact – such as in the transport sector – or newly established – such was the case for the waste disposal area. It was in particular the building of the Wall in 1961 which set a sudden end to most personal interactions between Easterners and Westerners. While prior to the building of the Wall it was possible to travel from the East to the West and vice versa, this was no longer possible after 1961 – while since the 1970s it was only possible for Westerners to cross into East Berlin and the GDR.

The fall of the Wall in 1989 and unification in 1990 took Berlin, and indeed Germany, by surprise. There were no plans for unification in the shelves of bureaucrats, businessmen or politicians. It must be emphasised that on a formal level unification can on most levels be equated with the East joining the West, rather than the emergence of new structures. Thus, the new political and economic rules which applied to the whole city after 1990 were those of the West. As the majority of East Berliners wished to join the Federal Republic of Germany rather than establishing a new German state, opposition to the plans of unification was weak. On many levels, unification proceeded quite smoothly, and the formal adaptation to the West was dealt with quite successfully. Soon, the few islands of cooperation which existed prior to 1989 emerged from the sea and transformed into huge pieces of land – since 1990, Berlin, East and West alike, is characterised by the primacy of integration. However, this general perspective should not divert attention from the many problems which the city faces in the process of transition. While not all of these problems relate to the East West divide, some do and are powerful reminders that 40 years of separated development have left a few islands of division intact. This chapter has discussed some of these divergent trends in the city as well, such as the different

party systems which endure in the East and the West or the emotional scars and partially different historical memories which exist in the East – and other examples could be added.

This analysis reveals that the unification of Berlin is a process which is still under way. Cities are evolutionary beings and always subject to change, in that sense every city has to face the permanent management of transition. In the case of Berlin – a city which was physically divided for more than four decades – this is even more relevant. Many of the visible and less visible borders between East and West – on the political, economic, social, cultural and symbolic levels – which have developed between 1945 and 1989, still continue to shape the city despite the formal unification. While the huge majority of Berliners in the East and the West of the city view the integration of the city in generally positive terms, the management of transition of this formerly divided city will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future.




Figure 1. The Wall and its leftovers after 9 November 1989. Source: private photograph.



Figure 2. The Wall after 9 November 1989: A View from the West on the demolished Wall. Source: private photograph.

Reconstructing the Past

Fragmentary Analyses of Errors and Missed Opportunities in German Unification – Not Only from a Berlin Perspective

Edited and compiled by Team Berlin

Kristina Volke and
Holger Kuhle

Preface

“The people do not govern, they are governed. The people live far away from the citadels of power. The people do not operate the levers of the republic. The people do not make history. History happens to the people”, wrote East German journalist Christoph Dieckmann in the weekly paper *Freitag* in March 2004. His view of the German condition at the present was disillusioning – the bitterness with which he described the majority of Germans as passive, patient sufferers of an inscrutable, or even uncontrollable power in politics and industry was also based on the knowledge that the East German people at least had demonstrated precisely the very opposite not very long ago. They had in fact governed, they had indeed operated the levers of the republic: In the autumn of 1989 as they took to the streets with the rallying cry “We are the people!” in order to force the government to implement fundamental reforms in a desolate economic and repressive political system, to force it to grant civil rights and open up to the rest of the world.

The movement of 1989 found its symbolic climax in the storming of the Berlin Wall – which to a large extent stood as the visible sign of the Cold War that divided the city for decades and the irreconcilability of the two ideological camps – and ended with accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany, which many regarded as the reunification of two parts that belonged together in a single German nation. In the period between October 1989 and the resolution stating that there would in fact be unification, the East German people had won a freedom that history only rarely guarantees. This form of peaceful

toppling of the state bodies and the democratic self-organization at round tables were unique in German history and there will hardly be any doubt that history was written by the people in this case – for a short, but important instant.

Its end was virtually announced by the East German people themselves: The slogan “We are the people!” became “We are one people!”, and the demand to introduce freedom of travel, freedom of opinion and assembly and to organize genuine participation in the search to find a new civil society, reformed through one’s own strength, turned into the desire to introduce the free-market economy and the D-mark. It is not only today that this all too complacent surrender of the precious power to take one’s fate into one’s own hands can be recognized. Even then, it became clear that the change in the direction of the movement would also entail a change in the participants and driving forces. Logically enough, both the players and the rules of the game changed according to which the fate of the East German population was now managed at the highest political level. From then on unification was organized under conditions which no longer had anything to do with the revolutionary movement in autumn 1989. Even the demand of the civil rights activists and reformers to bring about the subsequently all-pervading unification with the West Germans on the basis of equality was thus doomed to failure. When the majority of East Germans gave their support to this aim, they became the “ungrateful” people for civil rights activists and those who participated in developing the conception of a third, alternative path.

In the meantime, 15 years have passed and the East Germans are being regarded as ungrateful for the second time– this time because they apparently failed to appreciate the transfer payments in the billions, West German know-how, rules and standards, and the personnel deployed to develop the East. The programme “Development of the East”, politically legitimized by all of the previous governments with just as much money as good will (we want to assume), is meanwhile regarded in many places, and for many East and West Germans alike, as having virtually failed. The manner in which the free-market economy was introduced resulted in a complete failure of one’s own economic capabilities and continuously rising mass unemployment (which even with its lowest values lags far behind the worst West German states) made entire regions hopelessly dependent on transfer payments – and this despite the expenditures with which modern infrastructure was developed, city centres rehabilitated and settlement of new businesses and industry were state-subsidized in enormous measure (and

except for few exceptions in vain).

In the meantime, Helmut Kohl, the so-called chancellor of unification, can be heard talking, for instance in autumn of last year at the marketplace in Straußberg, a centre of the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) near Berlin – apparently with some understanding now for the errors of unification – about the illusions and misjudgements: “Naturally I made mistakes as well”, he confessed, but “at that time one simply had a different perspective.” It was time for campaigning for the regional elections in Brandenburg; that is the only way to explain a confession that only until recently was equivalent to a betrayal of the grand vision of “flourishing landscapes.”

Although we have seen the beginnings of a critical retrospective of the past 15 years now and again, they remain without consequence at the political level. The dominant interpretation is that the only way to unification was the fast way. However, the obvious frustration and resignation of many East Germans is explained as the unfortunate, but inevitable trouble of a social learning process – which is regarded as the price for rapid reunification without an alternative. The degree to which the inertial forces of the West and its rules, instruments and procedures – resistant to every modernizing impulse from the East – have a share in the present malaise is not discussed in any detail. Scientific analyses on the errors and misjudgements since 1990 hardly find their way into public discourse. Not even by the Party of Democratic Socialism, the PDS, which is no longer represented at the federal level and which is perceived as the party of the East Germans, in particular as the party of the losers and which in any case is not regarded as a legitimate discussion partner for the German public as a whole when it comes to questions involving the German unification process.

What, however, prevents us from a critical review of the past 15 years? A lack of consciousness for the errors that have been committed? Weariness with those that are “constantly dissatisfied”? Is it a strict pragmatism that assumes that, on the whole, everything could only be carried out in this way or not at all? Or is it fear of questions regarding our fundamental constitution in Germany, and, once their discussion begins, uncontrolled transformation in the power of interpretation?

Whatever it may be, the public space for criticism has been very confined thus far. This is confirmed, among other things, in the case of the article by

Christoph Dieckmann, which was quoted in the introduction. The newspaper *Die Zeit*, where the journalist was employed as an editor, refused to print it. When he nevertheless had it printed in *Freitag*, another German weekly paper, his position as an editor was terminated. Officially the decision was justified with a violation of form. Needless to say, East Germans ask themselves how far can one go with public treatment of past mistakes in Germany without being called to reason?

The following text is the result of a workshop organized by the Berlin part of the Jerusalem Berlin Forum (JBF) at the Hermannswerder Conference Center in Potsdam in January 2004. The aim of the workshop was to expand the otherwise narrow scope for discussions about personal positions on the success and failures of the German-German unification process, and to make our debate about it and about the respective professional experience with the possibilities and limits to designing the unification process, more tangible to our colleagues in Jerusalem. It also concerned utopias and alternatives to the actual processes – each from an East and a West German perspective.

Thus we consciously departed from the scope of our contributions, which is otherwise oriented toward Berlin; but this was necessary in order to be able to provide the information repeatedly requested by our partners in Jerusalem. This is not the first attempt to communicate the conflicts and deficiencies of German unification – but it is a new one, the form of the discussion allows contradiction and agreement as well as divergence and convergence to become more easily visible than a series of individual scientific texts. It involves the initial result of work that touches upon the fields and lines of conflict, rather than trying to provide any exhaustive treatment. To a certain extent this provisional character also reflects the uncertainty as well as the inadequate knowledge about actual occurrences during the unification process, clarification of which every member of the Berlin group seeks to contribute based upon his or her specific professional background. Above all, however, it is an offer to the people of Jerusalem to be critical in their queries and to desire to know even more precisely.

We have highlighted in this chapter, through bold letters, specific key words, which are meant to offer the reader the possibility of quick orientation on the main issues dealt with here.

*Kristina Volke and Holger Kuhle
February, 2005*

A New Beginning After 1989: The End of West German Reform Movements in Favour of Conservative Values for “Secure” Development of the East?

Thomas Flierl

Looking back on German reunification in historical terms, the **drafting of institutions** onto East Germany was probably without a political alternative. Nevertheless, we must admit that a West German system which, in many instances was already in need of reform, was transferred to the East and that “**development**” of the East was only staged as a **reproduction of the West**. In many ways this build-up of the East is regarded today as having failed (economic stagnation, migration, a lack of prospects), or at least has to be fundamentally reconsidered. The reunification process chosen in the nineties resulted in a dramatic bottleneck in the reform process in Germany as a whole, the consequences of which concern us today. The unwillingness to analyze, modify and further develop the model, which was to be transferred before the backdrop of East German expectations and experience, and the dominant orientation toward preserving the prevailing **conservative hegemony**, succeeded in the end. It precluded the model of learning institutions just as much as any participation as such, and thus any transformation of the East German elite.

Andreas Wilke

In my opinion, the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had a government which was led by the CDU and FDP at the time of reunification and the legislative period thereafter should also be taken into consideration. This government worked toward liberalization of the economy. This process was, in my view, at least initially strengthened by accession of the former GDR. Several important discussions within the FRG were no longer addressed as a result of the reunification process or were at least removed from the focus of public interest. I see one of the causes of mutual criticism from ‘Easterners’ and ‘Westerners’ in the act of accession itself. The simple accession results, on the one hand, in the fact that the society of the FRG is regarded as exclusively that of the **old Federal Republic of Germany**, something which prevents identification and, in the long run, a feeling of joint responsibility for this situation and, on the other hand, external criticism always causes a tendency to close the ranks internally.

The old FRG was a society of many contrasts and a broad range of different views which now sees itself as often reduced to just one common denominator. Several of the discussions which were necessary for the society of the FRG, were interrupted by the reunification process and have now emerged as presumably East-West discussions.

Holger Kuhle

With regard to a series of decisions which were carried out after reunification East and West Germany, one must unfortunately state today that they – possibly other than originally intended – have instead obstructed rather than promoted development in what was former East Germany since 1990. Our problem is that they in effect make prospects for future development even more difficult. Allow me to recount some of these decisions: First of all, the way in which the Deutsche Mark was introduced into the GDR, i.e. the decision to exchange the balance on **private accounts**, if I remember correctly, up to an amount of 4,000 Marks (for pensioners 6,000 Marks) at a **rate of exchange** of 1:1 for DDR Marks into the Deutsche Mark and all amounts above and beyond that at a rate of exchange of 2:1. This practice had far-reaching consequences for the companies and enterprises of the GDR and thus for the economic basis of the various East German regions. With one stroke this conversion and thus equalization with the D-mark transformed their commitments, debts and/or loans and exchanged them at a ratio of 2:1. Thus they lost their significant **competitive advantage**. Since the enterprises now had to suddenly cover for their expenditures in accordance with this new relationship, the rate of exchange of 1:6 which had been valid up to then for sales and payment transactions with Eastern European or even Western European and West German customers could no longer be maintained. Inevitably, the price of the products manufactured by these enterprises had to be increased, the difference in cost compared with – predominantly higher quality West German – competitor products was abolished overnight. As a result of this decision the economy of the GDR was directly exposed to both the **competing** West German economy – the third strongest in the world based on its aggregate value added – and the global market. Even those enterprises which co-operated with the West German market prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall by supplying, among other things, all of the West German mail order companies with furniture, technical devices, etc. collapsed.

Volker Hobrack

The full extent of the change in virtually every sphere of social life and the learning processes associated with this was not entirely clear to most GDR citizens in the period of political transformation around 1990. The legal system; economic system; health system; educational system; technical standards; travel possibilities; everyday professional life; as well as purchasing and consumption habits, changed and had also been anticipated as desirable changes. Only a few areas of everyday life such as television, the colloquial language or forms of worship remained excluded from this process. There was a high general expectation of better living conditions and “flourishing landscapes”, while risks and disappointment were not yet in sight. This initially positive attitude toward social transformation was encouraged by the introduction of the Deutsche Mark at the favourable rate of exchange of 1:2 for private households.

Holger Kuhle

Needless to say the exchange from GDR Marks to the Deutsche Mark was advantageous for private households! However, as it has already been pointed out, it was fatal for GDR enterprises! Other decisions with far-reaching consequences included the regulation of “**return before remuneration**” with regard to real estate as embodied as a universal principle in the Reunification Treaty; **privatization policy** in accordance with the method of realizing quick sales as well as the regulation of the so-called old debts of GDR enterprises.

Just a word on the policy of privatization carried out by the *Treuhandanstalt* or **trust agency**¹ which, in the final analysis, was destructive in its impact: In order to enable quick sales of DDR collective combines and large-scale enterprises, they were divided up and dismembered into their individual parts according to the criterion of easy marketability. Things which belonged together eco-

¹ **Trust Agency (Treuhandanstalt):** An institution created by the last, freely elected GDR government to manage the industrial, trade and agricultural enterprises of the GDR. After reunification (October 3, 1990) the trust agency became a directly operated federal government enterprise under the Federal Ministry of Finance. As the (temporarily) largest holding company in the world (principal place of business in Berlin) its task was to privatize the nearly 14,000 business enterprises (with almost four million employees). By the time the trust agency was dissolved at the end of 1994 approximately 6,000 companies had been sold, 2,000 returned to the former owners and just under 4,000 liquidated for lack of profitability. The federation government bears the (estimated DM 300 billion) debts and deficits of the world's largest privatization measure. Cf. source: Schubert/Klein, *Das Politiklexikon* (The Political Encyclopaedia), Bonn 2001: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz.

nomically were torn apart in many places, the profitable **“prime investment choices”** were sold off dirt cheap, while the remaining parts were no longer able to survive. If one looks at the motivation behind the purchases of these **“prime investment choices”**, the structure and origin of the buyers as well as the structural integration of the acquired parts of the respective enterprises and their survival rates, then it becomes clear that these purchases were unable to form structures or at least have a stabilizing effect. By the middle of 1992, 90 percent of the enterprises that were sold went to subsidiaries of West German companies.

These, as well as several other aforementioned decisions, have served to thwart the positive effects of even the best and most sophisticated financial instruments and efforts toward regional development in East Germany. Here I am reminded, for example, of the establishment of **training and employment agencies** in eastern Germany. In addition, there were of course instruments which only reinforced the general malaise in connection with the decisions mentioned the above: For example; when people – under the guise of qualifying measures – were forced to **dismantle their own companies** or places of work. This was perceived as cynicism – not only by those affected, but it made a mockery of the designation “qualification-” or “job creation measure” and did not help them to find new work. I would say, perhaps in a rather off-hand way, that – seen from the perspective of several hasty managers of social measures with a certificate from the West – it was the case that the East Germans lived on the moon, but we were not living behind the times! The feeling and the measure of dignity had not been completely expunged in the population even within the boundaries of an authoritarian GDR! Another example of **counterproductive instruments** consists in the **exceptional write-offs**. Anyone who invested in the East was entitled to write-down 50 percent of their investment already in the first year while the normal write-downs, as a function of the respective life span, amount to four to 10 percent in the case of plants and facilities used over longer periods of time. One assumed (if other asset-creating intentions were not assumed) that this would direct a flow of investment into the East. As a result of the existing uncertainties with regard to markets and competition, the actual investments did not flow into productive areas, and those coupled with the economic reality of the New Federal States, but primarily into office buildings, supermarkets, housing projects, industrial parks, etc. Even the overcapacities which soon became apparent did

not act as a deterrent in view of these write-down facilities! The main problem of the East – strengthening the insufficient industrial base and a lack of equity capital – was not solved by this primary promotional measure, instead the distortions were substantially intensified. At the same time, these **tax savings models** enormously reduced tax revenues, although profits exploded during this period and the state had enormous financing requirements for public services.

Volker Hobrack

It also became obvious that values changed with regard to the conception of the larger German society under these new conditions, that competitive behaviour and pressure to perform in both the economic and vocational spheres soon became normality! However, this did not appear to be a danger at first.

It was only the winding up of many unprofitable enterprises and administrations by the trust agency and the, in part, degrading evaluation of scientific facilities that generated a different opinion about the changes. The loss of jobs and a lack of apprenticeships – completely unknown before – were gradually perceived as negative phenomena which in principle could not be evaded. At the beginning of the nineties there was not a general awareness of the associated increase in social injustice and inequality.

Holger Kuhle

The changed value conceptions which you addressed, that subsequently turned into a fear of threats, nevertheless had a very material background for more than a few. The rapid impetus of change in terms of the East German economy and employment was as follows: There was a 30 percent **scale-down of jobs** within the shortest possible amount of time, while the real gross domestic product fell by a third and industrial production in East Germany declined by 40 percent. From 1989 to 1994 only 25 percent of all employed persons remained in the same enterprise, 18 percent switched companies without interruption, 5 percent commuted back and forth to Western Germany, while the “remainder”, i.e. 50 percent, had to suffer temporary or continuous interruptions in employment or had to abandon working life altogether. This was the first shock, only the beginning of the continued process of transformation. All in all, what developed and

remained were the material offers and transfers of West German institutions of transformation in order to **support the dissolution of the GDR** and integrate it into the system of the Federal Republic of Germany, but no medium or long-term sustainable assurance of a future for the East German regions!

Volker Hobrack

For me the trust agency was also an instrument of power, of course from the side of the stronger economy and political supremacy. After all, the former GDR acceded only as a small part. There was only an increase of a quarter of the population. And the structures were poor in economic terms – in relation to capitalism, in relation to the markets of the free market economy. They were relatively stable and competitive within the encapsulated, socialist economic system. They were even capable of being planned and represented a modest basis of existence for the people in the entire Comecon region. But they were not naturally capable of competing on a global market, which was only waiting to swallow up everything it could. That is, unprotected economic structures were forcefully exposed to the domestic West German and the entire world market.

My change of profession serves as an example of the changes that were forced upon very many people in the East. As the building academy of the GDR was wound up after the change in the political system, I had become an inspector for concrete in a voluntary union of concrete works. With other new colleagues we had to familiarize ourselves with the new system and quality inspection. The scepticism of the West German specialists with regard to our technical knowledge became very clear within the scope of a training course in Hanover. We then passed the examination based on our individual expertise and were allowed to perform inspections. The specialists in the concrete works which I visited were glad to see a former colleague before them who was familiar with the general and specific difficulties of each enterprise. Nevertheless, I recognized that they hardly had a chance on the world market. A concrete plant in Bad Saarow or here in Beelitz, for example, or somewhere in the proximity of Berlin traditionally supplied concrete parts to Berlin, particularly for the large building settlements made from prefabricated slabs. This market collapsed after the change in the political system and it became necessary to convert the equipment. These

new enterprises only had very limited chances for survival with no loans as a result of the legal uncertainties – because of old debts and unsettled questions of ownership. It became clear to me that a number of concrete plants would shut down and that I could not expect to have a permanent job. Younger colleagues often left for the older, former states of the Federal Republic where the possibilities for earning a living were better and firm economic structures promised a new start in their working life.

If one exposes the economic and thus social basis of a region to such pronounced changes in such a short period of time, then imbalances are inevitable. For me this connection between the cardinal errors in the Reunification Treaty has become quite clear, specifying the priority of ownership rights and not wanting to have compensation as an alternative.

For me, that was a wrong decision.

Lena Schulz zur Wiesch

Previous contributors often implied that many of the decisions have been taken too hastily and were short-sighted. Even though I agree with these claims, I wanted to mention some of the **official justifications** for this haste after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Often, the argument of a “window of opportunity” has been brought forward in order to explain why decisions on reunification and the constitution of the reunified country were seen as urgent. Many thought that the historical chance for reunification was unique: they guessed that the conditions in the former Soviet Union, the decisive international actor in the process, were too unstable and that an expected coup against Gorbatschow could have brought the rapprochement between East and West Germany to a halt. As long as the situation in the SU was still calculable German politicians felt **urged to act**.

The euphoric emotions in the rest of Europe were favourable in the time after the fall of the Wall – although, in France and Britain, fears of a too big and too powerful Germany encouraged scepticism.

There are also assertions that German reunification was scheduled in accordance with the electoral campaign of chancellor Helmut Kohl, who urged that reunification take place in October 1990. He wanted to become chancellor of a unified Germany. The first common elections were held in December 1990.

Because of the urge of the governing parties to bring about Germany's reunification, the round tables of the East German civil rights movement were largely ignored. They were seen to threaten and slow down the process with their insistence in democratic proceedings.

The attempts to keep the GDR alive were frustrated by the inability of its last government under Modrow and de Maizière to consolidate the power structures within the East-German state. Furthermore it is an open question whether the massive transfer payments to a still autonomous East German state would have been accepted in the West.

With regard to the quick transfer of western institutions, economists had allegedly recommended shock therapy, expecting a big bang effect. They feared that a slow transformation of the eastern into western structures would have given too much time to **legitimacy crises**.

The above arguments show that many of the decisive actors implied that there was no alternative to the way that reunification was conducted. However, in the long run, a more radically democratic and economically grounded process could have prevented many of today's problems.

The Failed Opportunity for a New Common Constitution

Monica Schümer-Strucksberg

I was personally and politically disappointed that we were not able to have a discussion about the constitution. And here I do not only mean an interesting dialogue about decisions such as how much **direct democracy** can we organize, how much representative stability does our society need, what basic social security must our state provide and which processes does the state not have to be involved in? I would also be glad to consider the following question: Are there

in these very old German problems, the fact that the eastern regions are the poor regions, that there are no mineral resources, that the soil is not sufficient for agriculture, but can only be worked very extensively... Is there still a reason and an economic chance for this other regional policy which the GDR practiced with the settlement of certain, highly subsidized industries?

I would be happy to continue this discussion: Isn't there the alternative – instead of the preferred tax possibilities, which ruined the economy and the entire market in East Germany, the same share of investments, which the process of reunification and the **promotion of investments** will cost the government – of giving this to every single person in the East who is of working age as **individual start capital**. For example, give everyone 17,000 Marks in cash and everyone sets up his or her own business, his or her own economic future precisely there where the people themselves live. This particular thought existed at one time as a serious proposal. Would there have been an economical basis for this? I would have liked to have played this model through. Which independent powers could be mobilized? What would this have meant for individual identification with the new common situation? The disappointment over the lengthiness of the adjustment process, which essentially arose from the foreseeable false promises, but also the self-deception of the people in the East, has now become a general reproach vis-à-vis “the West” and is a burden on the state structure today.

Holger Kuhle

The aim of a **comprehensive system integration** was in fact inevitable after the constitutional policy decision for reunification as being accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law. The alternative option, reunification on the basis of a new constitution negotiated between East and West Germans, as made possible by Article 146 of the German Constitution, was not employed. The majority of the delegates of the first democratic parliament of the GDR, elected after the fall of the Berlin Wall, voted for accession. Then development with the primacy of immediate

system integration took its course. It abandoned the expectation still held by some that a new constitution between East and West Germans would be prepared and thus reunification would then follow the accession. And political pressure to do so nevertheless was incapable of being organized. A number of the relevant **participants from the GDR civil rights movement** were, at least in my view, already generally paralyzed at that time. And the political parties active in the federal states of former East Germany, apart from the PDS as the successor to the SED, the official GDR party, involve extensions of the parties already established in West Germany and naturally also managed from there as well. For various reasons there was no relevant interest in a debate on the constitution which was capable of being asserted either on the part of the conservative-liberal government or by the opposition, composed of the Social Democratic and Green parties.

Monica spoke about the East as the traditionally poor regions, with a lack of natural resources, poor soils for agriculture, etc. In my opinion, that is not completely correct either historically or geographically. One of the regions in which industrialization began was in the south of Saxony, one of the German industrial cores was always located at the centre of Saxony, Berlin was historically the industrial city, one of the most fruitful soils, the Börde in Saxony-Anhalt. And since we are dealing with history, then we should not fail to mention that the developments which caused the serious economic and thus social problems are often sought today, in a very precipitous manner, in the planned economy of the GDR. That is also true, had the GDR not created such a desolate situation, then things today would indeed be easier. But the problems that caused the miserable economic development in the GDR can also be found in the comparatively disadvantageous conditions immediately after the Second World War. In comparison to West Germany the GDR was weakened through war reparations that took the form of every possible kind of material, plant, etc., all of which went to the Soviet Union – there was no Marshall Plan.

To me the problem today seems to be that no alternatives at all are really sought after with regard to the respective paths of development. If, in light of the desolate situation in the East, there is a hectic discussion at regular intervals and driven by media headlines, then the same buzzwords usually emerge again and

again. The much more radical intellectual pastimes as Monica described or more moderate ones, perhaps less radical, remain outside of our **prevailing discussion matrix**. Conclusions are not drawn, are not even considered, although they are actually evident in view of the obviously poor results of the past policy, which was oriented toward narrow economical interests. A development policy which deals with structural, labour market, regional or environmental policy impacts is overdue, but is not being discussed.

Precisely if one shifts one's view away from Germany, then one can see a series of instruments and development strategies as an **alternative option to the neoclassical economic development approach** that was pursued and administered to the East Germans as an unavoidable ideal approach – for example, in crisis areas – be it southern Italy or Wallonia in Belgium – which have lived through enormous restructuring processes in recent decades, not completely *ad hoc*, but over the years. All of this knowledge, this entire know-how seems to me in the past ten years to be practically beyond the German border, held up somewhere on the Rhine. For example, many millions of euros were spent in order to maintain large enterprises, and in effect to save several hundred of the former thousands of jobs. When I talk about the experience of other countries, as specified in the above, I mean approaches which rely in particular on activation of the local value creation steps when it comes to regional development. Instead of tearing down old factories and practically erecting entertainment and recreational parks, where the social transfer services of the unemployed are siphoned off at best, it would be more important to generate **local developmental dynamics**. Because development approaches and instruments are involved such as the promotion of entrepreneurship instead of enterprises; the development of a micro lending business; the regional-specific and flexible development of the features of a unique position through promotion of education, research and a cultural industry with customized supporting measures; support of the third sector for the sake of market capability instead of using it only as a parking station for job creation measures. Unfortunately, this did not belong to the “mainstream” of the repertoire of development policy. However, what is cause for concern is the fact that such approaches are not taken into consideration, even today after the limited impact of the past preferential treatment for new and expanded infrastructures and the tax and depreciation models have become obvious.

Kristina Volke

I am not certain whether the emphasis on the respective players and regional approaches, in the way that Holger advocates it here, would actually have been a model that would have been beneficial to East Germany from the beginning of reunification and which would have led it into a different direction. The year 1989 and the following years were not only characterized by a general – and thus in the long run unsuitable – transfer of institutions and structures, but also the readiness on the part of most East Germans to integrate themselves **into this new structure**. Accession of the GDR was desired and supported by the majority of the population with all of the associated consequences, the capitalistic system of the Federal Republic of Germany enjoyed great respect amongst the East German citizens who had suffered from a planned economy. Documents from the initial years demonstrate how great the belief in the strength of the market was and the chance for personal fortune within this system. Skepticism, on the other hand, was expressed in relation to alternative models which, as the history of reunification itself teaches us, were never regarded by the majority as an alternative to accession. The **reform project of a “third path”** and “democratization of real existing socialism” was an intellectual construct, and remained such, because it did not meet with or met with too little response amongst the population – above all probably, because it appeared more painstaking, more uncertain and required more sacrifice than accession. The picture of the successful economic system of the Federal Republic of Germany was – precisely because the governments of the GDR had maintained the exact opposite over decades – rather more of an ideal than a hostile image. To finally be able to determine one’s own fortune; to finally be able to do what one wants; to finally find out what one is really capable of, became the guiding motivation of their own future for many East Germans precisely because the GDR so vehemently contradicted personal, individual desires and possibilities. To remind ourselves of this seems to me to be important – not only in order to understand the **dynamics of reunification**, but also for understanding the dilemma and the challenge with which East Germany is confronted today, because it is characterized not only by disappointments, but also by a learning process which is important to make use of today.

Nevertheless, I am convinced that there could have been ways and means of bringing about reunification on an equal footing – including with regard to economic adjustment of a socialist, planned economy system to a capitalistic market economy. Monica's private financing of the East German households has less to do with my model in this case – after all, how much economic self-sufficiency can one establish with start capital amounting to 17,000 D-marks, and how many micro-companies does a region need? But a different way of handling the “national property of the GDR” would have been possible and necessary as well. Today, fourteen years after reunification, we hear that small and medium-sized enterprises are being purchased by their own employees in order to save the company because the shareholders up to now are pulling out – not because they are not earning anything here anymore, but because only a fraction of the costs need to be paid in Asia or Eastern Europe and thus clearly more can be earned. To be content with less and thereby maintain jobs is a concept that perhaps would have functioned in East Germany as well – had there been the political will and the corresponding possibilities of a learning process and a respective appropriation of knowledge. Such thoughts are not popular and are quickly responded to with reference to a completely desolate economic system which could only be maintained at the expense of high national debt in the East. But who is not able to look behind these arguments and see that the winding up East German “national property” came at more than just the right time for the West German market system? What would have happened if this national property had been nationalized in the sense of this new, private-enterprise, if it had not been left to the trust agency, but rather to the employees to determine how they would continue to run their companies? And invested at least a part of the otherwise apparently wasted funds from the solidarity pact here instead? Germany would look much different today, even if only 10 percent of them had been successful! And, not least of all, the relationship between East and West Germans would have looked a lot different from the outset because it would have been important to follow new paths together – a circumstance that would have made it possible for West Germany to learn something as well.

Thomas Flierl

Originally, German reunification was characterized by the intention to **establish equivalent living conditions**, and 15 years later, the new president Horst Köhler has declared that this demand should be abandoned. A critical review of German reunification highlights the difference between the state and society once again. In many respects two partial German societies have been preserved and reproduced in the context of national reunification. And now, if this goal of harmonizing living conditions is abandoned, then this naturally represents a dramatic admission on the part of conservatives with regard to the earlier goals of the process of reunification on the one hand, and is completely marked by the federalism of neo-liberal competition. On the other hand, it may open up new horizons of **belated self-determination** and institutional reforms.

Waste or Investment? The Solidarity Pack for Eastern Germany and the Lack of Concepts for Self-Sustained Regional Development

Cornelia Poczka

It is true that the Germans were not prepared for the reunification and that most people thought that the process of transition would be much easier than it finally was. The consequences, i.e. the industrial decline, the high unemployment rate and the social discrepancy between the population in the new and old federal states, are the main reasons for great disappointment in both parts of Germany.

The German government is still transferring millions of euros to the Neue Laender (East German Federal States) each year to establish the infrastructure and economy there.

Holger Kuhle

The figure of DM 1 trillion is frequently cited as having flowed into the East since 1990! However, this involves a gross amount that does not include part of the tax revenue and the solidarity contributions from the acceding region (eastern German states) or payments from the tax revenue of the national govern-

ment which benefit all of the states in accordance with the principles of German federalism. As the majority of transfer payments were funded by national debt and generally flowed back to Western Germany in the form of purchases from companies in that half of the country, the creation of this transfer program had the effect of an enormous **Keynesian program of economic measures** that gave the Western German economy above-average growth rates during a phase of global economic slowdown. A legitimate question today, in my opinion, would be whether the extra profits for companies from the market expansion incorporating the GDR or extra profits resulting from the previously mentioned exceptional write-offs should not be skimmed off in order to help fund the costs of reunification?

Cornelia Poczka

However, the transfer of millions of euros unfortunately does not only fail, but it seems to even widen the gap between East and West; **disagreement between Westerners and Easterners** remains intense in Germany. Westerners think that there is too much support, and the East Germans argue that they should receive more funds. However, this is not the case in Berlin because we work together in the administrations, institutions and in the private sector, have almost the same incomes and similar economic problems in both halves of the city. In some western boroughs the unemployment rates are even significantly higher than in the eastern ones. We have defined 17 neighbourhoods in decline and 12 of them are in the western part of the city.

As the gap between East and West widens (at least in the minds of German citizens), East Germans are looking backward and regarding their own past and life experience in the GDR as more favourable. For example, many East Germans I know meanwhile say that life was easier in GDR times, although they qualify this by adding that it was because one was told what to do by the regime, it was easier because one had fewer choices and decisions to make. I also think people were closer to each other and less selfish than in the West.

In the meantime, East Germans are looking back on their past achievements with pride. This sense of pride – linked, no doubt, with some nostalgia for times

when people were more or less equal, almost nobody got very rich but also no one was poor – has led to a surprising rediscovery of past values and symbols. This phenomenon can also be seen in the very successful film “Goodbye Lenin”. The most significant symptom is the return to products and brand names of GDR times, even those that are now manufactured by formerly state-owned companies that have been taken over by West German or multinational corporations. Indeed, there is an increasing number of people trying to buy as many East German products as possible.

On the political level it was the same. The Westerners thought that they knew what was good for their colleagues from the East. Although well-meant, the **procedure was not entirely democratic**. When we founded the “**Stadtforum**” **in Berlin** we did not ask anybody from the eastern part of the city whether they wanted it and whether they agreed to the structure we had chosen. We had not even thought of doing so. Surely, we tried to find members for the Stadtforum from East Berlin and were quite surprised that it was so difficult. While the number of experts from West Berlin had to be limited, experts from East Berlin remained in a minority until 1995. Meanwhile, the political representatives from the eastern part are experienced politicians and, independently of their party membership, fight for the interests of the East German population.

Kristina Volke

In my view, the question in the meantime is: how are things to continue? Since there can be no “turning back”, then the only choice can be **modified concepts** for the future – other than the one shaped and prescribed in 15 years of common history of a system which reproduces itself with enormous effort. To say it with words other than those employed by Holger: I see a new democratization of politics as the only chance to remedy the errors and strengthen East Germany in a sustainable manner, in **strengthening of the regional participants**, in the formation of new **institutions and structures appropriate to the concrete relationships and circumstances**. **Democratization**, for me, means reaching decisions in a way that is closer to the base, to the places where things actually happen. Since reunification, East Germany has been dependent on transfer payments in the billions – a tremendous amount of money, which was obviously

erroneously invested because it did not trigger any development. This insight has now even been articulated on a broader political level – which has just recently led to another national discussion about the subsidized special status of the five new federal states. Only the years to come will show whether it has been understood in these discussions that a weak East is of no use to, that elimination of the East German economy on a long-term basis will mean much greater damage to the economy as a whole than short-term investment and profits from speculation. Meanwhile, even the government is advocating forms of regionalization, in which one plans to strengthen the regional urban centres in future – in which so-called future-oriented industries such as the high-tech industry, new technologies, infrastructure, etc. are to become the pillars of a lasting recovery, which has an impact on a general scale and thus becomes a determining factor for a whole region.

What I do not have once again, however, is **confidence in the participants** in East Germany and the will to include them in the decision-making processes for which so much government money is invested. The belief that one only has to replace the old, obviously unsuitable programme of *building up the East* at the “top” with “the right one”, so that the recovery will finally get underway, is almost cynical. The promotion of centres, as it has been outlined in the debate referred to thus far, runs the risk of once again becoming a subsidy scheme devised from above, a construct which permits either **too little inherent dynamism** or none at all. But precisely that is what is important – and this requires the participants on location, those who have decided not to move away, those who realized their will to shape. As a lesson from the errors of reunification it will be important in future to encourage local participants, to **open up space**, the courage that people develop prospects themselves. Creating adequate structures to this end would be the actual challenge – and a field in which **both East and West Germany would be able to learn**.

Jutta Borgstädt-Schmitz

An essential problem that existed up to reunification and continued to exist for a long time thereafter was that the West, which commanded all of the decision-making power after accession of the New Federal States of the Federal

Republic of Germany, hardly had any idea at all of how the GDR was positioned economically. With manipulated statistics in the eighties, the GDR had catapulted itself to seventh place in the world rankings of industrialized nations (even ahead of Great Britain!). When it came to all of the essential criteria, **regional planning and industrial location policy** had little in common in the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany.

An example: the city of Tangermünde (in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania), a small, historical city, derived its income from a large chocolate factory with 2,000 employees. After the collapse of the GDR this chocolate factory, which had primarily supplied the Comecon countries, was shut down. The sales markets in the Comecon countries were no longer there and there was no way of keeping up with the competition of the western countries. With the closing of this factory nearly all of Tangermünde became unemployed from one day to the next, because the chocolate factory with its ancillary industries was virtually the only employer. Under free market criteria the following points would have to be taken into account for Tangermünde as a business location for a large-scale enterprise like the chocolate factory: Only one company as the most important employer of a whole municipality is problematic, the infrastructural connection of the city of Tangermünde to the motorway network or to the railway is very poor and there are no agglomeration economies with other enterprises in the near or wider surroundings. The qualifications of the resident population will soon only be oriented toward this single enterprise.

The industrial location policy of the socialist countries was actually quite simple: In the planned economy the state had the power to establish enterprises where jobs were needed. The migration of the population to the industrial locations, which had already taken place for a long time within scope of the free market economy, had scarcely begun in the GDR. The distribution of the state-owned large-scale enterprises throughout the entire country, without paying particular attention to the infrastructural links of the various locations pursued, among other things, the goal of binding the population to their respective residential locations. The risk of insolvency did not exist in the planned economy. However, the market economy does not make allowances for this type of industrial location policy. Here, location advantages, such as a well-linked infrastructure,

the proximity to other companies, etc. are at the foreground. On the other hand, workers are expected to be mobile and follow the jobs. Hardly anyone expected that the current **migration of the younger population**, from the new federal states of the Federal Republic of Germany to the jobs in the former states, would take on the dimensions that they have at present (already up to 20 percent in many municipalities). This point should be illuminated in more detail in the discussion of any desired **“transitional phase”**. One might even be led to the assumption that this migration of the younger, mobile population would have occurred even faster with a “transitional phase” or a “third path”.

The regional policy which then briefly began after the turn of events in the New Federal States of the Federal Republic of Germany made no sense at all. A lot of public money was invested in areas which had no chance of development, as is demonstrated by the many **“illuminated meadows for sheep”**: empty industrial parks in rural areas, which are completely developed in terms of the infrastructure. A regional policy which concentrates on less, but larger centers, would have made more sense.

For some inexplicable reason, it took several years to prepare binding regional plans and programs in several of the New Federal States. Frequently, real developments had already made the plans obsolete.

The very miniscule divisions at the municipal level proved to be a huge obstacle to practical regional policy. For political reasons the policymakers did not dare to immediately introduce a municipal reform – for fear of appearing to already restrict democratic self-determination again. While the municipalities had virtually no liberty to make their own decisions in the GDR – which is why the municipality structures in the GDR were bereft of significance when it came to policy planning, the municipalities after the demise of Communism enjoyed **full planning competence**, even if they consisted of only 500 inhabitants who often made use of it very egoistically, and not oriented toward the public interest. Here, only legally binding regional planning could have made a difference – but that was long in coming.

Cornelia Poczka

Yes, we can still see some examples of that **uncoordinated planning in the Berlin region**, projects which were built in the first years after reunification. In some areas on the periphery outside of Berlin, large commercial centres with thousands of parking lots were erected on former agricultural land without any adequate infrastructure in view of public transport, roads etc. To my mind many decision-makers of small communities in the metropolitan area of Berlin tried to get a piece of the pie too. But, they had no experience and did not know how to deal with western investors who made vain promises and even offered to pay for the entire planning process. In my opinion, the lack of a regional planning system was less significant than the total lack of knowledge and experience in the communities. Although the situation in Jerusalem is completely different, I am certain that communication and information, the exchange of experience and public participation is of the utmost importance for local decision makers. If these structures are being improved, a co-ordinated planning could also work/succeed without a statutory regional planning system. It goes without saying that, in addition to communication, market research and impact analyses should be carried out to find out whether the project is environmentally compatible and could work economically.

Quick Reunification Versus Transitional Phase

Holger Kuhle

As far as a comparison with Jerusalem is concerned, my lesson now from the reunification process in Germany or even in Berlin would be that one needs transitional phases. If any other proof had been required at all that the “market” produces chaotic conditions without basic regulatory control and defined frameworks, then this has been demonstrated once again in the transformation of the planned economy of the GDR into the free market economy of the Federal Re-

public of Germany. A transitional phase would be such a **regulative measure**, e.g. with the decision that the East German municipalities had to immediately enter into the financing system of the FRG, that is, they had to formulate their local budgets precisely on the basis of the trade taxes let to the municipalities – the sums there were all wrong! That turned out to be completely indefensible as a result of the failure to generate any trade taxes with the economic ruin of East Germany!

Andreas Wilke

One of the opinions that prevailed among politicians and experts and in published opinions was that reunification would provide the state, and in particular the municipalities, with substantial value. The former national ownership of property and the soil was to virtually guarantee the **wealth of the municipalities**. In hindsight, these assessments must appear as nothing less than cynical if one considers the precarious budgetary situation of the municipalities in the New Federal States and the degree to which their decisions were subject to influence as a result of this predicament.

Stephan Stetter

I would like intervene with a provocative remark, because the “protected area” – and it existed for forty years – was called the GDR. When we talk about investments now, the real question is: where will they come from? Where will they go? What is the source of the tax revenues? How is productivity obtained? How is it actually possible for a formerly protected market to establish itself on the global market?

Of course, one may ask now: could things have been done differently? However, I believe that the dynamics did not take the course that they did only because of Kohl. And it was also not only the longing of a majority of the East German population, but a whole set of other factors as well.

There is, nevertheless, a small amount of economic latitude: Either one has completely rigorous borders – such a thing as semi-rigorous borders does not work in the context of globalization, of a common European market – and other

economic dynamics of which East Germany is also a part. And therefore – as Monika has already pointed out – the problem is not only: What happened after 1989 and what was decided? But above all: What problems were actually created by the system of rigorous borders of the GDR and the Eastern Bloc, which in certain ways were only able to unfold after the years 1989 to 1990? We all remember the famous statistics which put the GDR at seventh place on the rankings of the world economy. But what that actually looked like and what was actually caused by the Wall and the separation, after the borders were also only half open – that could only really be seen then. And that is, I think, the interesting analogy to Jerusalem. Either, one has completely **rigorous borders**; one can even maintain them somehow. However, what happens if they then collapse and if very, very different systems are established on both sides on every possible social level? The fact that this harbours enormous **potential for conflict and problems of coordination** seems to be clear to me.

This also means to not only reflect on the failures after 1989, but to reflect on the causes. Understanding the causes of the division of Germany, not just during the Cold War, but as a consequence of the German crimes in the Second World War, has already been discussed. In my opinion, the economic and social problems after 1989 must then be seen in the context of the building of the Wall, dictatorship and the establishment of very different social systems as well. However, as soon as borders are opened up in several areas, I have serious doubts that one could really have maintained a partial opening between the East and West. That does not mean that one would not have had to examine things in more detail when it came to a whole set of individual questions about what should have been done differently, e.g. the privatization process through the trust organization, property questions, etc. There are many areas that have been mentioned.

But I do not think that the belief or hope that separation by means of stronger or partial borders would have been beneficial for both the East and West is really one that is valid.

Holger Kuhle

Yes, but in some areas where the interests of the West were affected, the federal states of West Germany among other things, there were in fact transitional phases! Even the principle of rapid and comprehensive integration of the GDR into the system through accession in accordance with Article 23 of the Basic Law shows examples of **selective integration** into the system. A concrete example is the **balancing of federal budgets**; that is reconciliation between wealthy and poorer federal states within the federal system of Germany. Normally it would have made sense to grant the new states “equal opportunities” immediately after accession, as in the case of the financially weak West German states – a consequence in accordance with the constitution, which provides for immediate and equal inclusion of the acceding region into the existing system of public finance! However, such an immediate expansion of the existing system of balancing federal budgets to include the East would have had serious consequences for the states in the West because of the differences in the taxable capacity and tax structure between the East and West German states. After all, the new states from the East which were to be included were all financially weak states, so that the previous relationship would have been completely shifted and past **recipient states** in the West (those states which received money from the richer western states) have become **donor states**. Besides, the financial requirements of the East German states would have made excessive demands on the existing financial equalization system and would have revealed its weaknesses. Finally, additional payments by the federal government would have been necessary and the system would then have had a more pronounced vertical orientation, which is a sensitive topic within the (West) German horizontally-oriented federal system. All of this was not in the interest of the West German states and another regulation which deviated from the Basic Law applied for a transitional phase. For this reason East Germany, including Berlin, only was included in the financial equalization system with a time delay of four years, beginning as of 1994. However, in order to counter any possible conceptions as though the temporary solution may have had its advantages, the fact should be taken into consideration that partial equalization payments were withheld from the East German states with the fund solution practiced until 1994, the federation inordinately

encumbered and the largest part of the costs transferred to future generations through loans.

This was, in part, decided even against better judgment. It is not every area in which we are smarter today. There were admonishers, critics and suggestions for alternatives in the case of several topics from the beginning. We are not only a people of clumsy oafs. But just like everywhere else there are interests and in connection with power certain interests assert themselves and others fall by the wayside! Thus it was as though these entire arguments were overrun with a herd of elephants. But today, it is too late. And what is really dramatic is the fact that we do not know what we can now do instead as a **repair workshop**.

Monica Schümer-Strucksberg

What is dramatic is the fact that a lot has not been “forgotten”, and a discussion about the system was not also wanted, the West German political majority and the economic powers did not want it, the political minority was undecided, the East Germans wanted **security** as quickly as possible. This explains the uncritical adoption of West German planning law, the bases of planning law and local self-government. The experiences of the past, i.e. the fact that these laws preclude any control, for example that of the city and hinterland relations between Berlin and Brandenburg, that the economic self-interests of competitors are stronger, that short-term local self-interests prevail politically and produce long-term social costs. A secured “transitional phase” would have provided time for examination and clarification. This could only have been accomplished if we had carried out a break with the system at that time. In all other respects the comparatively smooth adoption of an entire legal system with more than eighty thousand paragraphs is a tremendous **socio-political achievement**, an achievement in learning and adaptation, the stabilizing effect of which is unjustly played down in this discussion.

One cannot stop a social system, a social process, a legal system, in order to say: Well, let us take a look at how we can do it better. That also surprised me a little about your regional and politico-economic discussion. The conception which you all have expressed would only have been possible if we had **kept the Wall**

intact: If a protected economic area had actually been created and if liberality in the choice of residence had been limited. But that would not have been accepted either by the population in the East nor in the West; as a whole it would not have corresponded to the national identity and the desire for reunification. Indeed! The people actually followed the “**banana**”. They wanted to have western standards immediately, without restrictions. Many of them, not all of them. It would only have been possible to stop them with very substantial intervention into the established basic understanding of social policy. And we should not fail to mention that this condensed process of transformation also produced a lot that was positive, reunification worked out better than feared; the large majority of the population is better off both socially and economically, the degree of the self-determination – who would want to turn it back?

With reference to the participatory experiences which were already addressed, I would like to emphasize that we also did a lot that was right – in certain areas which were perhaps not as interesting in economical terms. Thus, for example, we organized **participatory processes in the urban redevelopment areas of East Berlin**, here in particular **in areas for large housing estates**. We, the members of, as I am forced to say, the administration which is dominated by West Germans, said with the backdrop of a targeted strategy (“fighting imminent spatial segregation, accepting cultural identity, improving community self-administration, empowering civil society”) that: “We are relinquishing the decision-making power here.” We gradually tried to make it clear to the inhabitants there: You can really decide for yourselves. The experiment referred to here was successful. However, the administration had reached a very important preliminary decision: The urban and structurally problematic large residential housing estates should be preserved, they should be modernized and supplemented with large investments in the East. People in East Berlin should not lose their “home-land” to which they had developed a surprisingly deep attachment. Thus money was made available – in part from the urban redevelopment programme in the western part of the city! – and then expensive procedures were in part moderated, in which the people themselves made their own decisions about the further development of their residential area and their homes. This was an **exciting transitional phase** in a particular sub-area where the mechanisms of the “pure” mar-

ket were curbed in the housing industry in the sense of a social balance and a learning process.

A number of smaller factors and measures produced the positive side of this process of reunification and development: Thus every (political and administrative) district in East Berlin established a partnership with a district in the western part of the city in which a lively exchange of questions, information, assistance and reciprocal visits from administrative units, politicians and social facilities were organized. Thus, neither the Western educational system nor the legal system were simply drafted onto the existing ones in the East, but rather further training and other educational offers were provided: The guidelines for recognizing training programmes were revised; the promotional instruments for integration into the job market were drastically expanded. These are only a few examples of active **adaptive change**. The people in East Berlin set out on their way with questions and demands, the previous “western institutions” set out on their way with organizational support, with information and training, as well as with material support.

The cultural problem that was addressed will not be solved already with a “simple” decision by the politicians for an open, democratic and participatory process of development. The social and cultural differences, the different levels, cannot be changed all of a sudden. Lengthy processes and targeted decisions are needed in order to employ instruments of development. And there, we must examine ourselves when we say that what we did was somewhat wrong. There must be a decision at the beginning with regard to the amount of patience we should have and also expect from others, which instruments can we employ in order to achieve a more harmonious process as a result?

In Berlin we are continuing this **citizen-supported decision-making process** with the “**Social (integrative) City**” programme because we have learned cultural and social barriers are best overcome if the people concerned find their way to each other with the financial and organizational assistance of the administration; if they try to communicate and are allowed to decide on changes themselves (top-down-initiation/strategy, bottom-up decision process).

Volker Hobrack

As we spoke before about having to keep the wall in place or prevent people from relocating, the inverse could have been said: If the revolution had been bloody, then it would have created new systems and we would have had new starting points. I know that that is hypothetical. But revolutions which were bloody also presented new opportunities. The French revolution is a phenomenon for me. And if one looks at this development, which we had in the GDR, about which we are really proud, it has precisely these disadvantages that West German planning law was brought over here and now one has to deal with it. Certain undesirable developments are then the result.

But I am an advocate of the so-called **protected zone theory**. One must accompany developments carefully through government measures if they are to be united at all. The model of the confederation is one in which both sides have a chance at rapprochement; otherwise it will not be democratic. Participatory sharing is a process. That must be accompanied somehow with democratic processes; otherwise they will have no chance.

Cornelia Poczka

Before reunification I was also convinced that a **confederation** would be the best solution to step-by-step adapt the eastern part of Germany to Western standards, mainly in an economic, educational and legal sense.

Meanwhile, however, I think that it would not have worked. The democratisation process and the economic transition would have required many years, but the people in the East were impatient. The majority of the Easterners wanted freedom, a better life and the Deutsche Mark because they thought it would help them to become better off. This is understandable. Therefore, in 1990 the majority of East Germans were of the opinion that everything in the West was perfect. Although we spoke the same language we were very different, we did not know anything about each other, we had developed different mentalities, and we did not understand each other even if we used the same words. I think the reasons for the most important mistakes made during the reunification process were the arrogance and ignorance of the conservative German government in that period.

Moreover, many West German “advisers” sent to East Germany by Western administrations behaved as if they knew everything better. This made the East Germans feel like losers. Everything they had believed in their whole life was supposed to be invalid now. This was quite frustrating for them.

In 1990, more than 90 percent of East Germans regarded the standard of living in West Germany as higher than in the GDR and only 2 percent thought it was better in East Germany. Meanwhile, only about eighty per cent say life in the West is better, and an increasing percentage claims it was better in the GDR. In 1990, some 60 percent of East Germans thought the GDR had provided better crime protection than West Germany; today about 90 percent are of that opinion. The positive opinions about the health and social welfare systems, as well as the educational system in Germany are changing as a function of federal reforms in these sectors and increasing poverty in the new federal states.

Thomas Flierl

In this case, you describe East German sensitivities less than the **dominating West German attitude toward East Germans**. This attitude, and the view of East Germans connected with it, is also prevalent in the media and in the public sphere. This raises the question as to how the **self-determined articulation** of East Germans in public and in the public sphere is able to succeed. For example, ten years after the autumn of 1989 there was a debate in Germany about whether and which East Germans should participate in the official ceremonies. At this point in time, the Berlin district Mitte intervened in the discussion in a rather spectacular fashion. On my initiative, in my capacity as the town councillor for building affairs, an enormous transparency with the wording “We were the people. Alexanderplatz, November 4, 1989” was attached to the cultural and educational building, Haus des Lehrers at the Alexanderplatz on November 4, 1999 in memory of the legendary demonstration in the year 1989. This intervention had a manifold meaning: After the slogan “We are the people!” was quickly replaced with “We are a people!” in the period following the collapse of the GDR; “We were the people!” conveyed bitterness and reproach. It also reflected pride, because “we” and not “you” were the people. And, finally, there was the hope or announcement that the people would call attention

to itself from time to time. Desperate demonstrations with the slogan “We are the people!” are currently underway once again; there is presumably no longer hope for the “one” people.

Kristina Volke

Thomas’ formulation of a cultural dimension is in opinion closely linked with what has been discussed thus far with regard to economic alternatives.

In addition to the economic ones there are, in my judgment, also strong **cultural reasons** which would have initially suggested a **confederation** of provisionally autonomous states as the **instrument of a transitional phase**.

For the citizens of the GDR it could have meant negotiating with one another, and within their own system, on how they imagined their future and how they intended to deal with their past. We know that the majority of them did not want to do this – nevertheless it is worth thinking about what would have happened if, etc. Considered in cultural terms, I see the **opportunity for a self-check** which could have led to positions of equality in the case of reunification at a later point in time. For example, because communication of justice and injustice in the GDR would have first been subjected to **internal arguments** based on one’s own standards of measurement and within the bounds of certain dynamics. The so-called processing of the impact of the state security service, which was essentially dominated and determined in the relevant measures of value by the West, would have been a completely different one had the debate between victims and perpetrators been carried out by themselves, and not between the perpetrators and (external) judges. I mention this example because it is significant in terms of the constellations and has permanently influenced the climate of a united Germany. I maintain that things would have been different and better if one had left the East up to itself for a bit and forced it to define its own interests and to carry out its **own reappraisal**. It could have made them into enlightened partners – a process which must now be subsequently made up for with a lot of energy.

In connection to this, I remember a discussion with partners from Jerusalem at the city hall in Berlin. Andreas at some point made the statement, (or some-

thing like it): “We did not have time to think things over. We simply used the historical opportunity. If we had thought about it we would have perhaps never been united.”

I find that this sentence has an unbelievable charm – but I believe nevertheless that it is wrong. It assumes that history is like a miracle, like an unrepeatable moment. I know that there is some truth to this; perhaps we would not be united today otherwise. But what I miss is the conviction that history can be shaped and that we would have had the obligation to change the **automatism** of things.

Stephan Stetter

In the mid-1990s, there was this picture of “**Dunkeldeutschland**” (“dark Germany”): A collective term for East Germany. The violent right-wing extremism in the nineties; that was a big topic and shaped the image of East Germany for a long time. I am convinced that this hate-fulfilled violence was closely connected with the interruptions of identity after 1989. Thus, they engendered social consequences that were absolutely concrete in both their form and substance. It is generally known that right-wing extremism has also been behind problems in Western Germany, and still is – except under different conditions, of course. And perhaps some of the anger could have been checked at an early stage by a policy oriented toward understanding and accepting differences and with a greater emphasis on the difficulties in the process of growing together – especially at the economic level.

This is not intended to imply that common interests cannot be actively built up on a cautious basis. After all, the emphasis on not just the differences but also on points in common, on areas shared with each other – shared perceptions, new areas of common interest – is a crucial component in this question.

In the early 1990s the German constitution was reformed, within the scope of which I would indeed have liked to have seen greater steps being taken. The keyword here would be **federalist reform in Germany**. This had been the subject of debate in West Germany since the 1970s. It would have been an opportune time to make changes after 1990, especially within the context of the key phrase “areas shared with each other.” With all respect, but states such as Hesse

or Lower Saxony, with a short history as actual states, could in fact have been pioneers in this process, together with Saxony-Anhalt or Thuringia in founding new federal states that **incorporated both the East and the West**. Even if it had only been a few states that had suddenly formed a state where West and East Germany had been – they would have created the basis for managing political affairs together. Not all federal states would have been affected. Certainly not the Saarland, as it would probably have been difficult to find a geographical overlap region. But to do something in the areas of federalism. A reform of the federal system would have offered space for alternatives at many levels because a change of this nature would have consequences in several areas – including the weighting of votes in the Upper House of the German Parliament (Bundesrat). And here we have the explanation as to why no changes were made. But this is exactly the problem – that those responsible did not make much effort looking for overlap regions between East and West. That said, the fact that these are now gradually emerging, perhaps now more than 15 years ago, in Berlin more than anywhere else, is a welcome development. But this issue would have been one in which a little more far-sightedness in 1989/90 would have been good for us.

Monica Schümer-Strucksberg

These overlap regions were sought, at least in the beginning, at the **party political level**. The Social Democratic Party decided back then in Berlin: We'll change our internal principles of representation within our democratic system. The number of delegates and allocation for the highest political decision-making body were no longer specified only on the basis of the respective numbers of members in the subdivisions, but we carried out **“positive discrimination”** toward the eastern assemblies with a special quota. Thus, in democratic terms, the East Germans were over-represented in the internal decision-making process at the party level. At that time, we also held rounds of discussions for a joint election programme with the aim of developing commonalities. This was not without problems: All of a sudden we had to abandon the sacred topics of the Western politicians such as energy conservation, womens' equality, etc., because of serious disputes with the people from East Berlin who feared that they would be missing out on something like energy growth, cars, etc. Unfortunately, we were

not resolute in returning to these rounds of talks after the election campaign. Understandably, we had to act with governmental responsibility under many external pressures, but of course we should have advanced these internal, political working groups at the party level; patiently developing a **renewed value system** with each other. Instead, we moved toward a “**normal system**” far too quickly. Yet the secret demand was: “Now everyone should participate in the daily mode of operation, in the introduced institutions, and themselves make an effort to assert themselves.” Our comrades in East Berlin soon ceased to participate, for a variety of reasons: economic, time-related, due to identification issues – for all of these reasons. We really should have organized this, continued to ensure that communication took place more intensively – at a large number of in-depth levels.

We did not make adequate use of the instruments at our disposal, instead reverting to our identities and somehow thus accepting the necessary power-related processes – sometimes a little diluted, sometimes not – and then at some point digging up our prejudices again, even if in the form of jokes. I believe that you have to take a very conscious approach to an institutional concept of this kind, in order to achieve agreement, a sustainable and long-term basis of cooperation for people of different cultural backgrounds, so as not to leave it to gradual growth and formation, instead organizing it in preparation, so that there is more communication, and that more cooperation is prepared through this communication. There is an entire range of options at an entire range of levels that, when you make them accessible to people, are really exciting and that these people may want to accept, without having already decided on questions of power.

Holger Kuhle

I completely approve when you emphasize the significance of institutions for such ideas. From my point of view, it would only be possible with these where overlap areas genuinely produce something for the common good of our country through **new areas of integration**, helping the latter to become manifest. Neither do overlap areas, as such, necessarily create anything new. There is probably a need for institutions for this purpose as well. Their significance grows with the frequency at which the new collides with established interests and chips

away at the **foundations of the status quo in society**. The fact that the mere presence of overlap areas does not in itself accomplish this is evident, for example, in the relocation of the seat of parliament and government to Berlin. This has caused a number of changes, of course, certainly symbolic and in the attitude of many of those who are involved in the sphere of influence of the **capital's institutions**, or in youthful anticipation believe that they will be able to take an active role here at some point. Except, however, that the suffering in eastern Germany that we are talking about here is no different under the label of the Berlin-governed republic than in the Bonn era. Maybe Wolfgang Thierse was able, in his capacity as president of the Bundestag, to proclaim to everybody from Berlin that the East is in a precarious situation. It did not do any good, however. He was pulled up short, together with the contents of his cry for help, just as in former times. The lobby from North Rhine-Westphalia, the state with the highest population in the West, is rearing its head again in the interest of the structural changes that still have to be overcome there!

A sober analysis is required in order to be able to undermine this hegemony to any extent at all, assessment and critique of the decisions taken with the transformation process and instruments, and also a distinction between those who make additional material profits solely as a result of the transformation of the East and those who have experienced exceptional losses, including future opportunities. The result of this differentiation between these two sides will not be in terms of an East-West cardinal direction, but in fact, to put it crudely, reflect the familiar pattern between “at the top” and “at the bottom.” This will be more a case of larger structures rather than of individual players. An example is the profits and losses from the way so-called **“old debts” held by GDR companies** were dealt with. This enabled a number of West German banks to pick up bargains as they bought up former GDR state banks. They are now earning substantial amounts from interest payments on the old debts of GDR companies, especially as it is ultimately the German state (i.e. tax payer), that is footing the bill.

A rational debate seems to me to be the only way of breaking through the now pent-up culture of mutual suspicion and apportioning of blame between West and East Germans, and transforming this into a discussion that is oriented toward the future. The very problems that evolved from the decisions taken at

the start of the transformation process, which have thus far been accepted without consequences, represent the matrix that on which both internal and external perception, and the discourse regarding the eastern part of Germany, are now based. The fact that the “flourishing landscapes” did not in fact come about is, even if a (financial) burden, primarily an abstract factor for many in the West. But even if something abstract appears to be a burden, people at some point no longer want to hear the moaning about the East and how it never seems to be moving forward. It is merely annoying. When the times eventually get tough, in the sense that social and economic prosperity in the West starts to totter, then the East does become annoying. A significant number of East Germans are experiencing the economic plight for themselves in very concrete terms. Disappointment and cynicism are widespread in both the East and the West. The only response to this is to have a genuinely open debate, take a close look, rationalize the entire issue, and to differentiate according to **winners and losers** and not according to East and West!

Thomas Flierl

Only a critical review of German reunification can provide ideas for societies characterized as **models of co-existence, cooperation** and **co-evolution** as they are so urgently needed for living together in the future. National unity (accession), the transfer of institutions (application) and the exchange of elites (delegation) were immediately identified as colonialism in the Middle East. What is needed are models of variously associated institutions that provide for mutual co-existence, cooperation and difference.

JERUSALEM BERLIN FORUM (JBF)

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currently teaches at the Department of Architecture at the Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design Jerusalem, and is coordinating the new graduate programme in Urban Design and Conservation. Turner has a private practice in architecture, conservation, urbanism and planning and is a consultant on international projects of conservation and planning. He serves as a consultant on cultural heritage to UNESCO, including on the evaluation the World Heritage Sites of Ilha de Mozambique and the Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp. He has recently assisted the Ethiopian Government in the preparation of conservation management plans at Axum and a cultural inventory workshop. Turner is the Israeli lead-member of the TEMPER project of the European Union-EUROMED heritage programme. This inter-university project will look at "Training, education, management and planning of pre-historic sites in the Mediterranean", and includes the UK, Malta, Turkey, Greece and Israel. As a member of the joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian task force he prepared a Friends of the Earth report for the "Creation of the Dead Sea Biosphere Reserve" for submission to UNESCO. Turner's recent projects include a twenty class primary school in Jerusalem; conservation plans for the Roman Theatre, Shuni; the Crusader Castles of Montfort and of Arsuf; and the City of David/Ofel, Jerusalem Archaeological Garden. The urban projects include the physical

component of the “Jerusalem Strategic Plan; design component of the proposed Biosphere of the Judean Foothills”. The design for the artists’ village, Ein Hod and the neighboring Arab village of Ein Hood/Abu-el-Hija; the urban design plan for Neve Sharet, Tel Aviv; the design guidelines for the Sewage Treatment Plant, Jerusalem and the urban improvement project for the old centre, Baka-el-Garbiya. He is currently preparing the conservation, revitalization and management plan of the Old City of Jerusalem.

Hermann Bünz studied History, Political Sciences, English and Russian Language at Hamburg University. He taught at Hamburg Gymnasiums for three years before becoming an assistant Professor at Hamburg University. Bünz has researched History and Politics at various universities in Germany and Moscow. He was a co-editor of several research volumes on Eastern and South-East European History, Economics and Politics. Bünz has held the position of Director at the department for European Affairs at the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Bonn, as well as representing the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Brussels, Poland and now in Israel.

Thomas Flierl holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy and was an assistant lecturer at Humboldt University in East-Berlin. In 1985 he was forced to leave university due to his public criticism of the demolition of a historical monument in the borough of Prenzlauer Berg. From 1987 to 1990 Flierl was a member of the GDR Ministry of Culture, responsible for basic issues of European cultural cooperation and a cultural exchange project between East and West Berlin. After the fall of the Berlin Wall he headed the cultural office of the borough of Prenzlauer Berg (1990-1996). In 1995 he became member and spokesman of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) parliamentary group for cultural affairs in the Berlin House of Representatives. In January 2002 he was elected as Berlin's Senator for Science, Research and Culture in the city's first SPD-PDS coalition government.

Volker Hobrack has received his Abitur in Lutherstadt Wittenberg, before he finished an apprenticeship as locksmith and later studied mechanical engineering at the Technical University of Ap-

plied Science in Magdeburg. Hobrack was working as a development engineer in different scientific institutions, including the Building Academy of the GDR. After the fall of the Wall he joined the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and became an elected member of the borough parliament in Berlin-Mitte, with his main area of expertise on issues such as Berlin's history and urban development. On several occasions Hobrack's work on memorial boards and monuments in Berlin has been honoured and he has also received the highest official German award, the Bundesverdienstkreuz. He is building director (Bauleiter) of one of Berlin's building societies.

Holger Kuhle

is at present project manager at a public agency for financing of SME and public infrastructure in Berlin. He is working in the division of Economic Support Co-ordination. He holds a Ph.D. in Sociology. Since 1999, Kuhle has been involved with EU co-financed innovation projects. The projects work to exchange best practices and to develop a micro-credit tool kit for start up's in urban and rural distressed areas and a project designed to develop methods for the transfer of best practices, in order to secure jobs at the local level. This includes the establishment of a web-based exchange of experience system based on the practice of e-learning. Kuhle is responsible to propose, design and carry out application-oriented research, analyzing key trends and changes in regional and local development policies and strategies, at European, national and regional levels, as well as assessing implications and proposing new programmes while managing their implementation. He is member of the supervisory board in the European association for Information on Local Development (A.E.I.D.L.), a European organisation headquartered in Brussels which carries out various tasks on behalf of the EU Commission. At the University of Applied Sciences Berlin (Administration and Law) Kuhle is a lecturer for the Masters

course of studies in European Administrative Management, in particular with regard to European promotional policy and with a focus on regional development.

Cornelia Poczka is Head of the division of international affairs and protocol to the Berlin Ministry of Urban Development and director of the World Congress Metropolis 2005. Poczka is a former politician of the Berlin borough of Schöneberg (especially upon environmental and urban planning issues), (1984-1988). Between 1989 and 1998 she was public affairs and press officer, Director of the Stadtforum (city forum) and Chief of Staff to the Berlin Minister of Urban Development, Environmental Protection and Technology.

Jutta Borgstädt Schmitz is lecturing at the Institute for Urban Planning Berlin of the German Academy of Urban and Regional Planning. She also works as a consultant to private companies for urban and regional planning. Recently Borgstädt-Schmitz was invited to lecture on urban planning at the University of Sydney, Australia and at MIT Boston, USA. She has also recently worked for the German developmental aid agency GTZ in a field study on Urban Management and Capacity Building in two Ethiopian cities.

Monica Schümer Strucksberg is a political scientist from the Free University of Berlin. Schümer-Strucksberg received her post-graduate training in Development Policy and International Organisations at the German Development Institute. She was a former desk officer for the Intensive Cooperation Project Pre-school Education with the Council of Europe, Strasbourg. She was also the former head of administrative section “Social City” within the Berlin Senate for Urban Development, a former lecturer at Technical University of Berlin and has long term electoral experience, as a Member of Community Parliament.

Lena Schulz zur Wiesch studied at the London School of Economics and Political Science and the Humboldt-University Berlin where she re-

ceived a diploma in Social Sciences in 2000. She worked as an assistant to the DFG-research project “Modernization of Houses and Urban Renewal under changed circumstances - example East-Berlin” at the Chair for Urban and Regional Sociology, Institute for Social Sciences at the Humboldt-University. Since January 2002 she has been working as a project assistant at the Chair for Urban and Regional Sociology - Bilateral Research project with the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the Humboldt-University, Berlin. She is sponsored by the German-Israeli Foundation (DIG) and pursues a project with the title “Planning the Contested City. Policy-Analysis and Implications of Reunification in Jerusalem and Berlin”.

Kristina Volke

studied History of Arts and Cultural Sciences in Berlin. Volke works as a researcher, author and curator with special interest in the cultural transition of East-Germany after the fall of the Wall and the cultural dimension and effects on the arts and its production of political changes. Volke’s most recent studies deal with transformation processes in East Germany since unification. She addresses the impact of arts and culture in this process in a study commissioned by the Kulturstiftung des Bundes (Federal Foundation for the Arts). Since 2004 she has been working for the Enquete-Kommission, “Kultur in Deutschland” of the German Parliament.

Andreas Wilke

has a Bachelor degree in the study of town and regional planning from the Technical University of Berlin. He worked several years for the administration of Berlin-Kreuzberg, at that time one of the most complex renovation-areas in former West-Berlin. Since 1990 he has worked as a coordinator for the urban renewing process of a renovation-area in Berlin-Mitte, former East-Berlin. In this work Wilke is dealing extensively with issues aimed to overcome the former division, especially in the field of land-ownership.